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ABSTRACT
STUDENT ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES MISSOURI EX. REL. GAINES V.
CANADA, REGISTRAR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, 1938,
AND GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER, 2003
by
Ansley Knox Daniel

The purpose of this study is to identify primary themes related to student access to
higher education and establishing diversity in higher education classrooms through a
comparative analysis of the 1938 Gaines v. Canada case and the 2003 Grutter v.
Bollinger case. Both of these Supreme Court opinions have significantly impacted
student access to higher education. The landmark ruling in Gaines inaugurated a new
and ground-breaking series of legal victories that opened minority student access to
higher education and eventually to secondary education. In Grutter, the Supreme Court
upheld the use of race as one of many factors that can be used to consider in the student
admissions process in higher education to encourage diversity in student populations and
in leadership opportunities. Using a methodology of historiography of education law, the
intention of this study is to expand the historical and legal implications of the Gaines and
Grutter cases, focusing on the application of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the relationship between the outcomes of the cases and the
judicial interpretation employed by the justices. In Grutter, while considering narrowtailoring and strict scrutiny to check for the legal development and implementation of
affirmative action policies, the justices prioritize providing equal access to higher
education for all students and ensuring meaningful diversity in university classrooms for
an extended, but still limited, time period. It is valuable for historians of the law and
members of the legal profession to consider the notion of active liberty articulated by
Justice Stephen Breyer (2005) when developing their interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause and how it should be applied.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) has played a crucial role in the
suppression and the granting of civil rights in United States history. In general terms, the
history of higher education in the United States has been fraught with issues of student
access since the establishment of Harvard College in 1636, particularly through the
exclusion of women and black citizens. For nearly four hundred years, disenfranchised
citizens have fought for their legal right to attend institutions of higher education with
equal opportunities and resources. Since that time, scholars have explored the myriad
issues related to the legal struggle for equal student access and the implications of
ensuring diversity in the student population.
In 1788, the First Congress of United States of America ratified the Constitution
and enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789 to establish the Supreme Court, which consisted of
a chief justice and five associate justices and acted primarily as an appellate court
(Rehnquist, 2001). The Supreme Court has had an extraordinary impact upon the daily
lives of all United States citizens throughout its 220 year history.
Two of the most important Supreme Court case opinions that have made a
significant impact on student access to higher education are the Gaines v. Canada, [305
U.S. 337 (1938)], case and the Grutter v. Bollinger, [539 U.S. 306 (2003)], case. The
landmark ruling in Gaines inaugurated a ground-breaking series of legal victories that
opened minority student access to higher education and eventually to secondary
education. In Grutter, the Supreme Court upheld the use of race as one of many factors
that can be considered in the student admissions process in higher education to stimulate
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minority access to selective institutions and diversity in student populations, and to
augment leadership opportunities for minority students.
Using historiography of education law as my methodology, I use both primary
and secondary sources to include multiple interpretations of the events surrounding both
cases to develop a comprehensive analysis. I provide an in-depth discussion of the social
and political context involving both cases. Through a comparative analysis of Gaines
and Grutter, I identify primary legal themes and reveal the implications of litigation for
student access and diversity in higher education. I focus specifically on the application of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, identifying the historical development of the Amendment and its use in
Supreme Court litigation, opinions, and dissents in Gaines and Grutter. Further, I
investigate the notions of active judicial interpretation in relation to judicial activism and
judicial restraint in accordance with the outcomes of Gaines and Grutter. I conclude the
analysis with a discussion on how the two cases shaped the timeline for equal access to
higher education, and briefly address recent Supreme Court actions involving student
access and diversity.
Purpose and Significance Statement
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify primary legal themes related to
student access to higher education and establishing diversity in higher education
classrooms through a comparative analysis of the Gaines case and the Grutter case. I
will show how the Gaines and the Grutter decisions have made an extraordinary impact
on the issue of equal access to higher education and the importance of having a diverse
population of students in higher education classrooms. In addition, I explore the impact
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of the legal application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
through the lens of the Gaines and Grutter cases, and reveal how this significant legal
tool has made meaningful student diversity and equal access in higher education not only
possible, but an academic institution priority. Finally, I identify and discuss elements of
active judicial interpretation and judicial restraint that involve the opinions and dissents
generated in Gaines and in Grutter that were generated on the part of the justices of the
Supreme Court in order to ignite the transformational shift that needed to occur to protect
the rights of all students seeking to attend higher education in the United States in Gaines,
and the implications for holding student diversity in classrooms a national priority in
Grutter.
The significance of this study is that it adds to the larger body of work regarding
the importance of equal access to higher education programs and diversity in student
populations. By comparing Gaines with Grutter, my study reveals historical and legal
themes, conflicts, and implications for the progress of equal access in higher education
since the 1930s. For example, Stohr (2004, p. 253) explains that social science research
studies advancing the necessity for diversity in student populations were used in the
Grutter case and are still relevant for further research today, “While some briefs were
important because of who filed them, others made notable substantive contributions to
Michigan’s argument. The American Educational Research Association took the lead in
making a detailed argument about the social science research into the educational benefits
of diversity.”
In addition, my study provides a contribution to the body of legal study regarding
equal access and diversity in higher education because it is based on primary document
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analyses of the judicial proceedings, opinions, and dissents. I explore the relationships
among the key figures in the cases and investigate the influences affecting judicial
decision making. For example, in the Gaines case, I identify key legal arguments
provided by the NAACP LDF (National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People Legal Defense Fund), university officials, and the judicial opinions leading to the
final outcome in the Supreme Court opinion on December 12, 1938. With a focus on the
application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, I investigate
how the legal precedents established prior to Gaines were implemented and overruled, in
addition to the legal contributions that the Gaines ruling had on subsequent cases
involving civil rights and equal access held before Supreme Court.
Further, Bowen and Bok (1998) conducted one of the most rigorous studies of the
educational implications of the Grutter case in The Shape of the River. They clearly state
the intentions of their study, which is to consider the impact of the judicial opinions on
students and educational policy.
Finally, our study addresses issues of educational policy. Our objective is
not to analyze the development of constitutional law, the proper
interpretation of civil rights legislation, or the present holdings of the
courts in these areas. We are concerned with the admissions policies that
colleges and universities have followed and with their consequences for
the country. (Bowen and Bok, p. xxvii)
By contrast, my study focuses on the legal implications for these events. The Bowen and
Bok study provides a complement to the objectives of my research as well as valuable
insights that I was able to use to guide my research.
In addition, through my research of the characteristics and historical importance
of the notions of active judicial interpretation, judicial activism, and judicial restraint, I
am able to provide analysis on how policy-making power emerged from the outcomes of
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Gaines and Grutter. I provide a historical review of the notions of active judicial
interpretation, judicial activism, and judicial restraint based primarily on Justice Breyer’s
articulation of active liberty (2005) and Burns’ (2009) research of presidential
appointments of Supreme Court justices and the political and legal ramifications that
emerged. I identify specific relationships from the legal opinions and dissents from key
justices generated from both cases to the notions of active judicial interpretation and
judicial restraint, which are the two ideologies of judicial interpretation that are
appropriate for the analysis of these two cases.
Finally, my analysis will contribute to greater body of literature concerning
programs and policies allowing for race to be a soft factor in student access to higher
education. The debate over affirmative action policies will continue for at least a few
more years. As Stohr contends, “For many of the central participants, the Gratz and
Grutter cases marked not the end of the fight over college racial preferences, but the
beginning of a new stage” (2004, p. 314). In addition, Katznelson (2005) explains that
affirmative action policies and diversity goals are still critical for current analysis:
The controversy over affirmative action, Randall Kennedy rightly noted in
1986, “constitutes the most salient current battlefront in the ongoing
struggle over the status of the Negro in American life.” The question still
bites. As American troops were being dispatched to Iraq early in 2003,
Robert Bartley observed in his Wall Street Journal column that ‘Second
only to the pending war, “affirmative action’ is the issue of the day.”
Unresolved and unsatisfactory, debate seems almost endless between
advocates of reparations and defenders of non-discrimination and equal
treatment who often seem blind to the organizing power of race in
American life. (p. xiii)
While the Supreme Court still holds that affirmative action policies are constitutional by
a very slim margin, the two most recent Supreme Court appointees are liberal in their
political ideologies. If political ideologies sway the Court margin, then affirmative action
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policies should remain intact should the challenge be presented before the Court again.
However, a historical review of equal access cases shows that the unexpected often
occurs. The contentious debate over the protection of diversity and equal access against
the belief that such policies cause reverse discrimination requires a critical historical
analysis to reveal the economic and political practices of oppression and hidden agendas
that maintained the dominant white social structure of the United States until decades of
civil rights legislation in the twentieth century provided the impetus to open economic
and political access for citizens of color. Katznelson (2005, p. 167) poses the question:
Can novel ways be found to talk about and advance the type of affirmative
action that never was achieved? These goals require coming to terms with
the implications of the critical moment when affirmative action was white.
Tracing its baneful influence is more than an exercise in revisionist history.
My study will thus provide further research and conclusions that expand the historical
and legal implications of the Gaines and Grutter cases and their impact on equal student
access to higher education and leadership opportunities for minorities.
Methodology, Method/Design, and Research Questions
My theoretical framework is a historiography of education law focusing on equal
access to higher education and ensuring diversity in student populations. I applied
Novick’s (1988) discussion of historical research methods to guide my research.
Novick’s theory of historical research emphasizes the notions of identifying the origin,
development, hidden and overt agendas, and intended and unintended consequences of
the litigation and its results. Novick further emphasizes the importance of explicating the
political, economic, social, and cultural factors that shaped the events leading to litigation
in addition to the basic facts of the case. Additionally, Novick asserts that historians
must also search for inaccuracies and misinterpretations in other historical studies to
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reveal the personal bias that often misshapes the record and the beliefs resulting from a
legal study.
Using historical research methods, my objectives are to identify and organize the
primary themes in the oral argument, opinions, and dissents in the Gaines and Grutter
cases. To frame the analysis, the research questions that I address are:
1.

How did the social and political climates in the United States in 1938 and
2003 shape the decision-making of the Supreme Court Justices during the
Gaines and Grutter cases?

2.

How was the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution applied and shaped in each case?

3.

Have the Gaines and Grutter cases contributed to active judicial
interpretation and/or judicial restraint on the part of the United States
Supreme Court? Explicate the relationships.

Specifically, the methods that I use include theme development through
categorization to identify and organize key excerpts from each document. I was able to
organize excerpts from case documents and related legal analysis into categories
identified by theme. The themes that I explicate in chapter six, emphasizing the historical
and legal implications of the Fourteenth Amendment, are Equal Protection, Equal Access,
Economic and Political Repression, Diverse Democratic Leadership (Hutcheson, 2010),
Creating Diversity in Universities and in other Contexts, Transcending Race/ Breakingdown Stereotypes, and Reverse Discrimination. In chapter seven, I focus on the
relationships between active judicial interpretation and judicial restraint and the outcomes
of the Gaines and Grutter cases revealing the themes of Equal Access, Political and
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Economic Repression, Compelling Interest, Critical Mass, Narrow Tailoring, Strict
Scrutiny, and Fixed Time Period. Through the document analyses, I show the
development of each theme and provide a compare and contrast analysis of the Gaines
and Grutter cases specifically focusing on the involvement of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the notions of active judicial interpretation and judicial restraint.
In addition, I include research from journal articles that further elucidate the
social and political context of the late 1930s and late 1990s-early 2000s for the Gaines
and Grutter cases, respectively. I also report on the legal and political ideologies of the
key justices involved in each case, and the language of the justices articulated in the oral
arguments, opinions, and dissents to identify salient themes and to provide analysis of the
relationships among the factors that emerge.
To guide my research objectives, methods, and analysis, I rely on the historical
research ideas presented by Novick (1988). Using Irons (1999) as a foundation, I provide
a historical review of the Fourteenth Amendment, and show how the Amendment was
applied and shaped as a result of the Gaines and Grutter outcomes. I rely primarily on
Burns (2009) and Breyer (2005) to provide a distinction among the ideologies of active
judicial interpretation, judicial activism, and judicial restraint, and to develop a
compare/contrast analysis of active judicial interpretation and judicial restraint through a
historical analysis of the Gaines and Grutter cases.
My concluding chapter provides final thoughts on the overarching themes that
emerged throughout my research. I was able to show how the social and political context
of Grutter and Gaines made a significant impact on the outcomes of the cases, and
subsequently, on equal access and diversity in higher education classrooms. I review the
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connections between the two cases in their interpretations and applications of the
Fourteenth Amendment. I conclude with reviewing the impact of both cases in the study
of active judicial interpretation and judicial restraint. My intention is that these
reflections will highlight the salient contributions of my study to the greater connection
of historical research and legal analysis of two significant court cases in the area of equal
access and diversity in higher education.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPLICATION OF HISTORIOGRAPHICAL FRAMEWORK AND
HISTORICAL RESEARCH METHODS
Historiographical Framework
The theoretical framework for my research is a historiography of education law
focusing on equal access to higher education and ensuring diversity in student
populations. Historiography is defined by Woolf (2006, p. 71), as both a “self-referential
history and a set of theories about what goes on in the recovery, representation, and
construction of the past,” requiring the researcher to make meaningful comparisons and
contrasts between individual texts and historical traditions. Historiography involves
comparing multiple sources of narrative, identifying moral issues, guilt and praise
assignment, and conducting revisionism versus orthodox interpretations (Fouray and
Salevouris, 1988).
I use historical research methods to conduct my research within the framework of
a historiography of education law. My primary goal is to provide research to show the
connection between the legal ideologies and practices and the impact of Gaines and
Grutter on equal access and diversity in higher education through a compare/contrast
analysis. To provide the foundation for my study, I use the primary characteristics of
historiography to guide the development of my research questions, conduct research on
the social and political context of Gaines and Grutter, develop a compare and contrast
analysis, and research the notions of active judicial interpretation and judicial restraint in
connection with the two cases. The following discussion highlights several of the
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important characteristics of historiography in connection with historical research methods
that apply to the objectives and procedures in my research.
Novick (1988) provides a comprehensive explication of the complexities of
interpretation and the quest for objectivity in historical research. First, objectivity and
truth were the ultimate goals of pure historical research, although it is not possible to
reach those goals. It is practicable for several historians to put together a picture of what
they believe occurred, but historical research is complicated by myriad factors that make
it impossible to complete the picture fully despite the best of intentions (Novick). Thus,
the quest for truth, rather than objectivity, becomes the primary motivation and objective
for historical researchers.
Historical research is subject to the interpretation, bias, and experiences of the
researcher (Novick, 1988; Wiersma, 1995). In addition, the personal, political, social,
and economic agendas of the researcher often distort the collection and interpretation of
historical data. There are also research studies that have been conducted with nefarious
intentions to portray a historical event in a fashion that supports a self-serving agenda,
such as the justification of the oppression of women, black Americans, and Native
Americans. Whether with sincere or spurious intentions, historians have reported on
events of the past that have shaped United States citizens’ and political leaders’
perceptions of and involvement in world events and in their efforts to either demoralize
or to value human and civil rights. These are the greatest obstacles to achieving truth in
the production of historical research.
Similarly, Wiersma (1995) argues that interpretation is central to the historical
research process. According to Novick (1988), scholars should recognize how historical
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literature is interpreted with a personal lens that reflects the political and social ideology
of their own identified communities. Leff (1995, p. 833) points out, for example, that
most traditional accounts of United States history were primarily a “sacred story with
strong nationalist overtones.” Historians failed to provide agency to marginalized groups,
reporting on events primarily from a white, male perspective. Scholars are now required
to move past the history of “great men” and “great speeches,” and research historical
events using multiple perspectives with critical analysis and significant evidentiary
support. In these cases, revision is necessary to provide the full analysis and meaning of
the legal event. Revision involves new approaches to older historical research that
reconsiders the myriad factors that involve an event. Likewise, evidence should be
evaluated from multiple points of view (Busha and Harter, 1980).
Legal scholars will benefit from an understanding of Novick’s (1988) trace of the
development of historical objectivity. The salient point is that the norms of historical
objectivity at times of ideological consensus and conflict throughout United States
history have “served to integrate and stabilize professional historical activity” (Novick, p.
4). It is through the “professionalization” of United States historians that universalistic
norms have strengthened over time, which has complemented the varied perspectives that
emerge in a country with a diverse population. Novick explains that in the 1980s, the
objectivity crisis became disillusionment with the search for truth or meaning at all.
Historians began writing “competing stories that impress the same historical experience
with radically divergent meanings,” critiquing colleagues, and supporting their own
agendas (Gordon, as cited by Novick, p. 556). From Novick’s discussion, legal scholars
can learn to exercise reflexivity, provide affirmative as well as counter interpretations,
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and expose discovery queries. Scholars should prioritize candor, wise judgment, and
responsibility in objectively explicating legal events
Novick’s (1988) work can be used by legal scholars to regard the essentiality of
objectivity and impartiality in historical scholarship. Novick explains that in traditional
United States historical accounts, when writing about subjects such as the American
Revolution, the Civil War, and Reconstruction, professional historians wrote with the
ideological perspective of “unity, stability, and continuity” (p. 72).

Novick argues that

these historical accounts were documented by historians based on the “’objective truth’”
of scientific racism, using the Anglo-Saxon justification for imperialism as the foundation
(p. 61). For example, Novick explains how historical interpretations of Reconstruction
did more damage on the social and political culture than did Reconstruction itself.
Keeping these priorities in mind, Novick argues that historians approached problem-areas
such as industrialization v. agrarianism and immigration with a nationalistic and racist
agenda.
Another example of how a legal event can be interpreted based upon the
ideological perspectives of the researcher is how Brown v. Board of Education, [347 U.S.
483 (1954)] has been presented in high school social studies classrooms. Brown is
typically heralded as the transformational United State Supreme Court case that
integrated the public schools. While this historical fact is true, its simplicity hides thirty
years of white resistance efforts and intense litigation that inhibited the manifestation of
integration established by Brown. Hess (2005, p. 2046) contends that while Brown is
viewed as an iconic, landmark case for civil rights and social justice in most social
studies classrooms and textbooks, scholars argue whether Brown’s legacy should be
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labeled as “an icon, liberation referent, unfulfilled promise, well-intentioned error, or
irrelevant.” Hess explores the incongruity between the “academic” and the secondary
“school” knowledge regarding Brown, and argues that a revised explication of Brown be
presented in the secondary school curriculum. Hess poses the question, Do teachers
“present multiple and competing perspectives about the case and its effects, or did they
teach it as a historical conflict that was correctly decided?” (p. 2055). Conducting a
study of sixty teachers from across the United States in 2002, Hess found that most
textbooks and teachers discuss the Brown decision as an icon, showing support of the
traditional, conservative approach to controversial issues taken by most social studies
teachers and authors of United States political and historical textbooks.
Thus, the counterstory is equally important to communicate to students as is the
success of the litigation in Brown in being the first step toward the integration of public
schools (Merritt, 2005; Siddle-Walker, 2004; Smith, 2005). Solorzano and Yosso (2001)
describe counter-storytelling as a strategy used to elucidate stories that were unidentified
or ignored in previous studies. They cite Delgado (1989) defining the method as “telling
the story of those experiences that are not often told (i.e. those on the margins of society)
and a tool for analyzing and challenging the stories of those in power and whose story is
a natural part of the dominant discourse – the majoritarian story” (Solorzano and Yosso ,
2001, p. 475). In historical legal studies, counter-storytelling is a strategy that reveals
hidden factors regarding the historical context. Challenging the legacy of Brown even
further, Bell (1995) takes an extreme position, arguing that Brown was a sham and an
unfulfilled promise, and questions the value of integration at all. This counter argument
to the traditional beliefs taught in public schools about Brown include the fact that busing
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black children to primarily white schools with few to no black teachers or administrators
negatively impacted the achievement levels of these students (Chapman, 2008).
Although black parents gained greater access to resources via the white schools, “they
lost the valuable cultural connections between the schools, communities, families, and
students” (Chapman, p. 44). Bell’s argument illustrates Lincoln and Guba’s (2000)
argument that historical realism involves social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and
gender values.
Cottrol, Diamond, and Ware (2003) further explain that as an institution, prior to
Brown, the United States Supreme Court had avoided interfering with the actions of state
governments. This is one of the reasons why historical scholarship regarding Brown’s
implications are multi-faceted and enduring. Scholars are able to identify elements of
racism in past events and apply these themes in current research and scholarship
regarding the white male domination of black citizens, Native Americans, and women,
and the lingering effects from which these groups are still trying to recover. In the midtwentieth century, many historians developed an anti-racist consciousness which led to
revisionist scholarship of slavery and Reconstruction. For example, John Hope Franklin
was a self-declared “‘historian of the South’ who happened to be Negro” (Novick, 1988,
p. 472). Franklin was regarded as accommodating by the white liberals in the 1950s, but
was considered an “antimodel” for the generation of black historians in the 1960s and
1970s. These black historians were spurred to reorient black history as a result of the
damaging and patronizing Moynihan Report that charged that the difficulties facing the
black race were a result of its own pathology developed from past oppression while
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ignoring the continued climate of racial discrimination (Novick). This new ideology of
black history converged into advancing the positive view of the black person and family.
Furthermore, legal scholars can use historical research to reconstruct the past
through a process of critical inquiry. For example, Foster (2005) argues that the path to
an increasingly cohesive society is not to abandon race-related discourse, but is to
develop research and discourse that raises race-related awareness to push for the fullest
extent of social justice. Legal scholars can use historical research to communicate to
their colleagues and the legal community data and analyses that will contribute to more
positive, effective policies, practices, behaviors, and attitudes that provide greater cultural
awareness of issues in educational equality and social justice.
Historical analysis is also helpful for both unexamined areas and in reexamining
events that need further revision. Wilkinson (1979), for example, argues that lynching
protection was the greatest omission by the Supreme Court calling it a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as well as rule and spirit of the law. This failure to provide legal
protection for the well-being of black people caused extraordinary harm and fear.
Wilkinson draws attention to this area of study in civil rights litigation that is critical to
legal scholarship, revealing the need to study omissions or errors of judicial acts as well
as the successes.
Another important example of how historical research methods can be used to
connect constitutional law to historical legal events is how legal scholars can trace the
origination and the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to litigation and identify the
implications it has had on individuals, racial groups, and society as a whole.
Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court has made one of the
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most profound impacts on United States citizens since its origination in 1866. Historians
have differed in their assessments of how the Fourteenth Amendment has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court. Schwartz (1993, p. 287) describes Justice Hugo
Black’s belief that “‘the basic purpose’ of the Fourteenth Amendment was “‘to protect
(against) discrimination”’ and to abolish ‘”such castes,’” referring to racial stratification.
By contrast, Levin (2005) takes the debate over strict construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment in a different, conservative direction, charging that the Supreme Court’s
interpretation has protected some citizens, but not all. Citing the Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, [438 U.S. 265 (1978)], case as his example, Levin
contends that historically, the United States Supreme Court has “taken the clear language
of the Fourteenth Amendment and twisted it into a pretzel” (p. 91), protecting minority
groups, but not Alan Bakke, the white male student denied admission to the medical
school at the University of California at Davis. Levin challenged that “there’s nothing in
the Fourteenth Amendment about different scrutiny tests, diversity, and all the other
judicial creations designed to get around the clear prohibition against racial
discrimination. Diversity had never been a constitutional basis for governmentsanctioned racial discrimination” (p. 95). Contrary to Levin’s arguments, Supreme Court
justices have actually been more conservative in their interpretations of law when
compared to other countries on many important issues such as the death penalty, limited
federal government, and lower taxes (Toobin, 2007). Levin ignores the “spirit” of the
law that the justices have considered as they have given license to the Fourteenth
Amendment to guarantee equality of access and opportunities to all citizens, especially to
those whose rights have been historically repressed. O’Connor states her belief,
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“Ensuring that there is, indeed, ‘equal justice under law’ – not just for the wealthy but
also for the poor, the disadvantaged, and the disenfranchised- is the sustenance that
brings meaning and joy to a lawyer’s professional life” (2003, p. 230).
Using the ideas discussed above as the foundation for the objectives of my
research, it is my intention to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Gaines and
Grutter cases, highlighting the legal ideologies and practices and the impact of the cases
on student access and diversity in higher education within the framework of a
historiography. I use the ideas of Novick (1988) as the primary basis for considering the
approach to my research. The salient characteristics that I consider are providing
multiple perspectives from multiple sources to research the social and political context of
Gaines and Grutter. Caldas and Bankston (2007) conclude that the social and political
climate of the United States at the time of each landmark case affects the outcome of the
Justices’ decision. I explore this concept as I explicate Gaines and Grutter.
I also was able to conduct document analyses by identifying themes and
organizing them into categories. These categories reveal patterns of the social and
political context as well as the legal ideologies that were applied to litigation to support
or discount equal access and diversity in higher education.
Second, my research questions focus on areas that elucidate the relationship
between the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the outcomes of
the Gaines and Grutter cases. In addition, throughout my analysis, I identify areas of
congruency and areas of conflict among the various primary and secondary sources
involving Gaines and Grutter. Legal precedence is one of the most important
considerations that justices apply to their decision making. One of my primary objectives
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was to identify the legal precedence established in prior cases that were applied in the
Gaines and the Grutter opinions and dissents, and to show the patterns of precedence that
emerged from the interpretation and application of the Equal Protection Clause.
Third, as I assess the historical implications of active judicial interpretation and
judicial restraint in the Supreme Court, I reveal patterns of political ideologies articulated
by the justices through their written and oral communication, in addition to their
reflections of the social and political climate at the time. I connect the political
ideologies of the presidents who appointed the justices to the key justices who impacted
the outcomes of Gaines and Grutter. Judicial interpretation can be politically
conservative in nature, such as through the leadership of Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
or politically liberal such as in the dogma of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. I identify
elements of judicial interpretation on both ends of the political spectrum, matching legal
practice with political ideology applied in the two court cases.
Finally, I identify and evaluate my political opinions and personal bias that may
affect my research conclusions. I am an educator who has strong beliefs in equal access
and opportunities for all students. Further, I feel so strongly about the injustices done to
black citizens, women, Native Americans, among other groups of citizens who
experienced repression and injustice, that I maintain that continued opportunities for a
high quality education through equal access and assurance of diversity in student
populations and leadership positions are still needed. Like Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
who values the protections of opportunity and diversity through the liberty granted by the
Equal Protection Clause, I have political beliefs that are grounded in the progress of
social justice.
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Historical Research Methods
Just months before being named Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
Judge Warren E. Burger expressed the value of legal scholarship in analyzing and
critiquing the exercise of judicial power:
A court which if final and unreviewable needs more careful scrutiny than
any other. Unreviewable power is the most likely to self-indulge itself and
the least likely to engage in dispassionate self-analysis … in a country like
ours, no public institution, or the people who operate it, can be above
public debate. (as cited in Woodward and Armstrong, 1979, p. 5)
I use the following ideas articulated by Novick (1988) to provide the basis for
selecting my research questions, conducting my research, and organizing my analysis.
First, historical research methods are critical to legal studies because they allow the
researcher to explicate the political, economic, social, and cultural factors that shaped the
events leading to litigation in addition to the basic facts of the case (Novick). Throughout
my study, I was able to examine books, newspaper articles, and journal articles to provide
details that elucidate the political, economic, social, and cultural factors that shaped the
outcomes of the Gaines and Grutter cases. Second, historians are charged with the
responsibility of identifying the origin, development, hidden and overt agendas, and
intended and unintended consequences of the litigation and its results (Novick).
Throughout my research, I provide insight and analysis of the conflicts, political agendas,
and complicating factors that emerged from both cases.
Using historical research methods, my objectives are to identify and organize the
primary themes in the oral argument, opinions, and dissents in the Gaines and Grutter
cases. I use theme development through categorization to identify and organize key
excerpts from each document. I show the development of each category and conduct a
compare/contrast analysis of the primary themes that emerged from the document
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analyses. In addition, I include newspaper articles and journal articles that further
elucidate the social and political context of the late 1930s and the late 1990s-early 2000s
for the Gaines and Grutter cases, respectively. Thus, the primary strength of historical
research methods used in the legal setting is that they expose the positive attributes of
judicial power as well as the negative, revealing implications and consequences for
individual citizens, groups of people, as well as society at large.
In addition, Novick (1988) contends that historians must also search for
inaccuracies and misinterpretations in other historical studies to reveal the personal bias
that often misshapes the record and the beliefs resulting from a legal study. I discuss
multiple accounts of the social and political context and legal components and outcomes
from both cases in order to provide as full and accurate of an interpretation of the events
as possible. Furthermore, like all historical research, legal historical studies are
complicated by the search for truth and the realization that such a goal may never be fully
reached (Novick). Historians must exercise reflexivity in identifying their own bias,
agendas, and basis for interpretation when explicating historical legal events. I provide
reflection throughout my research to identify bias that may occur.
Characterized as “a sprawling collection of assumptions, attitudes, aspirations,
and antipathies,” historical objectivity is essentially the quest to identify and elucidate the
objective truth about the past (Novick, 1988, p. 1). To move beyond “great men” and
“great speeches” history, historical researchers should analyze public-policy issues to
identify their origination, reveal the political agenda behind the policy including those
who benefited and those who suffered, and assess the impact experienced by
communities. Throughout my research of Gaines and Grutter, I use multiple sources to
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provide a comprehensive review of the historical facts and context of the cases, and I
identify the key players involved, assessing those who benefited from the outcomes of the
cases, and those who were negatively affected. I also research the impact of the cases on
the local communities involved as well as the greater impact of the case on the students
and universities in the United States.
Novick (1988) contends that he views his perspective on historical objectivity
uniquely within each historical context. Scholars must identify the political, social,
cultural, and economic contexts and apply this evidence to the historical interpretation of
events unique to each situation. I focus on this goal as I assess my research on the social
and political climates in both the Gaines and the Grutter cases. The social and political
climates during the 1930s and the late 1990s/early 2000s made a significant impact on the
decision making of the justices. I use multiple sources to develop the historical facts of
the cases in addition to the characteristics of the social and political climates through
categorization. Further, Novick explains that changes in the climate of public opinion
can cause shifts in interpretations, and the unique backgrounds and philosophies of
historians can cause divergent representations of historical events and ideologies. Novick
supports this claim by asserting the importance of historical relativists Charles Beard’s
and Carl Becker’s works, which showed how “social circumstances shaped historical
scholarship in the past” (p. 410). My research corroborates other scholars by showing
how the social and political context in the Gaines case and in the Grutter case became
one of the most important factors in the decisions (Stohr, 2006; Kluger, 2004; Tushnet,
1987; Linder, 2000). Argument in the opinion and the dissents of both cases reveal that
the social and political context involving both cases affected the judicial decision making.
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Wiersma (1995) rightly contends that one of the primary foci of historical
research is to explore the full context of the legal event. However, as Novick (1988)
explains, historical research goes much further than this to reveal the complexities
surrounding the origin and development of the litigation, as well as the resulting longterm intended and unintended implications. The context of the legal event will also
include a full exploration of the political, economic, social, and cultural external and
internal factors that shaped the event, many of which are competing forces. For example,
in the Gaines case, University of Missouri officials rebuffed the idea of integrating
graduate programs and chose instead to place the blame for the lack of graduate
education programs for black students on the inadequacies of the black university at
Lincoln. White resistance to integrating graduate programs such as the University of
Missouri Law School revealed the perceived economic threat of providing equal access to
quality graduate programs for black students, potentially challenging the white economic
stronghold. On the other hand, many white students recognized the prejudice of the
University of Missouri administration and the resulting injustice against black students,
and called for the integration of the Law School. Thus, competing political forces
emerged, stimulating a social climate of racial superiority versus social justice. Many
white students and citizens began to join the greater black social movement toward
equality of opportunity by supporting the right for equal access to education, which
enhanced the cultural climate needed for greater legal victories in the courts for the
NAACP LDF counselors.
Most historical research is presented through narrative analysis primarily because
of its power to elicit voice (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). Leff (1995) recommends that
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historical researchers should engage in free critical inquiry that emphasizes empathy and
tolerance of different points of view. This is a powerful tool for researching legal events.
The researcher should view common patterns of experience and engage in collective
decision-making. Tushnet (1987), for example, published a historical query entitled The
NAACP’s Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925-1950. Tushnet’s research
corroborates Richard Kluger’s study, Simple Justice, (2004). Both studies give voice to
marginalized people and provide depth and comprehensive storytelling to reveal the
origination and development of legal strategies that eventually led to what has been
called the most important Supreme Court case in United States history, Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, [347 U.S. 483 (1954)]. Both Tushnet and Kluger’s research
highlights the voice of the marginalized students and determined NAACP lawyers in
Gaines. These data provide vital description for the social climate, civil rights objectives,
and the value of the litigation process for the advancement of social justice in the 1930s.
Both Gaines and Grutter had a tremendous impact on individuals, groups of
people, and society. I identify elements of judicial power in my research, and I explore
the impact of judicial power from these cases on individuals, groups of citizens, and in
the United States in my analysis.
Historical research methods can also be used to reveal hidden attitudes and
practices, whether intended or unintended, that further elucidate the context of a legal
event. For example, gradualism and tokenism were used by local school boards to
minimize the implementation of public school integration required by Brown, until the
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, [391 U.S. 430 (1968)], case in which
Judge Wisdom stated that “school boards had a positive duty to integrate, not merely to
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stop segregating” (Wilkinson, 1979, p. 112). By identifying the overt and seemingly
hidden attitudes and practices that perpetuated school segregation by white officials,
Wilkinson was able to contrast the effect of the Brown ruling with the ruling in Green.
The result of Green finally led to support for effective integration from the executive and
the legislative branches in the form of guidelines, enforced by fund cut-offs, established
by The Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
Another significant change came in the transferring of the supervisory power of
integration from local school boards to the federal courts. For my analyses of Gaines
and Grutter, I identify hidden and overt attitudes and practices of the key players that
were intended to repress the education of marginalized citizens as well as those that were
intended to provide social justice and equal access to higher education.
Historical research methods are important tools for legal scholars to elucidate
power relationships to reveal how the legal event was shaped as a result of political
interactions and social beliefs (Urrieta, 2006). Much scholarship in historical legal
research has contributed to the overt and hidden practices that white people held over
black people until effective legal strategies were employed by the NAACP to liberate
oppressive practices and policies through the court system. For example, white power
suppressing the rights of black people is overtly displayed in Dred Scott v. Sandford, [60
U.S. 393 (1857)], in which the Negro was legally labeled an “inferior” being with “no
rights which the white man was bound to respect” (Kluger, 2004, p. 47). Similarly, in
Plessy v. Ferguson, [163 U.S. 537 (1896)], which resulted in the infamous “separate but
equal” judicial standard that confirmed the legal segregation of Louisiana rail cars and
legalized other Jim Crow practices, white oppressive measures against blacks continued
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despite the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment that had been passed into law by
Congress in 1868 to establish and protect the rights of freed slaves. White-dominated
governments overturned progress made for civil rights that had been established during
Reconstruction. In Plessy, Justice Henry Brown would contend that the “colored race”
chose to view segregation as a “badge of inferiority” denying white responsibility for acts
of repression (as cited by Kluger, p. 99). Likewise, I identify power relationships in
Gaines and in Grutter. The Gaines case provides a poignant illustration of the impact
that power relationships, social beliefs, and political interactions had on the greater cause
of equal access and civil rights that occurred during the 1930s-1970s primarily through
the University of Missouri administrators in contrast with the NAACP LDF counselors.
The Grutter case also reveals patterns in social and political beliefs and the impact of
those beliefs on power relationships in higher education, the judicial branch, and in the
White House.
Moreover, the role of the historian is to repel any notion of advocacy or
circulation of propaganda (Novick, 1988). In legal historical research, whether with
sincere or spurious intentions, scholars have reported on events of the past that work to
either demoralize or to equalize human and civil rights. For example, Leff (1995) shows
that even consensus history can be deceiving. United States historical research has been
dominated by an Americanized, capitalist, nationalist ideology. Leff describes how in the
1940s and 1950s, consensus historians joined social scientists to perpetuate the
Americanized agenda by minimizing class conflict and ignoring the voice of blacks,
women, workers, and immigrants. Many scholars and historians today have identified
this misrepresentation of civil rights litigation and equal justice in historical research.
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One of the primary intentions of my research is to contribute to the knowledge base for
expanding the historical and legal implications for equal access for students and the
importance of diversity in higher education. In addition, my study will contribute to
more positive, effective policies, practices, behaviors, and attitudes that provide greater
cultural awareness of issues in educational equality and social justice.
In addition to providing an understanding of the past, Wiersma (1995) explains
that historical research is essential to articulate information for decision making and
policy formation. Wiersma explains that historical research involves much more
interpretation and a projection of results onto current issues, such as the continued legal
struggle for equality of opportunity through affirmative action cases such as Grutter, and
school zoning cases based on racial balancing such as Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, [551 U.S. 701 (2007)]. To research these cases
and their implications effectively, legal scholars should apply Novick’s practices in their
pursuit of historical truth. Analyses generated from historical research can be an
invaluable source of information that legal scholars and practitioners can apply to their
decision making. Historical research can help predict future trends in making legal
decisions and indicate possible implications for creating new programs or policies. In
sum, historical research methods provide “‘perspective and prevention’” (Graham, 1980,
as cited by Wiersma, p. 233). Perhaps what is most important about my research is that
it reviews historical context and events of the past while concurrently citing legal trends
that emerged that hold precedence over future litigation regarding student access in
higher education. I explore these legal trends in the conclusion of the comparative
analysis of Gaines and Grutter.
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Furthermore, Cottrol, Diamond, and Ware (2003) show how historical legal
research can connect constitutional questions that currently remain contentious in
courtrooms with significant legal events of the past. Gaines and Grutter are important
examples of how historical research methods can be used to connect constitutional law to
historical legal events by researching the origination and the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to litigation and identifying the implications it has had on individuals, racial
groups, and society as a whole. Grutter is particularly significant because it currently
holds legal precedence in affirmative action policies used in higher education student
admissions.
On another note, Kaestle (1988) explains the importance of defining key terms in
historical research. Clearly defining terms helps properly form the research problem.
Without that clarification, terms such as affirmative action or diversity can be misleading.
Kaestle also cautions scholars to avoid presentism, which means interchanging ideas
from the past with ideas of the present, which may have not existed or meant something
else at the time. The notion of a color-blind society illustrates the point. At one time,
citizens viewing society through a color-blind lens would have been the ideal. In a
dissenting opinion from the Plessy case, Justice John Harlan labeled the Plessy decision
as “pernicious” as the proslavery decision in Dred Scott, and developed the notion of
colorblindness stating that “our Constitution is color-blind” (as cited by Pettigrew, 2004,
p. 521). However, scholars of racial discourse now encourage citizens to value, respect,
and celebrate racial backgrounds and discourage the idea of the color-blind philosophy.
A color-blind society is now defined as ignoring racial categories, which may actually
perpetuate racial injustices and inequalities. Historical researchers can locate examples
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of the color-blind ideology and show how racism is perpetuated, ignoring racial realism,
the belief that race remains an important cultural concern for all people today (Foster,
2005).
For the purposes of clarity in this paper, I define the following terms: diversity,
affirmative action, quota, racial respect, race realism, and institutional racism. First, I
define the term “diversity” as a meaningful community of students representing the
myriad race, class, and gender components of the United States population. I borrow the
definition of “affirmative action” from Hernandez (2001, p. 1) as being a system of
policies “designed to remedy past discrimination and eliminate current and future
discrimination.” I define the term “racial respect” as the mutual recognition and
appreciation for the unique characteristics of each race and ethnicity. I define the term
“quota” as a specific number or measure used to establish a minimum quantity of race,
ethnic, or gender representation in a particular context. Additionally, I use Foster’s
(2005) definition of a color-blind society as one in which justice is defined as ignoring
racial categories, despite the reality that this practice may actually perpetuate racial
injustices and inequalities. I also borrow the term “racial realism” from Foster to mean
the belief that race remains an important cultural concern for all people today. Finally, I
borrow the term “institutional racism” as defined by Bell (1995) as subtle, hidden,
unintended behaviors, policies, practices, and attitudes that continue to be harmful to
students of color and perpetuate white political, social, and economic hegemony.
Historical research methods also allow legal scholars to use document analyses
and interpretations to study legal language used by the justices. For example, one theme
that has emerged as supported by judicial language analyses is the justices’ use of non-
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inflamatory language in the civil rights cases from the 1930s-1960s supporting the
NAACP’s arguments, but written using benign language. Daniel (2005) explains that the
Supreme Court’s use of language was carefully constructed to provide the appearance of
justice without upsetting large groups whose resistance could frustrate efforts for relief
and undermine judicial authority. According to Wilkinson (1979), for example, using
temperance in order to minimize the reaction of the South, the Warren Court presented a
short, bland, moral opinion ruling against segregation in public schools in Brown I, and a
vague, conciliatory plan for implementation in Brown v. Board of Education II, [349 U.S.
294, 75 S. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083, (1955), U.S]. Notably, Novick quotes Edward Said in
Orientalism, stating that objective truth is “‘embedded first in the language, then in the
culture, institutions and political ambience of the representer’” (1988, p. 545). For my
analyses of Gaines and Grutter, I identify elements of political ideology, legal
precedence, social justice, repression of marginalized citizens, and the value of diversity
as I review the written and spoken language of the justices in the cases.
Further, historical analysis also reveals cause and effect relationships. However,
Kaestle (1988) reminds researchers to distinguish between correlations and cause and
effect relationships. For example, the United States Supreme Court cases in Griffin v.
Prince Edward County School Board, [377 U.S. 218 (1964)], Green County School
Board of New Kent County, VA, [391 U.S. 430 (1968)], and Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, [402 U.S. 1 (1971)], are correlations because their
opinions worked congruently to stop white resistance efforts to integration. Specifically,
in Griffin, the Supreme Court outlawed state closing of schools to avoid desegregation.
In Green, the Court declared freedom of school choice inadequate to meet desegregation
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standards and established the Green factors of a unitary (not dual) system and integration
of extracurricular activities. In Swann, the Court legalized busing to enforce adequate
integration.
An example of a cause and effect case comparison is the Pearson v. Murray, [169
Md. 478 (1936)], case settled in the Maryland Court of Appeals in 1936 that led to
Gaines in 1938. The Maryland case allowed the first black student, Donald Gaines
Murray, to enter the University of Maryland School of Law. This case directly led to the
Gaines case, which pressured the Supreme Court to support the demand raised by Lloyd
Gaines to integrate the University of Missouri Law School. I explore this cause and
effect relationship in detail in chapter three. Furthermore, in Brown, Schwartz (1993)
discusses the causality of the liberal-minded justices of the Warren Court, whose activism
led to the surge in civil rights victories. Schwartz contends, “The Warren Court decisions
furthering racial equality were an important catalyst for the civil rights protests of the
1960s and congressional action to protect civil rights (p. 277).
One of the important results of historical research is that it shows how one event
led to other events in history. Looking back at Robert Carter and Thurgood Marshall’s
article in the Summer, 1955, Journal of Negro History, historians are able to trace the
originations of the shift in the legal burden from the plaintiffs’ responsibility to show that
segregation was illegal and harmed the black student. Marshall explains, “Here we think
the burden now would be on the school boards to prove to the courts’ satisfaction that
their programs have eliminated, open or covert, enforced segregation, and not upon
plaintiffs to prove that some form of segregation remains” (p. 400). Marshall was also
able to foretell of white resistance that was to come. “In all probability these defendants
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will make every effort to obtain a delay of a showdown for as long as possible.
Undoubtedly tactics of evasion will be employed” (p. 400). Marshall’s predictions came
true, and it was not until the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Supreme Court landmark
decision in the 1968 Green case that the legal victories achieved by the NAACP LDF
finally came to fruition. The Gaines case was an important early victory in the shift in
political liability to government officials. In my research, I reveal how the litigation
process impacted the social climate and judicial decision-making that contributed to
future cases for equal access to higher education and K-12 integration of schools.
Historical analysis also allows for systematic and classification of data
particularly through the identification of patterns (Barzun and Graff, 1992). Legal
concepts, context, events, and trends can be organized into categories to identify
emerging themes to foster analyses and develop conclusions. Historical research
methods are also helpful for conducting document analyses and interpretations to identify
categories of emerging themes from the legal language used by the justices. For example,
I organize the concepts from Gaines and Grutter into themes. These themes emerged
from my readings of the court documents from both cases as well as related legal
analyses. This process helped me to identify, organize, and analyze the primary aspects
of the cases to describe events, identify patterns, and show how ideas compare and
contrast with other ideas.
Trustworthiness of the Study
Cross-referencing data from multiple sources strengthens the meaning and
trustworthiness of the analysis and conclusions of the research (Wiersma, 1995). I
investigate the Gaines and Grutter cases using multiple sources, including both primary
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and secondary documents and scholarly research from several legal historians to provide
the full explication of the social and political context involving both cases. I use research
from several legal scholars including Justice Stephen Breyer with regard to the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment in both cases, and in the discussion of judicial
interpretation.
In addition, Leff (1995) recommends that researchers should conduct small
studies that replicate each other in order to generate new perspectives and greater
meaning of an event involving political history which is what I present here. A
researcher can also establish trustworthiness of his/her conclusions by showing that other
studies have shown similar results. The conclusions of my study do corroborate the
research of other scholars (Irons, 1999; Burns, 2009).
To ensure greater meaning and validity of historical research, scholars must view
common patterns of experience, use a shared vocabulary, and replicate studies. Scholars
must be open to public debate, questioning, critical thought, testing by evidence, and
revision (Wiersma, 1995). I use scholarly research from multiple sources to generate the
legal terms and ideologies I use in my research and my analysis. I also identify patterns
in legal analysis to apply to my research, such as investigating the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the discussion of judicial interpretation. I
also provide conflicting argument among scholars who were writing from different
political ideologies.
To strengthen the trustworthiness of a study, the researcher should identify and
acknowledge his or her own political and social beliefs and explain how this bias may
have affected the research and conclusions of the study (Harter and Busha, 1980; Novick,
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1988). In addition, the researcher will also need to identify bias in how he or she made
judgments about the authenticity of sources as well as the relevancy of sources (Wiersma,
1995). The process of determining what sources to use and which ones are authentic is
part of researcher interpretation (Wiersma). I thus provide a reflection of my own
political and social beliefs as I explain the process of selecting my research objectives
and sources, and as I draw my conclusions. Additional cautions when conducting
historical research include internal and external criticism that are important for
establishing the validity of historical research. First, the relevancy of the source must be
established to satisfy internal criticism. Second, researchers must ensure that the source
is genuine to satisfy external criticism. In order to satisfy these criteria, I chose to
analyze primary documents and provide evidentiary support for my conclusions from
related scholarly research that has also been reviewed and corroborated by other scholars
(Tushnet, 1987; Schwartz, 1993; Bowen and Bok, 1998; Irons, 1999; Linder, 2000; Stohr,
2006; Burns, 2009).
Legal scholars will strengthen the trustworthiness of their research by heeding the
caution of Novick (1988) who reminds historians of the importance of their role in
providing reflexive, evidential, and empirical arguments. In their research, scholars
should be mindful that the universal truth based on objectivity that Theodore Clarke
Smith had labeled the “‘noble dream’” (Novick, p. 259) does not exist. However, it is
important to conduct historical research with practices that pursue objectivity. Further,
the notable historian, Charles Beard, once argued to use an empirical, scientific method
of study, but later recognized that the historical study was inescapably value-laden and
that universal truth was not actually obtainable (Novick). Because I have used a
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historiography of education law as my framework, I have been able to research using
reflexive methods as I assess the data I have collected. Under this framework, I provide
multiple interpretations of Gaines and Grutter to provide a comprehensive investigation
of the facts, contexts, elements of judicial power, and the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment in my analyses.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF
GAINES V. CANADA, REGISTRAR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
A notable scholar once stated that the “‘law has been a favorite strategy of nearly
every social change movement in America’” (Biklen as cited by Wadel, 1991, p. 11).
This statement is certainly true of the greatest social movement in United States history,
which led to integration of public schools and to the renewed and expanded protection of
individual rights through the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The NAACP is rightly credited
with creating possibilities of equal access and opportunity for all citizens using peaceful,
legal strategy that transformed United States government, education, culture, and
economics.
I begin my discussion of the Gaines case with a brief review of the foundation of
the NAACP LDF and its leadership of the civil rights movement. I then provide a
background of Gaines’ life, and how he became involved in the case. Next, I explicate
the facts of the Gaines case and provide a comprehensive analysis of the social and
political context of the late 1930s to show how the outcome of the case was influenced by
these factors. Excerpts from primary and secondary documents are included that I
retrieved from the Douglas O. Linder essay (2000) through the Harry S Truman Library
and Museum. From my archive research and document analysis, I report on the opinion
and the separate opinion written by Justices Hughes and McReynolds, respectively. I
then organize the opinion and the separate opinion into categories based upon themes that
emerged during my analysis to show how the case was a catalyst for the legal abrogation
of segregated public education. The primary intentions of this chapter are to explore
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deeper the social and political context surrounding the Gaines case, the judicial
philosophies that the justices’ used in their decision-making, and the justices' influence
on establishing equal access to higher education.
Brief Review of the Post-Civil War Political and Legal Events that Led to the
Establishment of the NAACP
In order to analyze the salient themes in segregation/integration history, Pettigrew
(2004) created four categories of legal trends: The Segregation Era (1876-1910); The
Preparatory Era (1911 – 1929); the Desegregation Era (1930 – 1973); and the
Resegregation Era (1974 –present). I will use Pettigrew’s framework to discuss some of
the landmark cases and their implications, and I will also weave in a more current
categorization of six salient themes in desegregation history beginning with Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, [347 U.S. 483 (1954)], in the Desegregation Era
developed by Caldas and Bankston (2007).
First, the Segregation Era was defined by two of the most important and
damaging Supreme Court opinions in United States history in Dred Scott v. Sandford, [60
U.S. 393 (1857)], in which the Negro was legally labeled an “inferior” being with “no
rights which the white man was bound to respect” (Kluger, 2004, p. 47), and in Plessy v.
Ferguson, [163 U.S. 537, (1896)], which resulted in the “separate but equal” judicial
standard. In Plessy, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state laws that
authorized segregation in private businesses, such as railroads in this case (Schwartz,
1993; Kluger, 2004; Irons, 1999). The case was based upon the planned arrest of Homer
Plessy to intentionally challenge Louisiana’s segregation law. Plessy participated in the
arrest through the organization of the New Orleans Comité des Citoyens (Committee of
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Citizens) who replied after the ruling, “‘We, as freemen, still believe that we were right
and our cause is sacred’” (as cited by Medley, 2003). Although Homer Plessy personally
remained quiet publicly, his case is also notable because it represents one of the first
examples of “interest group” litigation, in which organizations such as the New Orleans
Comité des Citoyens brought test cases to expand or defend the constitutional rights of its
members (Irons, 1999, p. 223). Justice Henry Brown would contend that the “colored
race” chose to view segregation as a “badge of inferiority” denying white responsibility
for acts of repression (Kluger, p. 99), One important, hopeful result of the Plessy case
was the dissenting opinion of Justice John Harlan in which he labeled the Plessy decision
as “pernicious” as the proslavery decision Dred Scott, and developed the notion of
colorblindness stating that “our Constitution is color-blind” (as cited by Pettigrew, 2004,
p. 521).
The Republican Congress intended to provide rights and protections to the newlyfreed slaves during the post-Civil War era. The salient Congressional acts included the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in addition to the 1875 Civil Rights
Acts. The Thirteenth Amendment was passed in 1864 to legally abolish slavery. Irons
(1999, p. 191) explains that for blacks in the South, the years 1865 and 1866 were “years
of terror” because of the Confederate’s stinging military defeat and their resulting efforts
at retaliation targeted at black citizens. The Republican Congress responded with the
establishment of the Fourteenth Amendment, extending the definitions of citizenship,
rights, and due process, and authorizing Congress to protect former slaves against
southern hostility, which passed in 1868 despite puissant resistance from the white south
(Kluger, 2004). The Fifteenth Amendment granted the right to vote to free men of color
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in 1870. Radical Republicans made one last attempt to guarantee protections for black
citizens by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, although its final version was weakened
by compromises with more conservative Republicans and Democrats (Schwartz, 1993;
Irons, 1999). Early drafts of this law would have actually required integration of public
schools. From that point, progress toward social justice was completely reversed. Whitedominated governments overturned progress made for civil rights that had been
established during Reconstruction.
The resistance efforts in the Segregation Era (Pettigrew, 2004) were manifest
through Jim Crow laws which worked to create extreme fear and oppression of all black
citizens. These elements of institutional racism (Bell, 1995) both overtly and covertly
perpetuated the white domination of government, education, housing, and public and
private use of accommodations, facilities, and services. The purpose of Jim Crow laws
was to politically, socially, culturally, and most important, economically, oppress and
disenfranchise black citizens in the United States between 1876 and 1965 (Kluger, 2004).
Whites feared the potential loss of their political and economic domination of society
(Kluger; Tushnet, 1987). Jim Crow laws mandated de jure segregation in all public
facilities under the guise of the “separate but equal” principle. Irons (1999) explains how
the post Civil War amendments were not the end of the maltreatment of black citizens:
Radical Republicans soon learned that many former Confederate leaders
had no intention of treating the freedmen as political equals, or even as
fellow humans. Their resistance to Reconstruction – even President
Johnson’s modest and conciliatory program – encouraged widespread
violence against blacks who dared to seek the ballot or challenge “the
established usages, customs and traditions” of white southerners, the racial
practices which the Supreme Court later cited in Plessy v. Ferguson as
grounds for upholding Jim Crow laws. (p. 191)
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In addition, in the late 1860s, the Ku Klux Klan was founded as a social club in Memphis,
but quickly spread across the South by 1870 as a reign of terror against black citizens and
white sympathizers (Irons).
In the legal arena, the Slaughterhouse Cases, [83 U.S. 36 (1873)], were the first
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court, and the result had a
devastating impact on the federal enforcement of civil rights (Rehnquist, 2001; Irons,
1999; Schwartz, 1993). The Cases basically state that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects federal “privileges or immunities,” but not those priviliges or immunities related
to the citizenship of a state [Amendment XIV, Section 1, Clause 2] . The opinion of the
Court was written by Chief Justice Samuel Freeman Miller and includes the following
principle argument, “It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States,
and a citizenship of a state, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon
different characteristics or circumstances in the individual” [Slaughterhouse Cases: 83
U.S. 36, 73-74 (1873)], is narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
significantly affected subsequent civil rights cases and severely inhibited the progress
that had been made for social justice for black citizens immediately after the Civil War
(Irons; Schwartz).
Further, the Supreme Court decided the Civil Rights Cases in 1883 [109 U.S. 3
(1883)]. Justice Joseph Bradley argued in the opinion that the Thirteenth Amendment
had “only to do with slavery and its incidents” and thus, provided no protections to black
citizens beyond that (as cited by Irons, 1999, p. 213). Bradley presented the same
argument in striking down protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, contending that
Congress could only deal with “state action” that denied black citizens equal protection
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of the laws (Irons, p. 214). Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in dissent, “‘The opinion
in these cases proceeds upon grounds entirely too narrow and artificial’” (as cited by
Irons, p. 214). Harlan further argued that Congress’ intent in passing the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments had been to abrogate all discrimination against black citizens
and “‘to secure and protect rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens’” (as cited
by Irons, p. 214). Tragically, the Plessy case rejected the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment that had been passed into law by Congress in 1868 to establish and protect
the rights of freed slaves.
Second, Pettigrew’s (2004) description of the Preparatory Era (1911-1929)
includes Supreme Court rulings against city ordinances requiring residential segregation,
Grandfather clauses, and white-only primaries. These practices began to slowly unravel
white legal efforts to maintain their hegemony and repress the rights of black Americans.
At the same time, efforts to resist the status quo slowly began to gain momentum. In
1909, the founding of the NAACP resulted in the remarkable contributions of members
of the LDF led by Thurgood Marshall in attacking the very core of suppressive practices,
its legal foundation. Kluger (2004) describes the players and events that led to the
founding of the NAACP including the voice representing black America by W.E.B.
DuBois through twenty-four years of publishing The Crisis. Following the principles
established by the Margold Report, black leaders such as Charles Houston focused first
on preparing highly skilled lawyers through the Howard University Law School, and then
began to tackle the equalization of public schools, eventually demanding complete
desegregation. With Marshall as Chief Counsel, the lawyers of the LDF realized that
because of the numerous injustices black Americans experienced that their cases would
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have to demonstrate a violation of the Constitution, not just of a state law. The attorneys
of the LDF had to reevaluate continuously their legal strategies such as if and when to
challenge the constitutionality of Plessy at the risk of setting back the equalization
process. In addition, they had to consider the credibility of the social science defense
strategy advanced primarily by Kenneth Clark, which eventually helped them win in
Brown.
The Establishment of the NAACP
On the cusp of the Preparatory Era (Pettigrew, 2004), deeply concerned by the
terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan, the degrading practices of Jim Crow laws, and the failure
of the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the executive branch to enforce justly the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts, W. E. B. Du Bois and twenty-eight
other prominent black leaders met secretly in Niagara Falls, Ontario, in 1905. They
produced a manifesto calling for an end to racial discrimination, full civil liberties for all
black citizens, and the recognition of human brotherhood. The organization became
known as the Niagara Movement. The need for formal organization was further
ascertained after the notorious race riot that occurred in Springfield, Illinois, in 1908, that
was triggered by the transfer of two black prisoners out of the city jail by the county
sheriff. White citizens became enraged, burning black-owned homes and businesses
resulting in seven deaths and $200,000 in property damage. After the riot, a group of
concerned white citizens joined with the leadership of the Niagra Movement and formed
the NAACP in 1909 including Oswald Villard, John Dewey, Jane Addams, and W. E. B.
Du Bois, among others (Rowan, 1993). A description of the first meeting on May 30,
1909, written by attendee Mary White Ovington, was that “‘the white people in
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attendance…engaged in religious, social and educational work, for the first time met the
Negro, who demands, not a pittance, but his full rights in the commonwealth’” (as cited
by Rowan, p. 27). Under the leadership of DuBois, the NAACP mounted legal
challenges to Jim Crow laws and lobbied legislatures on behalf of black Americans.
DuBois also established and edited The Crisis, a monthly publication for the NAACP,
which was one of the most critical tools the NAACP had to communicate to black
citizens the needs and objectives of the NAACP, the LDF, and the resistance movement
at large (Lewis, 1993; Stafford, 1989). McWhirter (2011) argues that the race riots and
lynchings of the summer of 1919 sparked a significant shift in the momentum of the
black resistance movement lead by the NAACP through The Crisis and the establishment
of the LDF in 1940 (Greenberg, 1994).
Rowan (1993) reveals the inner struggles of the NAACP such as a lack of
financial support, lack of community support and unity among blacks, and disagreements
over objectives and strategies, including the decision to fight for complete equalization
under the segregated system, or to fight for the abolishment of segregation altogether to
achieve equality. Tushnet (1987), Greenberg (1994), and Kluger (2004) corroborate
Rowan’s explications and provide detail into the struggles, conflicts, lessons learned, and
successes of the NAACP and the LDF . For example, Tushnet explains how the
Maryland cases, in particular, Murray v. Pearson, [169 Md. 478 (1936)], became the
cases from which the NAACP counselors were able to identify which strategies were
effective, which areas the black community and white politicians were more supportive,
and in which areas there were conflict and dissention. Further, Du Bois was forced to
resign from the NAACP in 1934 after disagreeing with its leadership over its push for full
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integration. Du Bois appreciated the value of black institutions, and did not like the idea
that they should be considered inferior as a result of the the NAACP’s quest for full
integration (Lewis, 1993; Stafford, 1989; Greenberg). DuBois had written in The Crisis
that “‘thinking colored people of the United States must stop being stampeded by the
word segregation….It is the race conscious black man co-operating together in our own
institutions and movements who will eventually emancipate the colored race’” (as cited
by Greenberg, p. 59). Further, Kluger (2004) explains that NAACP counselors’ legal
strategies, workload, financial woes, and guiding principles were constantly under
scrutiny and strain. Tushnet describes a letter an NAACP lawyer, Cecil McCoy, sent to
Walter White, the leader of the NAACP for nearly twenty-five years:
McCoy wrote White, “Those upon whom we had counted for our
staunchest moral support have been found leading the attack against us
and a few loyal supporters.” McCoy attributed “this dissension” to “the
pressure of a few white politicians upon our so-called Negro leaders.”
Although he and Pearson (from the Maryland case) found themselves
“almost alone after being promised the unqualified support of almost
every influential man of color in our city,” they were encouraged by “the
sympathy of the Negro in the street, as well as many other Negroes and
well-thinking white people,” and by their success in reorganizing the local
branch. (Tushnet, 1987, pp. 52-53)
Leadership for Equal Rights through the NAACP
Despite the struggles, the NAACP pressed forward by strategically challenging
each legal obstacle, one argument at a time. Charles Hamilton Houston is credited with
developing the litigation program to stimulate the process of equal rights and fair
treatment for black citizens. Called the ‘Moses’ of the journey to end ‘second-class
citizenship,’ Houston inaugurated the legal campaign to fight for full equality under the
law (William H. Hastie, speaking at the funeral of Charles Houston, 1950, as cited by
Greenberg, 1994, p. 3). In addition, Houston shaped the program at the Howard
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University Law School to produce highly skilled law students who were well-prepared to
support the litigation process (Greenberg, 1994; Kluger, 2004). Greenberg (p. 4)
contends that as the “legal and social architect” of the successful litigation to end
segregation and Jim Crow, Houston helped change United States law and the way it was
practiced. Houston’s work was channeled through the NAACP. After joining the
NAACP as a legal counsel in 1934, Houston devised the litigation campaign to instigate
first a broad-based assault on the selection of juries, then to equalize the salaries of black
teachers, and then to attack segregation in education through law schools (Greenberg,
1994; Kluger, 2004). His most notable protégé was Thurgood Marshall, who was able to
advance Houston’s plan further past Houston’s death in 1950 through the landmark case
of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, which ruled to end segregation in K-12 public
schools (Rowan, 1993).
Marshall graduated from Frederick Douglass High School in Baltimore in 1925.
After graduating from Lincoln University, Marshall applied to his hometown law school,
the University of Maryland School of Law, but was rejected as a result of the school’s
segregation policy. Ironically, this would be the university that later, as a civil rights
litigator, he successfully sued which overturned the policy in the case of Murray v.
Pearson in 1936 (Kluger, 2004; Rowan, 1993). Marshall was deeply affected by the
refusal of the University of Maryland School of Law to admit him because of his race.
This turn of events proved to be the catalyst that propelled his induction into the fight for
equality and equal access. Marshall was accepted at the Howard University School of
Law and became Houston’s protégé (Kluger, 2004; Rowan, 1993). Marshall would
describe his relationship with Houston as providing guidance and unwavering support
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during extreme adversity, emotional stress, and physical danger. Marshall recalled that at
the onset of his career as a lawyer for the NAACP that he was “‘young, hungry, and
angry,’” which spurred his fortitude and pugnacity in fighting for social justice (as cited
by Rowan, p. 71).
Marshall litigated and won his first case in front of the United States Supreme
Court in 1938 and was appointed Chief Counsel for the NAACP in the same year. Most
of his cases were argued successfully, including Gaines v. University of Missouri, 1938,
Smith v. Allwright, [321 U.S. 649 (1944)], Sweatt v. Painter, [339 U.S. 629 (1950)],
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, [339 U.S. 637 (1950)], and Brown v. Board of
Education, 1954, (Irons, 1999; Rowan, 1993). In Gaines, the Supreme Court forced the
University of Missouri to allow a black student to enter its law school if the state could
not establish an equivalent program within state borders. The ruling established this case
as the legal precedent to wipe out Jim Crow laws in several states. In Smith, the Supreme
Court overturned the Democratic Party’s use of all-white primaries in Texas, and for
other states conducting similar practices. This ruling extended voting rights, and chipped
away at white discriminatory practices (Irons; Rowan). Rowan (p. 129) argues that this
case “brought to blacks ‘power’ that no bigots would ever be able to strip away” and “a
right, a power to America’s outsiders that would forever change the faces of city halls,
state legislatures…and for the presidency.” In Sweatt, Marshall effectively challenged
the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy, and the Supreme Court granted Heman
Sweatt, a black man, the right to attend the University of Texas School of Law because
the school that Texas had rushed to create for black students was inferior in quality and in
resources. The Court held that access to other lawyers and legal discussions was an
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important component to a legal education. In McLaurin, George McLaurin applied to
earn his Doctorate of Education degree at the University of Oklahoma. The University
admitted McLaurin, but provided him separate facilities, including a designated desk in
the library, a desk just outside of the classroom doorway, and a special table in the
cafeteria. McLaurin sued to have the separate facilities removed to allow him to interact
fully with the other students. This case was decided on the same day as Sweatt, and
together they marked the end of the Plessy doctrine of separate but equal for graduate and
professional education (Kluger, 2004). In all, Marshall won twenty-nine out of the thirtytwo cases that he litigated before the Supreme Court.
Thus, the Desegregation Era (1930 -1973) had begun when Charles Hughes
became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1930 (Pettigrew, 2004). The Hughes
Court, and later the Stone and Vinson Courts, ruled against the exclusion of blacks from
juries, upheld state antidiscrimination laws, established nondiscriminatory seating on
interstate trains, and ruled against racially restrictive housing covenants (Pettigrew, 2004,
and Kluger, 2004).
Marshall was constantly in physical danger during his tenure as a litigator for the
NAACP. He escaped a noose that hung waiting for him by the Klan in Columbia,
Tennessee, in one instance (Rowan, 1993). Marshall would often move to a different
house in the middle of the night to thwart the threatened aggression of the Klan, but there
were occasions in which those who provided support and housing for him were beaten or
killed after he had left (Rowan). Despite these vicious threats, Marshall consistently
supported non-violent resistance through the judicial system, and declared the real heroes
to be those who lived and endured the injustices every day, as well as the ones who let
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him stay in their homes. Marshall also valiantly traveled to Korea during the Korean
Conflict to investigate unjust courts-martial of black soldiers serving in the Army.
Marshall and the NAACP were successful in getting more than thirty sentences reduced.
This experience led to his strong advocacy for the rights of the accused, which he carried
with him to the bench of the Supreme Court (Rowan).
Marshall’s strong belief in the United States Constitution and its Amendments
gave him strength in times of adversity (Rowan, 1993). He called the Constitution a
“living document” and believed that it should be loosely constructed to fit the needs of
people today and marveled at how well the documents and its intentions did so (Rowan, p.
390). Upon his appointment to the Chief Legal Officer for the NAACP when Houston
retired, J. Skelly Wright, a member of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
circuit, eloquently described Marshall’s skill and talent:
I encountered few lawyers as skilled in their craft. He had an uncanny
ability to identify the crucial facts in a case, and to describe legal issues in
clear, commonsense terms. And he was able to do this in a way that
conveyed, often quite dramatically, the realities of segregation – how it
affected the daily lives of black Americans. (as cited by Rowan, p. 158)
On June 13, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson appointed Marshall as the first black
member of the Supreme Court. Marshall served as a Justice for twenty-four years,
creating a liberal record that strongly supported the Constitutional protection of
individual rights. Marshall made a speech commentorating the 200th anniversary of the
United States Constitution, the freedoms and rights for which he had spent his life
fighting to preserve:
Some may more quietly commemorate the suffering, struggle, and
sacrifice that has triumphed over much of what was wrong with the
original document, and observe the anniversary with hopes not realized
and promises not fulfilled. I plan to celebrate the bicentennial of the
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Constitution as a living document, including the Bill of Rights and the
other amendments protecting individual freedoms and human rights.
(ThurgoodMarshall.com, Speeches. Constitutional Speech, May 6, 1987)
Marshall was characterized as “Mr. Civil Rights” and that he “will, as he should, be seen
as the most dogged and sacrificing of all the battlers for black freedom” (Rowan, 1993, p.
376).
Jack Greenberg was a litigator who served as Director-Counsel for the LDF from
1949-1984. He outlines the most valuable contributions of the LDF during his tenure as a
counselor:
We were more successful in persuading the Supreme Court, in 1977, to
outlaw capital punishment for rape, a sentence that had been more
consistently and more blatantly racist in application than any other in
American law. We made Southern schools the most desegregated in the
country, at the same time fighting school segregation in many cities, north
and south, by extending the controversial concept of busing. We took a
leading role in defending affirmative action. LDF played a large part in
enforcing and amending the 1965 Voting Rights Act. (Greenberg, 1994,
p. 9)
As mentioned above, one of the most important early cases in the Desegregation
Era (Pettigrew, 2004) to attack segregation in higher education was the 1936 Murray v.
Pearson case from the Maryland Court of Appeals. Donald Gaines Murray applied for
admission to the University of Maryland School of Law in 1935, but his application was
denied. Murray received a letter from the Law School stating, "The University of
Maryland does not admit Negro students and your application is accordingly rejected"
(Rath, 2007). University president Pearson cited the Law School’s obligation to adhere
to the Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine of separate but equal to assist him in studying
elsewhere, even at a law school in another state. Murray appealed this rejection to the
Board of Regents, but was still refused admission. Houston and Marshall initiated legal
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proceedings to challenge Murray’s rejection (Greenberg, 1994; Rowan, 1993; Linder,
2000). They applied a legal strategy developed by Nathan Margold \to attack the
“separate but equal” doctrine using the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (Greenberg, 1994; Kluger, 2004; Rowan, 1993). Using the 1886 opinion of
Yick Wo v. Hopkins as his judicial precedent which established equal protection of the
law, Margold’s strategy included focusing on the states most resistant to integration of
higher education institutions, pushing individual cases forward to make it too costly for
states to maintain dual educational programs (Kelleher, 1971; Kluger, 2004; Rowan,
1993; Greenberg, 1994). The Margold Report established a two-pronged approach to
attacking segregation of higher education schools. First, one prong would void
segregation laws in seven states that had not provided equal funding protections for black
students. The second prong would outlaw the practice of segregation in states where
discrimination was habitual and thus, a violation of equal protection. Notable about the
Margold Report was that it did not stray far from Supreme Court’s precedents, and its
primary intention was to force the states to give in to equalization rather than having to
push expensive litigation through the court system (Kluger, 2004; Greenberg, 1994).
Thus, “Margold proposed forcing the issue, but on the least risky terrain possible”
(Kluger, p. 135). Houston initially wavered on implementing the strategies outlined in
the Margold Report, but eventually, he pursued the main thrust of the “black attack,”
although in limited form to Margold’s provocative strategy (Kluger, p. 136). For
example, Houston chose to initiate integregation strategies in areas where whites were
most vulnerable and were least likely to respond viciously, which were in institutions of
higher education.

51
In the Murray case, Marshall and Houston argued that Maryland failed to provide
a “separate but equal” education for Donald Murray, which was required by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Marshall argued that "since the State of Maryland had not
provided a comparable law school for blacks that Murray should be allowed to attend the
white university. What’s at stake here is more than the rights of my client. It’s the moral
commitment stated in our country’s creed” (A Century of Racial Segregation, p. 5).
Houston and Marshall won the case. The circuit court judge issued a writ of mandamus
ordering the University of Maryland Law School to admit Murray. He became its first
black graduate in 1938 (A Century of Racial Segregation, p. 5; Kluger, 2004). The
Murray case directly led to the Gaines case.
The Murray victory opened the door for further legal challenges against inquality
and segregation. Kluger (2004) contends that Murray had to be reinforced and then
expanded to effect meaningful change. William Hastie stated that, “We all recognized
that Maryland was a border state, and you couldn’t assume that states in the deeper South
would follow the precedent. But as a result of Murray, local NAACP branches around
the country started referring cases to the national office” (as cited by Kluger, p. 201).
The ideal case had emerged.
Analysis of the Social Context Leading up to the Gaines case
McWhirter (2011) discusses the belief of black soldiers that after World War I,
they expected to return to a peaceful, prosperous era in which they were treated with
equality and were appreciated for their military service on behalf of the United States.
They hoped that by actively participating in the fight for democracy that they would
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finally be given the rights and freedoms that they had been promised since the
establishment of the Reconstruction Amendments.
Instead, a violent, unprecedented wave of riots and lynchings targeting black
citizens swept the country. McWhirter (2011) explains that the majority of the riots
occurred in the South. From April to November, 1919, the lynchings and riots spread
from the South to the North, the Midwest, and in to Washington, D.C. McWhirter argues
that the “red summer” of 1919 was the catalyst for the momentum in formalizing black
resistance. Under the leadership of Nathan Margold and Charles Houston, the NAACP
began to create legal strategy to challenge the racial discrimination plaguing black
citizens. W.E.B. DuBois became the primary communicator for NAACP news and
strategies of resistance for black citizens by publishing The Crisis beginning in
November, 1910 (Tushnet, 1987). DuBois remained the editor of the monthly magazine
until 1934 when he began arguing for black separatism, contradicting the legal strategy of
the NAACP, which was pushing for the equalization of facilities, opportunities, and
resources, with the hope of full, legal integration in all of these areas soon after.
Rowan (1993) and Kluger (2004) corroborate McWhirter’s contention that service
in the United States military failed to provide the fair and equal treatment that black
soldiers had hoped for upon returning from their service. For example, they detail
Thurgood Marshall’s trip to Korea in the early 1950s to ensure fair treatment of black
soldiers who were under military arrest. In addition, Rowan and Kluger provide detail in
to the discussion of the social and political context in the South during the 1930s. They
chronicle the white resistance to black citizens owning and running businesses that would
interfere with white businesses. They describe the lack of educational and structural
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resources available to black students and teachers. Their salient argument is that white
political and business leaders worked hard to suppress black citizens’ opportunities in
business and in education. Whites responded to any perceived threat to their political and
economic domination with retribution, often in a violent manner.
Background of the Gaines case
Greenberg (1994) points out that before lawyers can argue cases, there must be
clients willing to stand up for their rights. Like Donald Murray, Lloyd Gaines was one of
those citizens. The case of Gaines v. Canada, 1938, was one of the most significant
Supreme Court opinions for granting equal access to higher education and to impel
further litigation that resulted in the end of segregation in K-12 public schools in Brown.
Riding off of the momentum of the Murray victory, Marshall and Houston were ready to
pursue another state, but they had to find an ideal plaintiff without officially soliciting
one (Rowan, 1993; Kelleher, 1971). Gaines, who was a graduate of Lincoln University
with an exemplary academic record and had been president of his senior class, had
applied, and was not admitted to the University of Missouri-Columbia Law School. The
ideal case had emerged.
Lloyd Gaines was twenty-three years old when he graduated from Lincoln
University. Kelleher (1971) contends that students with exceptional academic records
like Gaines were fully aware of the Murray ruling. Thus, when Gaines applied to the
University of Missouri, he fully expected resistance, and welcomed the opportunity to
push the boundary of equality in Missouri when Houston selected him as his plaintiff
(Kelleher). Houston selected Gaines as the best candidate to challenge the system of
inequality because Gaines was applying to law school, and Houston was particularly
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concerned about the need for training black lawyers in Missouri (Kluger, 2004; Kelleher).
In addition, Gaines had a strong academic record and was a product of the Missouri
segregated schools. For the University of Missouri to argue that Gaines was not a
qualified applicant would imply that the Missouri public schools were unequal, which
would impair the University’s argument (Kelleher).
Gaines was born in 1911 in Mississippi, and moved with his family to St. Louis at
the age of fifteen (Linder, 2000). He graduated as the senior class president and
valedictorian in a class of fifty from Vashon High School. Gaines’ essay, “U. S.
Inspection of Meat,” won first place as well as a $250 scholarship, which he used to study
for a year at Stowe Teachers College in St. Louis (Linder). He then transferred to
Lincoln University, which was Missouri’s all-black college, after he had been awarded
another scholarship in 1933. Gaines was equally successful in academics and in
extracurricular activities at Lincoln. Gaines was president of the 1935 class, joined a
Negro social fraternity, and represented Lincoln at the American Negro Economic
Conference at Wilberforce University. Gaines graduated from Lincoln in August, 1935,
with a major in history and minors in education and in English (Linder).
Gaines left Lincoln in 1935 during the Depression with three stellar
recommendations from his university professors. Gaines’ professor of education, S. F.
Collins wrote that Gaines “‘is conscientious, painstaking and is desirous of growing in
the teaching field’” (as cited in Linder, 2000, p. 11). Cecil Blue of the English
Department described Gaines as “‘an earnest young man who wants to get somewhere’”
(as cited in Linder, p. 12). Gaines’ history advisor, Sherman Savage, wrote that, “‘his
resourcefulness and ingenuity will make him an excellent teacher.’” Savage also stated
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that “‘his poise and temperament’” should be “‘an asset in any community where he
happens to work’” (as cited in Linder, p. 12). Despite the recommendations and superior
academic record, Gaines was unable to find work as a teacher.
In the winter of 1935, four students who had graduated from Lincoln University
applied to Missouri University for professional or graduate schools. The University
began to feel additional pressure because of these students who applied to the law school,
graduate school of mathematics, and to the school of journalism (Rowan, 1993). Gaines
was one of these students (Missouri University Archives, 2007). Gaines sent a letter to
the Registrar at University of Missouri School of Law, Silas Woodson Canada,
requesting a catalog. Canada responded as usual and sent the form letter and a catalog to
1000 Moreau Drive in Jefferson City, Missouri, not realizing that Gaines was black
(Linder, 2000). Gaines applied to the University of Missouri School of Law in 1936.
Despite Gaines’ exemplary academic record, he was denied admission to the University
based on the grounds that Missouri’s Constitution called for “separate education of the
races” (Rowan, 1993; Linder, 2000). The Board of Curators for the University issued
their resolution:
Whereas, Lloyd L. Gaines, colored, has applied for admission to the
School of Law of the University of Missouri, and
Whereas, the people of Missouri, both in the Constitution and in the
Statutes of the State, have provided for the separate education of white
students and negro students, and have therby in effect forbidden the
attendace of a white student at Lincoln University, or a colored student at
the University of Missouri . . . (as cited by Rowan, 1993, p. 72)
Although Missouri would have been required to pay for Gaines to attend law schools in
Iowa, Kansas, or Nebraska, Gaines fought for the right to attend law school within his
own state.
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Simultaneously, Houston, was looking for the right opportunity for a successful
suit to challenge the policy of segregation at the University of Missouri. In July of 1935,
Houston contacted Sidney R. Redmond, a black St. Louis attorney, to prepare a
“‘preliminary investigation and written report concerning the exclusion of Negroes from
the University of Missouri’” (Grothaus, 1984; Rowan, 1993; as cited in Linder, 2000, p.
12). Houston requested Redmond to investigate and report on the comparison of Lincoln
University to the University of Missouri on the rates of faculty compensation, budget,
and course offerings. Houston told Redmond, “‘On the visit to Columbia, take camera
along and take pictures of the buildings at the University which house departments for
which there is no equivalent Negro education in the state’” (as cited in Linder, p. 12). In
addition, Houston requested Redmond to “‘obtain application for admission blanks,’” but
to be careful in that “…These must not be obtained under subterfuge, because we want
our hands to be absolutely clean. Best way here is to let the prospective student or some
of his friends obtain the blank in his or her own way’” (as cited in Linder, p. 12).
Redmond was paid fifty dollars for his efforts.
Shortly after Houston’s memorandum to Redmond was sent, Gaines applied to the
University of Missouri Law School. It is unclear whether Gaines applied on his own
initiative or whether the NAACP requested Gaines’ assistance in their case, although
both the NAACP and Gaines denied that Gaines was being used as a pawn by the
NAACP to help its case. Gaines wrote to the president of Lincoln University, informing
of his plans, stating, “‘I am applying for admission to the Missouri University School of
Law with no other hope than this initial move will ultimately rebound to increase the
opportunities for intellectual advancement of the Negro youth’” (as cited in Linder, 2000,
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p. 12). Gaines requested the registrar at Lincoln to forward his transcript to the
University of Missouri in Columbia.
Since the University of Missouri applications did not request applicants to
identify their race in 1935, the officials did not realize Gaines was black until his
transcripts were reviewed. Dean Masterson of the University of Missouri Law School
knew that Gaines’ application would be a challenge to defend because their admission
requirements had been established in a 1909 statutue that the applicant had to be ten years
old and demonstrate scholastic ability. There had never been any further description of
student criteria (Grothaus, 1984). In addition, a 1921 state statute provided for out-ofstate scholarships for students who successfully completed requirements at Lincoln
University, but the statute did not address programs offered at the University of Missouri
– Columbia. The dean then declared that black students would be eligible to be admitted
to the Law School, but to prevent that from actually happening, he urged an additional
statute to be developed. This new statute would provide an exception to admitting a
student that would be “inimical to the welfare, discipline, and best interests of the
University,” (Grothaus, p. 23). This statute was “to be interpreted to apply to negroes”
and would be legal and constitutional (Grothaus, p. 23). Registrar Sy Canada sent Gaines
a telegram stating that his application was no longer being considered:
REGARDING YOUR ADMISSION TO LAW SCHOOL PRESIDENT
FLORENCE AND MEMBER BOARD LINCOLN UNIVERSITY WILL
CONFER THIS AFTERNOON IN JEFFERSON CITY ABOUT
MATTER SUGGEST YOU COMMINCATE WITH PRESIDENT
FLORENCE REGARDING POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS AND
FURTHER ADVICE. (as cited by Linder, 2000, p. 12)
Gaines received this telegram on September 18, 1935, and wrote a letter that same day to
President Florence at Lincoln to reply to him by mail, “‘just what are the POSSIBLE
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ARRANGEMENTS’” and “’FURTHER ADVICE’” (as cited in Linder, p. 12). Five
days later, President Florence responded to Gaines that he should take advantage of the
Missouri law that that allowed him to attend law school that admits blacks in another
state with a scholarship.
Gaines’ response was to write directly to the president of the University of
Missouri, Frederick Middlebush, “‘I am a student of limited means but commendable
scholastic standing. May I depend upon you to see that I am admitted to Missouri
University, where I am sure of getting what I want at a cost that is most reasonable? An
immediate reply would be highly appreciated’” (as cited in Linder, 2000, p. 12). Gaines
never heard back from President Middlebush nor did the university formally admit or
reject his application.
Houston and the NAACP had hoped that the 1936 Murray v. Pearson case out of
Maryland would open the door for the University of Missouri to allow Gaines to be
admitted (Rowan, 1993; Linder, 2000). Of particular distinction between the Murray
case and the Gaines case, the state of Missouri intended for Lincoln University to be a
quality institution for higher education for black students, and was a leader in providing a
better education for blacks when compared to other segregated states (Kluger, 2004).
Missouri officials were willing to develop a law school for blacks if the interest was
shown. Kluger explains that the out-of-state subsidy was genuinely available to Gaines,
unlike Murray in Maryland, unless Gaines wanted to wait for Lincoln to develop its own
law program. However, this subsidy was for tuition only, not for travel and living
expenses that Gaines would incur by studying in another state. Houston was also hopeful
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that the University of Missouri would allow Gaines to be admitted without resistance,
rather than seek a court action through a lawsuit.
Aware of Columbia’s past issues with racism and a lynching that the Governor of
Missouri knew about in advance, but did not prevent in 1923, Houston wrote:
It is up to the Association, the citizens of Missouri, and the people of the
United States to convince the Governor of Missouri, the President and
Board of Curators of the University, and the student body, that regardless
of what happened in 1923, there must be no violence when Lloyd Gaines
arrives at the School of Law in 1936 or 1937. A broad sympathetic appeal
for fair play must be made to the students of the University. Perhaps when
students realize that Lloyd Gaines’ presence will not interfere with their
ordinary routine and when they understand some of the hardships and
handicaps which Negro boys and girls have had to face in order to get an
education, the spirit of fair play will prevail. (as cited in Linder, 2000, p.
13)
Missouri officials refused to allow Gaines’s admission, and Redmond submitted
his report to the NAACP. Houston and a team of lawyers representing several states
decided that the Gaines’ case was their best chance at successful litigation, and filed suit
against the University of Missouri in Boone County Circuit Court in Columbia. The suit
was in the form of a petition for a writ of mandamus asking the court to order Registrar
Canada to either approve or reject Gaines’ application. The petition stated that Gaines’
rejection to the University of Missouri Law School “‘solely on the basis of color was a
clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution’” (as cited in
Linder, 2000, p. 13-14). The formal captioning of the case with the “ex rel.,”
abbreviation for ex relatione, in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, was a poetic practice
exercised for the sake of formalism by the plaintiff’s attorney, Houston, to invoke the
state of Missouri as the responsible party legally obliged to act in Gaines’ behalf (Kluger,
2004). Houston sent a telegram from the Hotel Booker in Washington to the President of
the NAACP, Walter White, stating: “‘LLOYD L. GAINES AGAINST S. W. CANADA

60
RESITRAR NO OTHER DEFENDANTS FILED TODAY PAPERS IN MAIL
SUGGEST SCHUYLER TRY HAND AT SPECIAL ARTICLE FOR NEGRO PRESS
WHEN PAPERS ARRIVE MONDAY’” (as cited in Linder, 2000, p. 13).
President Middlebush took the Gaines’ issue to the Board of Curators the next
month, requesting assistance from the Board’s lawyer members for possible responses.
The Board reconvened and followed the recommendations of the lawyers to adopt a
resolution concerning the admittance of Negro applicants to the university. The response
stated in part, “‘Lloyd Gaines, Colored, has applied for admission to the School of Law,’
the ‘people of Missouri’ have ‘forbidden the attendance of a colored person at the
University of Missouri’” (as cited in Linder, 2000, p. 13). The report concluded by
stating, “‘…any change in the state system of separate instruction would react to the
detriment of both Lincoln University and the University of Missouri. …the application
of Lloyd L. Gaines be and it hereby is rejected’” (Linder, p. 13). Marshall would later
recall,
They gave us a legal gift that was bigger than anything we could expect at
Christmas. God, I couldn’t believe it when the curators made it clear in
their instructions to registrar Canada that Gaines was being rejected solely
because of his race. Hell, the curators saved the NAACP about a hundred
thousand dollars, which it didn’t have, by that admission. (as cited in
Rowan, 1993, p. 73)
The matter came to trial at the Boone County court on July 10, 1936, before Judge
W. M. Dinwiddie (Kluger, 2004). Houston was disappointed in the black turnout in the
courtroom. The heat, the lack of public transportation, the distance, and the fear of
lynchings discouraged black citizens from attending. White farmers did make a strong
showing since the drought had slowed their work in the fields. Approximately one
hundred white students attending summer school at the University of Missouri in
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Columbia also attended. The attorneys on both sides shared a single table, which seemed
a strange practice to Houston. Houston wrote of the experience in an office memo, “‘All
during the trail we were looking down one another’s throats. For private conference at
the table we almost had to go into a football huddle. …the Court and all concerned
agreed to remove coats, so we had a shirtsleeve trial’” (as cited by Kluger, p. 202).
Houston also noted that during recess, some of the farmers “‘looked a little strange at us
drinking out of the same fountain and using the same lavatories with them, but they did
not say anything’” (as cited by Kluger, p. 203). Overall, Houston reported that the crowd
was not hostile, and was respectful. There were no outbursts, and the crowd sat
unsegregated. Lloyd Gaines was consistently referred to as “Mr. Gaines” (Kluger).
However, Houston’s account of the hearing proceedings itself showed that he
anticipated a poor outcome, and that an appeal was immediately anticipated. The
NAACP counselors had argued that the University of Missouri was obligated to provide a
legal education to Gaines because it was the only program available in the state, and that
the state had no other choice but to allow Gaines’ admission because of the Equal
Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment (Kelleher, 1971; Grothaus, 1984;
Bluford, 1959; Linder, 2000). The attorneys for the University were from a notable
Kansas City private firm and were “‘driving and dramatic’” in their opening presentation
according to Houston (as cited by Kluger, p. 203). Houston’s obstacles during the
hearing were that the defense argued that Gaines’ remedy was to be provided by the
officials at Lincoln University, and that the officials at the University of Missouri at
Columbia were resistant to acknowledging that Columbia was a particularly good place
to be trained to be a lawyer if you wanted to practice in Missouri (Kluger).
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Judge Dinwiddie accepted the argument of the University, which was that it was
Lincoln’s responsibility to provide a legal education for black students, and that until
Lincoln was able to make that program available, the state’s provision for out-of-state
scholarship funding for Gaines’ tuition was sufficient to meet the “separate but equal”
standards (Kelleher, 1971; Grothaus, 1984; Bluford, 1959; Linder, 2000). Dinwiddie
dismissed the petition, and Houston filed an appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court.
The NAACP lawyers, led by Houston, filed an appeal to the Missouri Supreme
Court in December of 1937. They argued that the scholarships were a “compromise and
a subterfuge” that prevented the black student from the joy of studying in his home state
through the state university system that he supported (Kelleher, 1971, p. 265). The
state’s argument was that there were not enough students to support Lincoln’s legal
program. The NAACP’s counter argument was that this was not about numbers, but
about individual rights. The Gaines case was important in highlighting the obvious,
which was that the out-of-state scholarships were a method for side-stepping the
obligation to provide graduate programs to black students (Kelleher, 1971).
The Missouri Circuit Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the
University to admit Gaines. On December 9, 1937, the Missouri Supreme Court issued
their support for the decisions of Judge Dinwiddie and the circuit court (Rowan, 1993).
The Missouri Supreme Court supported the arguments of the University. In comparing
the Maryland case to Missouri’s, the Missouri Supreme Court found that there was no
requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide an identical educational
program, just an equal one. Likewise, in Maryland, there was no official person to
provide separate educational programs, but in Missouri, the Board of Curators at Lincoln
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University was officially responsible for this task (Rowan, 1993; Kelleher, 1971).
Justice Frank’s opinion reflected the language used in a previous Missouri case,
“’There are differences in the races’ that ‘create different social relations recognized by
all well-organized governments’” (as cited by Linder, 2000, p. 17). Separate schools for
negroes are “‘to their great advantage’” (as cited by Linder, p. 17). “‘We hold that the
opportunity offered appellant for law education in the university of an adjacent state is
substantially equal to that offered white students at the University of Missouri’” (Linder,
p. 17). The NAACP had a prime opportunity to take Gaines’ case to the United States
Supreme Court.
Marshall knew that he had to have the press on his side to win in the long run,
despite the decisions of the judges throughout the process. Marshall recalled, “‘I felt
great when Time magazine, the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, began to
write about how we were stirring up a ‘revolution’ in higher education’” (as cited in
Rowan, 1993, p. 74). A sympathetic white student also provided student sentiment from
the University of Missouri to the NAACP (Grothaus, 1984). Other Missourians
expressed similar support by comparing the stance of the university to that of Nazism in
Germany and declared their disgust that the University of all places should be that
“‘democracy will have little hope when ‘a great university will not support the Bill of
Rights and the American Constitution’” (as cited in Grothaus, p. 24). Reaction by the
students at the University of Missouri was mixed. Some students threatened to leave and
said that Gaines would be treated like a “dog” (Grothaus, 1984). Other students
expressed that they did not mind integration in the classroom, but would be
uncomfortable with mixed dormitories and social activities. The school newspaper, The

64
Missouri Student, took the dogmatic administration and the oppositional students to task.
Also equating their bigotry to Nazism, the editors reminded the students that white racial
domination was decided by the Civil War. The University of Missouri needed to face up
to “‘The Inevitable Mr. Gaines’” and embrace “‘our call to pioneer the nation out of this
last frontier of racial prejudice and superstition’” (as cited by Grothaus, p. 25).
The United States Supreme Court Opinion of the Gaines v. Canada case
As a result of Houston’s failing health due to tuberculosis, Marshall, at age thirty,
became the leader for what became the legal and social revolution for school integration
(Rowan, 1993). Marshall said about this transition of leadership, “‘The first thing I
thought about was not what it meant to me, but what a loss it was to the NAACP’” (as
cited in Rowan, 1993, p. 76). Despite the slow, discouraging pace of the Gaines case,
two and a half years later, Marshall took the case on to the Supreme Court. On
November 9, 1938, Marshall and Redmond went to the United States Supreme Court for
the oral argument. During the proceedings, the lawyers for the University of Missouri
were embarrassed several times because they had to correct their embellishments of the
state’s “generosity” to black education (Kelleher, 1971, p. 267).
One month later, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes announced the Court’s
decision on December 12, 1938 (Grothaus, 1984; Kelleher, 1971). The Court’s ruling
favored Gaines and reversed the Missouri Supreme Court. Despite repeated denials from
the Missouri Court System, the 6-2 majority of the Justices serving on the United States
Supreme Court viewed the case in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and declared that Gaines must be admitted
to the University of Missouri – Columbia or provided an equal education at Lincoln
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University within the state of Missouri. The primary argument of the Opinion was that if
white students could attend law school within the state of Missouri, then the same
opportunity must be provided for black students (Grothaus). In addition, an educational
program could not deny admittance to a person solely because of the color of his skin.
However, majority’s opinion did not require the Law School to admit Gaines. Rather, the
decision to either admit Gaines or provide a separate legal education program was left up
to the Missouri authorities to decide and implement (Kelleher; Grothaus).
United States Supreme Court Syllabus of the Case
The official Syllabus of the Supreme Court of the United States provides a legal
summary of the majority opinion that decided the case. The following is my summary of
the findings of the Court reported in the Syllabus for Gaines, [305 U.S. 337 (1938)].
The background of the case involves Missouri’s program of separate secondary
schools and higher education institutions for whites and negroes. The University of
Missouri provides a law school for white students, but the university for negroes, Lincoln,
does not. The State of Missouri shall arrange for the legal education of Missouri negroes,
and to pay the tuition charges for this education, at law schools in adjacent states where
negroes are accepted and “where the training is equal to that obtainable at the Missouri
State University, until the curators of Lincoln University deem that the courses are
“necessary and practicable” for their own student population (p. 1, Syllabus). Relying
on this State policy for separating the races at educational institutions, the curators at the
Missouri State University denied admittance to a Negro student into the law school
because of his race. This Negro student then sought a mandamus, in the state courts,
which was denied.
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(1)

The Supreme Court held that the curators of the Missouri State
University abided by State policy, representing the State, and thus
their action in “denying the negro admission to the law school was
a state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment”
(Syllabus, p. 1).

(2)

The State of Missouri in providing legal action to whites, but not to
negroes, “was a discrimination repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment” (Syllabus, p. 2). “If a State furnishes higher
education to white residents, it is bound to furnish substantially
equal advantages to negro residents, though not necessarily in the
same schools” (Syllabus, p. 2).

(3)

“The unconstitutional discrimination is not avoided by the purpose
of the State to establish a law school for negroes whenever
necessary and practicable in the opinion of the curators of the
University provided for negroes” (Syllabus, p. 2).

(4)

The State of Missouri does not satisfy the requirements of the
equal protection clause by sending its negro citizens to other states
for legal education. This particular concern is not over the quality
and availability of legal education afforded to negroes in other
states, but that Missouri provides opportunities for a legal
education to white students within its own state, and denies it to
negroes solely on the basis of color. “That is a denial of the
equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege which the
State has set up,” and the provision of paying tuition for the negro
student does not remove the discrimination (Syllabus, p. 2).

(5)

The State of Missouri is obligated by the United States
Constitution to provide equal protection of laws and establishing
the rights of persons within its own borders.

(6)

The fact that there is a small demand for the legal education of
negroes does not excuse the discrimination in favor of white
people.

(7)

The delay in the curators providing a legal education for negroes
until they deemed it to be necessary and practicable to provide
facilities, the alternative of sending negroes to different states is
not excusable as “temporary discrimination” (Syllabus, p. 2).

Primary Arguments from the Supreme Court’s Opinion and Separate Opinion
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote the Opinion for the majority of the
Court. In a 6-2 decision, Hughes wrote this key passage:
The basic consideration is not as to what sort of opportunities other States
provide, or whether they are as good as those in Missouri, but as to what
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opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students and denies to
negroes solely upon the ground of color. [305 U.S. 337, p. 350, (1938)]
Hughes argued that Gaines denial of admission was a “personal one” that violated the
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment that Gaines deserved as the right of an
individual. By arguing that Gaines’ right was a “personal” one, the Court was agreeing
with the NAACP lawyers that out-of-state scholarships were not equal opportunities and
were constitutionally defective. This argument from the Supreme Court was significant
because it gave legal basis to the NAACP lawyers’ plan that state universities would not
be able to afford dual systems, and would be forced to integrate educational programs to
avoid this expense (Kelleher, 1971). Hughes continued:
The question here is not of a duty of the State to supply legal training, or
of the quality of the training which it does supply, but of its duty when it
provides such training to furnish it to the residents of the State upon the
basis of an equality of right. By the operation of the laws of Missouri, a
privilege has been created for white law students which is denied to
negroes by reason of their race. The white resident is afforded legal
education within the State; the negro resident having the same
qualifications is refused it there, and must go outside the State to obtain it.
That is a denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the
privilege [p350] which the State has set up, and the provision for the
payment of tuition fees in another State does not remove the
discrimination. [305 U.S. 337, p. 350, p. 353, (1938)]
In his dissent, Justice James McReynolds expressed beliefs that were typical of
whites in the 1930s (Kelleher, 1971). He saw Gaines as having spurious intentions, and
he predicted that because of this ruling “The University of Missouri would have to
abandon her law school . . . or . . . break down the settled practice concerning separate
schools, and thereby, as indicated by experience, damnify both races” [305 U.S. 337
(1938)]. In addition, quoting Justice Harlan in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of
Education, [175 U.S. 528 (1899)], McReynolds reinforced the tradition of allowing states
the liberty to run their schools as they pleased by arguing, “The education of the people
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in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States”
[305 U.S. 337, p. 353, (1938)]. The majority on the Court disagreed with Justice
McReynolds and fellow dissenter, Justice Pierce Butler, and affirmed that the Fourteenth
Amendment to provide equal protection under the law for individual rights superceded
any state’s prerogative to infringe upon a citizen’s right to an equal education.
Aftermath of the Ruling
In response to the Supreme Court’s Opinion, in May, 1939, the Missouri
legislature enacted the Taylor Bill, which evaded integration despite the opposition of
over 200 black citizens who attended the hearings regarding the bill. The Board of
Curators at Lincoln University was charged with creating a legal education program
when the need arose, and was allotted $200,000 to establish the program. In 1939, the
Missouri Supreme Court sent the case to the circuit court for a jury trial to determine if
the Taylor Bill’s provisions for Lincoln were equal to the University of Missouri’s law
school program in Columbia. If the facilities proved to be unequal, then Gaines would be
admitted to the University of Missouri Law School (Kelleher, 1971; Grothaus, 1984).
Just as what resulted from the “with all deliberate speed” principle of the Brown
ruling, Missouri officials, including University of Missouri President Middlebush,
managed to develop resistance practices. Middlebush took a strong stand to maintain the
status quo and prevent black students from being admitted to the graduate programs in
Columbia (Linder, 2000; Grothaus, 1984). He created a plan to send their own professors
to teach classes at Lincoln University to avoid having black students attend classes within
the Columbia campus. One of the University’s lawyers, Kenneth Teasdale, even
authored a memorandum entitled, “The Conspiracy to use the Professional Schools,” in

69
which he argued that the investigative lawyer, Sidney Redmond, and the NAACP had
used spurious tactics to force integration including urging Governor Donnell to close
black professional schools and appoint the board of the Lincoln Curators to become a
black majority (Grothaus). Meanwhile, during the resistance delays for integrating the
University of Missouri, students and officials at Lincoln fought for full, equal
accreditation and resisted the efforts of the Missouri Legislature to cut its budget for the
program in 1943. The law program at Lincoln operated for several years until the
subsequent Supreme Court rulings in Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma, [332 U.S. 631 (1948)], McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents [339 U.S. 637
(1950)], and Sweatt v. Painter [339 U.S. 629 (1950)], went further than the “separate but
equal” ideology and declared segregation to be an infringement of students’
constitutional rights (Bluford, 1959). The Gaines case was decided in 1938. The
University of Missouri allowed black students to enroll in regular classes in 1950.
When Charles Houston came to address these new challenges, he found that
Gaines had been missing for several months (Kelleher, 1971; Kluger, 2004; Rowan).
Throughout the legal proceedings, Gaines had completed his M.A. degree in economics
from the University of Michigan with the financial support of his family and the NAACP
(Kelleher, 1971; Bluford, 1959; Rowan, 1993). He worked for the Michigan State Civil
Service Department as a W.P.A. clerk (Bluford). Gaines returned to St. Louis, worked at
a service station, and told friends in December, 1938, that he planned to attend the
University of Michigan Law School in the fall of 1939, stating he was "ready, willing
and able to enroll in the law department at the university in September and had the fullest
intention of doing so" (Bluford, p. 244). Redmond and Espy helped pay for him to live at
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the YMCA. Eventually, Gaines took a train to move to Chicago on April 28, 1939, and
Bluford herself accompanied him to Union Station. In letters to his mother, Gaines
expressed weariness and dejection in reflecting on the three years of litigation and of
feeling pressure to remain the hero. He left the Alpha Phi Alpha fraternity house one
night, and was never seen or heard from again. Some believe that he disappeared to
Mexico, others believe foul play occurred, and some believe that he accepted a bribe to
relinquish the fight. On October 11, 1939, the NAACP lawyers informed Judge
Dinwiddie that Gaines was missing. Consequently, the Gaines case closed without an
ending in January, 1940.
Impact of the Opinion on Student Access on Higher Education
In assessing the impact of the Gaines’ ruling on student access to higher
education, Bluford states it best, “The ruling in the Gaines case was a far cry from the
sweeping opinion of May 17, 1954, but two decades ago it was hailed as the most farreaching decision affecting Negroes handed down by the highest tribunal in many, many
years. It was considered the greatest victory Negroes had won since freedom” (1959, p.
242). Bluford and Guzman (1959) contend that students today do not realize that their
protected, guaranteed rights for equal opportunities in higher education as well as in
secondary schools largely emerged from the legal triumph from the Gaines case.
Bluford further argues that the Gaines decision established the principle of
"equality of education" (p. 242, 1959; Guzman, 1959). During the 1930s, there were
sixteen states that actively practiced segregation to the point of sending black students to
other states for their higher level education programs (Bluford, 1959). In Georgia, for
example, a black student who wanted to become a doctor, lawyer, or engineer, would
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have to travel hundreds of miles from home and would bear a heavier financial burden as
a result. In cases like these, educational programs for black students were non-existent
(Kluger, 2004). This particular aspect of educational discrimination became difficult for
the Supreme Court to deny equal protection, which would force the South to either
develop separate graduate schools for black students or admit them to white institutions.
This open door allowed the NAACP legal strategists to advance their cause to
undergraduate institutions, and eventually to elementary and secondary schools through
Brown (Kelleher, 1971; Kluger, 2004).
Bluford herself was a noted victim of Missouri resistance to integration. Bluford
graduated from the University of Kansas and was the managing editor of the Kansas City
Call (Grothuas, 1984). Bluford was a well-qualified applicant who sought admission to
the school of journalism at the University of Missouri. She received several rejection
letters, and then applied to Lincoln, which stated that it did not have the resources to
provide such a program. Bluford applied again to the University of Missouri, and was
denied, again, and was told to wait for Lincoln to develop its journalism program.
Bluford’s case went to court, but the judge agreed with the University attorney that time
must be given to allow Lincoln to develop its own program. The Bluford case is
particularly notable to the history of student access to higher education because it
highlights the failure of the Gaines opinion of the Supreme Court to require immediate
acceptance of Gaines to the Law School (Grothaus, 1984). Bluford was never admitted
to the University despite her many applications, even after the court decisions. The
Bluford case highlighted the continued efforts at resistance to integration that were
complicated and delayed even further during World War II. Like the Brown decision to
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come fifteen years later, the Gaines decision stated the principle of equality of
opportunity and protection of individual rights, but provided for a weak, unstructured
plan of implementation that allowed resistance and legal challenges to continue for years
(Grothaus, 1984).
Despite the resistance efforts and the perpetuous obstacles that black citizens
faced to receive their protected rights and equality of opportunity, scholars still hail the
Gaines case today as a monumental victory in history of the Supreme Court’s decisions.
For instance, Roy Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP in the 1960s, argued in the
1950s, “‘On the Gaines case hinges not only the educational welfare of Negroes in
Missouri, but it will influence the whole system of education for Negroes in southern and
border states’” (as cited by Bluford, 1959, p. 246). When Bluford wrote her article in the
Journal of American Sociology in 1959, four southern states still maintained institutions
for white students only - South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. While this
might seem staggering to the reader today that the resistance efforts held for so long, in
Bluford’s mind at the time, that was quite an accomplishment that only four states
remained. She acknowledged the Gaines case as the impetus for legal and social change.
Finally, one of the most interesting reflections came from Thurgood Marshall,
who both celebrates and laments the events of the Gaines case:
“This case produced the victory, the legal precedent, that we used to wipe
out Jim Crow in Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, and other states. In Gaines
we dragged the federal courts one more step away from ‘separate but
equal.’ We stopped the outrage of a state rejecting its black, taxpaying
citizens by paying for them to study in a university in some other state.
We stopped the delay of justice by getting the Supreme Court to say that it
was not enough to promise black kids that sooner or later they would
establish medical, law, and other professional schools ‘just for blacks.’ I
remember Gaines as one of our greatest victories, but I have never lost the
pain of having so many people spend so much time and money on him,
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only to have him disappear. The sonofabitch just never ever contacted us
again.” (Rowan, 1993, p. 78)
Although an intense, nation-wide search for Gaines never turned up any leads, scholars
remain mixed on what likely happened to Gaines and whether he bowed out or was a
martyr for the cause. For our historical understanding, all one can do is be grateful for
the efforts that he did make, and in his name did successfully accomplish, for
significantly advancing student access to higher education.
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CHAPTER 4
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE POST-GAINES
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 1938-2003
White Resistance to Integration of Higher Education
Despite the legal victories in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, [305 U.S. 337
(1938)], Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, [332 U.S. 631 (1948)],
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents [339 U.S. 637 (1950)], and Sweatt v. Painter [339
U.S. 629 (1950)], white resistance to the integration of higher education was extensive.
Tensions rose even higher over the integration of public schools ordered by the Supreme
Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, [347 U.S. 483 (1954)]. In the 1970s2000s, the Court considered the issue of affirmative action policies used as a redress for
past discrimination and as a means to provide diversity in higher education. The
following chapter provides a historical timeline of the primary legal events relating to
equal access to higher education from the Gaines case up to the landmark decision in
Grutter v. Bollinger, [539 U.S. 306 (2003)], which is analyzed in chapter five.
Harold Wecshler (1977) in The Qualified Student provides an in-depth historical
analysis of the social, political, and economic factors that shaped student admissions in
United States higher education from the 1800s to the 1960s. One of Wecshler’s primary
objectives is to show how student admissions policies mirrored society’s social structure
at large, and how access to higher education affected a student’s life chances and social
mobility. Wecshler unveils the hidden agendas that administrators and faculties in higher
education utilized in developing their student admissions criteria and policies. The
themes of selectivity, exclusivity, and access that Wecshler effectively develops are still
salient for examining higher education today.

75
A key component of Wecshler’s argument is, “Admission to college would
henceforth mean admission to the professions and upper middle class America”
(Wecshler, 1977, p. 82). Wecshler articulates the significant impact that admission to
higher education makes upon society as a whole:
But the aims of a college (and hence its admissions policies) are affected
by the world around it, the goals it adopts and their method of implementation have an effect on the larger society. But regulating access to
the professions, the colleges have affected the nature of social mobility in
American society and, more intangibly, the nature of the decisions made
by those in authority. (p. 187)
Wecshler contends, “But at certain points in the academic university, admissions
policies were deliberately, self-consciously, and articulately manipulated to achieve
broad social ends” (1977, p. 66). These social ends designed by university officials were
enacted primarily through student admissions practices.
In the same vein as Wecshler (1977), Karabel (2005) explores the connection
between meritocracy and exclusion practices at Princeton University during the early
1900s. Quoting E.E. Slosson, who conducted a survey of fourteen leading universities in
1910, at Princeton “‘negroes…are shut out by reason of their race, an injustice which is
unique among the universities’” (as cited by Karabel, p. 232). Princeton’s practice of
total exclusion of black students extended through the early 1940s. Two of the most
important political steps in the process for promoting fair student access were President
Truman’s Committee on Higher Education, (Higher Education for American Democracy,
1946), and his Commission on Civil Rights. Both were examples of how the political
pressure applied to universities to admit students “on the basis of merit and not with
regard to race, color, creed, or national origin” by withholding public funds and by
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allowing accusations of discrimination to be investigated, provided a watch-dog effect on
university admissions officials (Wecshler, 1977, p. 203).
It was Kingman Brewster, president of Yale from 1963-1977, who significantly
increased the admittance of Jews, blacks, and women. Brewster contended that the
United States system of free enterprise was dependent upon “’wide-spread confidence
that success is a function of merit and effort’” (Karabel, 2005, inset, photographs).
Likewise, at Harvard, Dean Wilbur J. Bender was the key figure in shaping Harvard’s
admissions policies after World War II (Karabel). Bender articulated the viewpoint that
admissions should be based on more than academic performance and that the deciding
factor should often be based on intangible personal qualities (Karabel). Karabel argues
that Bender’s notion is still important for virtually all of the selective private universities
in the United States today.
NAACP Strategy Leads to Brown
While admissions officers in higher education were slow to provide meaningful
integration in their classrooms, white resistance to the integration of elementary and
secondary schools in the South was even greater. Considerable scholarly research has
addressed the intended and unintended outcomes of the Brown 9-0 decision (Russo,
2004). Called the “most important decision in the history of the Court,” by the nearly
only dissenting Justice, Stanley Reed, the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Brown ended
legalized segregation in the public schools (Kluger, 2004, p. 712). While the
implementation of the ruling has both “liberated and infuriated” members of the black
community fifty years later, there can be no dispute that Brown generated “a
reconsecration of American ideals” (Kluger, p. 713). Kluger explores the backgrounds
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and characteristics of the key players in each case such as Reverend Joseph Delaine and
student Barbara Johns, whose courageous leadership in South Carolina and Virginia,
respectively, were part of the five key cases that, along with cases in Kansas, Delaware,
and Washington, D. C., became known simply as Brown. Spurred by successes in Sweatt,
McLaurin, and Gaines, the talented black members of the NAACP Legal Defense Team
including Marshall, Bill Hastie, Spottswood Robinson, James Nabrit, and Robert Carter,
chipped away at the bedrock of Plessy and opened the door to future opportunities to
challenge segregation in the public schools. In overturning Plessy in 1954 through Brown
v. Board of Education, Chief Justice Earl Warren told his fellow Justices that segregation
could be justified only with the belief in the inherent inferiority of black people, and that
if they were to uphold Plessy, it would have to be on that basis. As a result, Warren
effectively delivered a unanimous opinion in Brown overturning Plessy (Schwartz, 1993;
Kluger).
Kluger (2004) provides an extensive description of the events of Brown itself
including the extraordinary twist of fate that brought Earl Warren to the Chief Justice seat
upon the death of Justice Fred Vinson during time period involving the Brown arguments.
After a resounding reversal of Plessy was ordered in Brown I, Brown II, which was
argued in 1955, vaguely articulated an implementation decree, which included the
disappointing, but notable call for school boards and District Courts to act “with all
deliberate speed.”
To invalidate the Plessy principle, Chief Justice Warren wrote in the Brown
Opinion,
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when
the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson
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was written. We must consider public education in light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.
(Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, [347 U.S. 483 (1954)])
While the Justices’ unanimous decision to reject “separate but equal,” in Brown
was profound, the tone of Warren’s argument reflects the justification he felt compelled
to provide to appease the Southern white population. Regardless, the Brown opinion
opened the door to protections for racial classes beyond white or “Negro” including
Mexican Americans in Hernandez v. Texas, [347 U.S. 475 (1954)]. In United States v.
Virginia, [518 U.S. 515 (1996)], and Levy v. Louisiana, [391 U.S. 68 (1968)], other
marginalized groups including women and illegitimate children were extended
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Kluger describes the champions of social justice, including Judge Waties Waring,
Eleanor Roosevelt, Presidents Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson, Chief Justice Earl
Warren, and the foes, including most of the white Southern leadership, Brown defense
lawyers Robert Figg and John W. Davis, to the more recent policies and opinions of
Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan and Justice William Rehnquist, who
unraveled many of the achievements in social justice established by the Warren Court.
After a resounding reversal of Plessy was ordered in Brown I, in the opinion of
Brown II, which was argued in 1955, the Supreme Court established an implementation
decree, which included the disappointing, but notable call for school boards and District
Courts to act “with all deliberate speed.” The Warren Court acted without the support of
President Dwight Eisenhower and other legal and political leaders. Even future Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, who was clerking for Justice Robert Jackson at the time of
Brown, urged Jackson to reaffirm Plessy stating, “’I think Plessy v. Ferguson was right
and should be reaffirmed’” (as cited by Pettigrew, 2004, p. 522). Beliefs such as this
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from judicial strongholds such as Rehnquist would come back decades later to undo and
further complicate the original intentions of Brown. The implementation of Brown
became complicated, arduous, and wearisome due to white resistance practices using the
vague principle of “all deliberate speed,” which caused a twelve-year delay in
implementation (Kluger, 2004). A few guidelines and a gradual timetable would have
been the better method for structuring the path to implementation (Pettigrew, 2004).
Wilkinson (1979) states that for the period of 1955 to 1968, the Supreme Court avoided
intervention in school integration by refusing to review most rulings of the lower federal
courts. He argues, “The Court’s great error lay not in the formation of ‘all deliberate
speed,’ but in not monitoring ‘deliberate speed’ after Brown to ensure that some genuine
progress actually took place” (p. 86). Wilkinson states:
Had the Court been determined, however, it might have shortened both the
litigation and the desegregation process: by setting a fixed date for
integration to take place, by approving only those plans that resulting in
substantial integration, by requiring that desegregation proceed in certain
ways (for example, through pairing of schools or geographical
zoning) . . . . (p. 66)
Wilkinson elucidates the white resistance practices to avoid Brown including
gerrymandering, segregated housing practices, white flight to the suburbs, growth in the
private school movement, and an increase in academic tracking.
Gradualism and tokenism were used by school boards to avoid full
implementation of Brown until the Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,
[391 U.S. 430 (1968)], in which Judge Wisdom argued that “school boards had a positive
duty to integrate, not merely to stop segregating” (Wilkinson, p. 112). Support of
effective integration from the executive and the legislative branches finally came in the
form of guidelines, enforced by fund cut-offs, established by The Office of Education of
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the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in response to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Another significant change came in the transferring of the supervisory power of
integration from local school boards to the federal courts, which initiated the
‘affirmative’ federal involvement period identified by Caldas and Bankston (2007). In
the affirmative period, the federal government began to take a stronger role in the
regulation of the nation’s public schools to force local school boards to develop
meaningful integration of public schools through the design of school attendance zones
and busing students to schools outside of their neighborhoods. The Supreme Court also
allowed admissions officers at universities and colleges to consider race as a factor in
student admissions to promote a meaningful diversity in higher education classrooms.
The 1960s became known as the Freedom of Choice Era in which school districts
gave students the “choice” to attend a school with children from another race. However,
freedom of choice did not remedy school segregation, placing the burden of integration
on black parents (Caldas and Bankston, 2007). Despite most southern school systems’
eventual superficial compliance with Brown, social pressure in the white community and
in the black communities prevented students from “choosing” to integrate their schools.
This ‘de facto’ segregation, in which segregation is caused by factors other than legal
principle, is still common in the United States today due to racially segregated housing
patterns (Caldas and Bankston). However, the 1960s political climate that stimulated
social change and led to the 1964 Civil Rights Act provided a significant factor in
motivating the Supreme Court to address de facto segregation and freedom of choice. In
Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board, [377 U.S. 218 (1964)], the Court
prohibited state closing of schools to avoid desegregation. In Green (1968), the Supreme
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Court held that the New Kent County, Virginia, school board’s “freedom of choice” plan
for desegregation was both unconstitutional and ineffective (Caldas and Bankston). The
Court noted that not a single white child had attended the all-black Watkins school in
New Kent County and that 85% of the Negro children in the school district still attended
the Watkins school. These facts showed that New Kent County, despite its “freedom of
choice” plan, was still a dual school system. The Court found that school districts should
be held responsible for providing a “unitary” school system, and that creating racially
mixed schools would be a requirement of school systems (Caldas and Bankston). The
Court created Green factors as guidelines for fully integrating schools including an
integrated staff, faculty, facilities, extracurricular activities, and transportation (Pettigrew,
2004, and Caldas and Bankston).
Two other landmark Supreme Court cases that supported the Green decision were
the 1969 Mississippi school case Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, [396
U.S. 1218 (1969)], and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, [402 U.S.
1 (1971)]. Through another unanimous decision in Holmes, the Court held that
desegregation must be achieved “at once” and “operate …hereafter only on a unitary
basis” (as cited by Pettigrew, 2004, p. 523). The Swann case was important because it
established the use of busing to desegregate each of the Charlotte, North Carolina, urban
schools in order to comply with the unitary system requirement. Wilkinson (1979, p. 145)
discusses Chief Justice Burger’s second thoughts on beginning the “busing war” as
Burger spoke days after the ruling focusing on the opinion’s “restrictive language” for
excessive limits for busing. Eventually, the fury over busing subsided, and busing for
integration continued. Finally, in Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1, [413 U.S. 189
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(1973)], the Court held that Latino children were also entitled to a full and equal
educational program.
African American Response
When discussing the legal implications for the integration of higher education and
elementary and secondary public schools, it is valuable to consider the impact on black
students and teachers to have a comprehensive picture of social and political climate from
the Gaines case in 1938 to the Grutter case in 2003. Research and discourse regarding
the desegregation of Southern schools has typically been conducted through dominant
cultural forces, providing little attention to the voice and complexities reported by black
citizens who lived the experience. An innovative approach to race studies was provided
by Dingus (2006). The purpose of Dingus’ study was to solicit personal narratives from
black teachers who experienced desegregation to illuminate the complexities in which
race, social class standing, gender, and personal relationships compounded individual
support, views, resistance, and participation in the movement to desegregate the Southern
schools. The core theme that emerged from the data was black teachers’ roles in efforts
to desegregate Southern schools, which included facing a lack of resources and the
resulting challenges to teaching and learning under such conditions. Lack of resources
included exposure to print materials and travel that advantaged white children over black
children. The counterstory provided by Dingus’ participants revealed the extraordinary
efforts of black teachers to overcome the shortage of resources and to foster resilience, a
sense of humanity, and determination and provide the skills, strategies, and orientations
the students needed to thrive in their rural communities. However, the results also
showed the importance of the human resources of the black teachers that have previously
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been overlooked in research regarding desegregation. One of the teachers described
using her own money to provide print materials stating that we “‘did the best we could.
Not what we wanted, but the best we could’” (as cited in Dingus, p. 221).
Another important theme in the counterstory emerged when participants
highlighted the ways in which teachers’ view of race, social status, and relationships
complicated their stances on school desegregation. Dingus (2006) concluded that while
the participants saw the need for greater access to material resources, their responses
indicated a disbelief that school desegregation solved race-based educational inequities,
opportunities, and outcomes for black children. One participant questioned her parents’
belief that attending a school with white children would provide a better education for her.
Similarly, Wilkinson (1979) found that black pride countered the notion that having
contact with whites in integrated schools was necessary for academic improvement.
Dingus’ participants also argued that black students were more successful in familiar
cultural contexts in the segregated schools receiving instruction from black teachers,
rather than in the current system of desegregation in which students are instructed by
mostly white teachers in unfamiliar cultural contexts; a system which now chronically
fails the black students in a way that segregated schools did not. Dingus’ conclusions are
similar to Siddle-Walker’s (2000) findings in which she used oral history as a method to
elucidate the successes of segregated black schools before Brown as a result of the
exemplary actions of teachers and administrators, involved parents, and strong
curriculum and extracurricular activities. These studies provide insight into the history of
black education and illuminate the belief systems regarding desegregation and its related
issues.
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Cowan (1971) used survey research to ascertain teacher perceptions of school
climate during the desegregation period. Conducted in 1971, Cowan’s doctoral
dissertation sought to explore the changes in teacher perceptions of school climate before
and after teachers were transferred in the Atlanta Public Schools in order to comply with
desegregation orders. Cowan concluded that Black teachers perceived their school
climate as more “open” than did white teachers both before and after teachers were
transferred. Cowan’s other significant finding was that the socioeconomic status of the
school had a stronger effect on non-transferring teachers’ perceptions of school climate
than did race both before and after the transfer.
Another extraordinary contribution to the post-Brown discourse is a living history
interview of Mrs. Vivian Scales, who was one of the original plaintiffs who challenged
the segregation of elementary schools in Topeka. McConnell and Hinitz (2003) reported
the interview with Mrs. Scales in November, 1998, in which she was asked to recount the
events of how she got involved in the Brown case. Most notably, she reported on how
the day after the decision, she and her friends went to the soda shop and ordered from the
counter, a place which previously served them from the back door. Mrs. Scales also
reported that very few whites went to the black schools after the decision, taking their
children to other schools. In addition, she said that today in Topeka, more than forty
years after Brown, all black schools are closed, and that the schools will never be equal
because “‘there are some white people that won’t go with the black kids’” (as cited in
McConnell and Hinitz, p. 80). However, looking back, Mrs. Scales said she would do it
all again because it was worth it for her daughter and that her daughter had a “‘better life
because of it. I feel like a winner. I’m for whatever is right’” (as cited in McConnell and
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Hinitz, p. 80). The meaning of this interview is important to my research in that it
reminds scholars of the personal end of legal decisions and how much those decisions
shape the daily lives of people.
McConnell and Hinitz (2003) were also able to interview the Brown girls
themselves, Linda and Cheryl. Cheryl reported that, ‘“The issue for black parents was
the distance their children had to travel to attend school, when there were schools in their
neighborhood. Neighborhoods in Topeka were integrated. People lived where they
could afford to live”’ (as cited in McConnell and Hinitz, p. 81). This issue that Cheryl
Brown Henderson raised in her interview in 1998 was important in 1954 and is still
relevant today as it was the primary issue in the Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1, [551 U.S. 701 (2007)], case in which the Supreme Court
decided that local school boards could no longer consider racial balancing when
designing school attendance zones.
The Resegregation Era, 1974-Present
According to Caldas and Bankston (2007), the period of decreasing federal
activism began in the mid-1970s and ended in the late 1980s. The Court abruptly
changed course in 1974, the year after Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1, [413 U.S.
189 (1973)], (Pettigrew, 2004). Milliken v. Bradley, [418 U.S. 717 (1974)], has been
deemed as damaging to civil rights as the Dred Scott and Plessy decisions by legal
scholars because it banned cross-district desegregation remedies in Detroit, which
reversed the only realistic remedy for integrating large cities that had been established in
Swann. In Milliken v. Bradley II [433 U.S. 267 (1977)], the Court ruled that states could
be required to pay for remedial programs to recover the damages resulting from years of

86
segregation. Pettigrew argues, however, that special financing for these unproven
programs was insufficient to make up for years of racial segregation and inequalities, and
that is a modern version of separate, but equal.
The Supreme Court Considers Affirmative Action in Bakke
In education law, the idea of providing minority groups opportunity and access to
educational programs that has previously been denied to them has been a primary
consideration for Supreme Court justices since the 1970s (Katznelson, 2005). One of the
most critical cases is the Regents of University of California v. Bakke [438 U.S. 265
(1978)]. This ruling, addressing affirmative action remedies for school inequalities,
barred the use of quota systems in college admissions, but affirmed the constitutionality
of affirmative action programs giving an advantage to minorities. The debate over
principles of meritocracy and representativeness is highlighted in the Bakke case of 1978,
in which a white medical school applicant was denied admission into the University of
California at Davis despite having stronger qualifications than some of the black
applicants that were accepted in the program (Karabel, 2005). In addition, Karabel
explains that in the oral arguments for the Bakke case, the attorney for the University of
California, Archibald Cox, presented the argument that emphasized the need for
autonomy for universities to solve this problem in their own way based upon the tradition
of historic discretion and independence. The University’s Medical School had held
sixteen in the class out of one hundred spaces for minorities whose undergraduate grade
point average was exempt from the 2.5 minimum required of the other applicants
(Mathewson, 2011). Citing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits racial preferences in programs that
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receive federal funds, Bakke argued that his grade point average and MCAT scores were
significantly higher than the minority students who were admitted to the Davis Medical
School (Mathewson, 2011; Wilkinson, 1979). Calling it a “Solomonic compromise,” the
Supreme Court supported Bakke’s entry into the medical school ruling against the use of
quotas, but supported the general principles of affirmative action which hold that race can
be a contributing factor in the admission of students into higher education.
The deciding vote rested with Justice Lewis Powell, a political conservative who
had a behind-the-scenes role in opposing the strategy of massive resistance to
desegregation in Virginia. Powell was known as the Justice most likely to balance the
conflicting interests in the case. Powell thus aligned himself with the four liberal justices
on the primary issue of allowing race to be a factor in university admissions, while
declaring the Davis policy to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause (Karabel,
2005). Justice Powell announced the Bakke decision on June 28, 1978, stating that ‘“we
speak today with a notable lack of unanimity. The verdict upheld the California supreme
court in ordering Bakke to be admitted to the Medical School at the University of
California at Davis, but is was reversed in that it had prohibited Davis from considering
race as a factor in admissions’” (as cited in Karabel, p. 494).
Thurgood Marshall in his concurring opinion wrote, ‘“it is more than a little ironic
that after several hundred years of class-based discrimination against Negroes, the Court
is unwilling to hold that a class-based remedy for … discrimination is permissible’”
(“Opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall,” as cited by Karabel, 2005, p. 495). Karabel argues
that Justice Harry Blackmun articulated the most sound defense of compensatory
affirmative action, stating in the “Opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun,” (p. 407), that ‘“In
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order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way.
And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannotwe dare not-let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuation racial supremacy.”’ In dissent,
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for a plurality of four justices including Rehnquist,
Burger, Potter Stewart that the Davis reservation of sixteen spaces out of the one hundred
defined a quota and was a violation of the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition of racial
discrimination in any publicly funded program (Mathewson, 2005; Wilkinson, 1979).
Notably, Karabel (2005) argues that the social and political context significantly
affected the outcome of the Bakke case. Had Justice Powell faced the same issues raised
in the Bakke case in 1970 rather than in 1978, he likely would have sided with the
conservatives against the use of race as a factor in university admissions entirely.
Karabel states,
But by the time Bakke reached the Supreme Court, affirmative action had
become part of the fabric of American higher education. In 1977, the
elimination of affirmative action would have meant a radical alteration of
the status quo – a deeply unappealing prospect for a man who believed
that law should be an instrument of social stability.” (p. 497)
Further, Powell concluded that considering race in university admissions is
permissible when necessary to obtain ‘“the educational benefits that flow from an
ethnically diverse study body’” (as cited by Karabel, 2005, p. 497). Wilkinson (1976)
discusses the benefits of affirmative action which include to serve social needs, to enrich
and diversify schools and occupations, to better meet the medical and legal needs of
minorities, to encourage interracial interchange, and to develop black role models. In his
argument Powell was supporting the Harvard University policy, in which he recognized
the public relations value in linking his opinion to the prestigious university. Powell
reprinted in full in the appendix of his opinion in Bakke the Harvard description of its
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admissions policy. Harvard’s practices also provided a concrete example to other
universities as to what was legally permissible. For example, in contrasting the Harvard
policy to that at Davis, Harvard prohibited quotas, followed a consistent process in which
minority applicants competed against nonminority candidates, and considered race as one
of many nonacademic factors in the admissions criteria including geography or life spent
on a farm. Powell also quoted extensively from William Bowen’s article in the Princeton
Alumni Weekly “Admissions and the Relevance of Race” (Karabel, p. 498). The
universities added support to the Harvard-Penn-Columbia-Stanford effort in demanding a
reversal of the California Supreme Court decision in Bakke by attaching a prefatory note
declaring ‘“general support for the arguments advanced in the brief and join the amici in
urging reversal of the judgment of the California Supreme Court’” were Brown, Duke,
Georgetown, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Notre Dame, Vanderbilt, and
Villanova (Karabel, p. 659).
The background of the Bakke case has an ironic twist. That is, Alan Bakke was
likely rejected from medical school because of his age, rather than his race. Bakke was
established in an engineering career with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration in California when he decided to apply to medical school (Mathewson,
2011). Bakke’s scores on the MCAT (Medical College Admissions Test) were good but
not outstanding, but were higher than the average score for students admitted to Davis
(Dreyfuss, 1979). He was thirty-three years old at the time of his second rejection to
Davis and was rejected by several other medical schools across the United States
including the University of California Los Angeles, Wake Forest University, the
University of South Dakota, the University of Minnesota, the University of Cincinnati,
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the Mayo Medical School, and the University of California San Francisco which actually
cited his age as a factor in his letter of rejection. The Age Discrimination Act of 1975
was not put in to effect until January of 1979 in which discrimination based on age was
declared illegal at any institution of higher education that received federal funds (Karabel,
2005, p. 659).
The case attracted significant attention from the press, particularly when the
University filed its petition for certiorari at the Supreme Court and when certiorari was
granted. According to the Legal Information Institute website maintained by the Law
School at Cornell University, a writ of certiorari requests a lower court to deliver the
record in a case so that the higher court may review it. The Supreme Court uses certiorari
to select most of the cases that it hears.
The Bakke case became the landmark test case for the constitutional interpretation
of affirmative action. According to Mathewson (2011), the three major television
networks ran a total of thirty-seven evening news stories about Bakke and his case even
before the Supreme Court made its decision in 1978. Mathewson reports that only fiftyfive percent of the stories mentioned the legal issues involved. Bakke refused to be
interviewed and remained a private person throughout the process. Most importantly, the
study conducted and reported by Mathewson revealed that television coverage repeatedly
referred to the admitted minority students as not meeting the Davis Medical School’s
admission requirements, indicating that they were unqualified students, which was a
misreported and misrepresented fact in the media coverage. ‘“In a public setting fraught
with ambiguity and ambivalence about affirmative action, the public’s posture toward the
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issue could be uniquely affected by the media’s message regarding the unfolding Bakke
litigation”’ (Slotnick and Segal, as cited by Mathewson, 2011, p. 308).
The Supreme Court cited its prior affirmative action decisions in Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, [515 U.S. 200 (1995)], and City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,
[488 U.S. 469 (1989)], which required ‘“strict scrutiny’” of racial preferences by
government; Fullilove v. Klutznick, [448 U.S. 448 (1980)], requiring ‘“narrow tailoring of
actions to further compelling governmental interests such as diversity in the classroom;”’
and Justice Powell’s arguments in Bakke calling for the individual consideration of an
applicant’s ‘“potential contribution to diversity”’ (Mathewson, 2011, p. 326; Stohr, 2004).
Affirmative action policies must be developed to serve the larger compelling national
interest of establishing a meaningful diversity in student populations. In Justice Powell’s
view, when governmental decisions “touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic
background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear
on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest” (Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke).
The Bakke case provides the standards for the development of affirmative action
policies for all higher education student admissions still today. The Harvard policy was
applied in the Bakke case, and established the implementation objectives of narrowtailoring, strict scrutiny, and compelling interest. Justice Powell noted that the Bakke
decision included a myriad of judicial interpretations of the constitutionality of
affirmative action policies. As discussed in the next section, the 1980s and 1990s reflect
a more conservative interpretation of the use of race in public education.
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The Court Takes a Conservative Turn
When President Ronald Reagan appointed William Rehnquist Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court in 1986, the Court further drifted from enforcing remedies for
desegregation, undercutting Brown. Caldas and Bankston (2007) have identified this era
as the unitary or integrated era, comprising the late 1980s – early 2000s with minimal
government involvement. For example, the 1992 Freeman v. Pitts, [503 U.S. 467
(1992)], case from DeKalb County, Georgia, found that DeKalb was not held responsible
for demographic shifts because it was unitary in student assignment and had already
undone de jure segregation (segregation by law). The DeKalb case established a seventh
“Green” factor, referencing Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, [391
U.S. 430 (1968)], which was the quality of education, which included ‘“certain
educational resources’ such as teacher qualifications and experience, library books,
student outcomes as measured on standardized tests, and ‘per pupil expenditures’”
(Caldas and Bankston, p. 242). Although the Court did acknowledge the district courts
consideration of the quality of black education in comparison with white in DeKalb
County, the importance of the Freeman case was that it reinforced the Court’s increasing
stance on the restoration of school districts to state and local officials and freed DeKalb
from adhering to all of the Green factors of a having fully unitary system. This trend
continued in Missouri v. Jenkins, [491 U.S. 274, 276 (1989)], in which the Court
restricted the federal court’s powers requiring closing of the achievement gap in the
“quality of education” clause. Pettigrew (2004) argues that the significance in this case
was that school district financial remedies should be limited, that districts were not
required to demonstrate correction of segregation damages, and, again, reaffirmed local
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control of school districts. In Board of Education in Oklahoma City v. Dowell, [498 U.S.
237 (1991)], again, the Court reestablished the local control of the school board.
Likewise, in Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, [347 U.S. 483
(1954)], the Charlotte school district was finally declared unitary on student assignment
and was charged to no longer use race-based student assignment (Caldas and Bankston).
Recent Court Decisions Affecting the Relationship between Race and Education
The last desegregation era identified by Caldas and Bankston (2007) consists of
the current and predicted trends in light of recent affirmative action and desegregation
rulings in 2003 and 2007. The most important affirmative action rulings since the Bakke
decision came in 2003 in Gratz v. Bollinger and in Grutter v. Bollinger. In the Gratz case,
the Supreme Court ruled against the University of Michigan’s undergraduate policy of
awarding points in admissions criteria solely based on race. In the Grutter case, however,
the University was correct in fostering diversity under the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment, allowing for race to be one factor among many factors in admission
considerations in their law school. Thus, if the state has an interest in diversifying the
racial composition of state institutions, then race can be a factor to be considered in
government selection process. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg claimed in her dissent in the
undergraduate Gratz case, ‘“The stain of generations of racial oppression is still visible in
our society, and the determination to hasten its removal remains vital’” (as cited in
Caldas and Bankston, p. 252).
Scholarly research is beginning to emerge regarding the Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, [551 U.S. 701 (2007)], case. The
primary considerations of the Parents case were explicated by Steigerwald (2007). On
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June 28, 2007, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down integration plans in
Seattle, Washington, and in Louisville, Kentucky, that used race as a method in
determining school district zones. The opinion was decided along with Meredith v.
Jefferson County Board in which the Court prohibiting assigning students to public
schools solely for the purpose of achieving racial integration. Racial balancing is no
longer considered a compelling state interest. The salient aspects of the case include the
fact that it was a split decision, held by the conservative majority. In addition, the ruling
sets a judicial precedent that future decisions regarding the consideration of race as a
compelling state or national interest for minority protections may become more restricted
over time.
Conservatives were delighted with the Parents opinion in which the notion of
colorblindness in educational policy making is validated. In an interview with the
chairman of the American Civil Rights Institute, Ward Connerly, who has worked to
oppose or reverse laws that use racial and gender preferences in schools and workplaces,
Connerly argued against the use of quotas in designing school districts, stating that in the
Louisville case, school officials were setting a minimum of 15 percent of African
American students at each school with a maximum of 50 percent. He also argued that
both white and black parents were unhappy with the idea of their children being bused
across the school district for lengthy time periods to achieve racial balance in the schools.
Connerly argues that the Court makes decisions based upon the current social climate,
which is why this judgment was handed-down in 2007, but would not have occurred ten
years earlier. Connerly’s salient point was, ‘“I think most of us want racial integration,
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but the question is at what price should we favor the government orchestrating it for its
own purposes?”’ (as cited in Steigerwald p. 2).
The Gratz and Grutter cases and the Parents case were the most significant
rulings affecting education established in the desegregation era (Caldas and Bankston,
2007). However, they had divergent implications for the use of race in education. The
Grutter opinion upheld the use of race as a remaining consideration in providing
meaningful diversity in higher education classrooms, while the Parents case ended the
practice of designing school attendance zones to reflect a balance of the races in public
school classrooms. It is important to note that both cases were decided with a 5-4 ruling,
indicating the contradictory opinions held by the justices on the use of race in the
classroom.
Foster (2005) explains that an unintended consequence of the Civil Rights
Movement was that it identified the meaning of racism to be isolated to individual
irrationality, and that currently, with or without intended consequences, race neutral
practices, attitudes, and policies that perpetuate white dominance over people with color
politically, economically, and socially, continue on without effective critique. Foster
uses Critical Race Theory to explore hidden outcomes of the current state of a “raceneutral” society (p. 490) and argues that a race-neutral vocabulary emerged from the
Civil Rights Movement that inadvertently has created a myopic ideology in which
scholars are limited in their abilities to identify hidden racist agendas and practices.
Foster, like other Critical Race theorists such as Ladson-Billings (1995), contends that the
path to an increasingly cohesive society is not to abandon race-related discourse, but is to
develop research and discourse that raises race-related awareness to push for the fullest
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extent of social justice. Foster’s salient point is to encourage people to develop more
open and equal policies, practices, behaviors, and attitudes.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF GRUTTER
The purpose of this chapter is to identify primary themes related to student access
to higher education and establishing diversity in higher education classrooms through an
analysis of the Grutter v. Bollinger, [539 U.S. 306 (2003)], Supreme Court decision.
Although I focus primarily on the Grutter arguments, opinion, and dissents for the
purpose of my document analyses and comparative analysis in chapters six and seven,
one cannot evaluate the Grutter opinion without meaningful consideration of the
accompanying case of Gratz v. Bollinger. Thus, I begin this chapter with an analysis of
the social and political context leading up to the Gratz and Grutter decisions. I include a
section to explicate the Gratz case and assess its relationship to the Grutter arguments
and decision. I conclude the chapter with document analyses of the Grutter arguments,
opinions, and dissents.
Specifically, I provide analyses from five documents which are the oral argument,
the majority opinion, the concurring opinion, and two dissenting opinions from the
Grutter case. In the Appendix of this paper, I provide the primary documents in the case
organized by theme development through categorization and coding to identify and
reflect upon key excerpts from each document. As I present the document analyses, I
focus on two guiding questions. First, what themes can be identified from an analysis of
the judicial ideologies articulated in the oral argument, the majority opinion, and two
dissenting opinions of the Grutter case? Second, how are the themes from the document
analyses consistent with or in conflict with each other? I explore these themes deeper in
chapters six and seven with a focus on the Fourteenth Amendment and judicial
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interpretation, respectively. The purpose of the Grutter document analyses is to reveal
the legal ideologies that impact equal access to student admissions in higher education in
large part because this is the ideology that holds true for students applying to higher
education still today.
Overview of the Case
The Grutter case addresses the issue of reverse discrimination and the use of
affirmative action policies in higher education. Affirmative action plans began first as a
redress for past discrimination. Then, after the Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, [438 U.S. 265 (1978)], ruling, it became a primary tool for universities, schools,
the military, and corporations to create a diverse population in classrooms, platoons, and
companies, and to generate leadership opportunities for minorities. The Bakke decision is
essential to the Grutter case because the criteria articulated by Justice Powell have been
the basis for all affirmative action policies since 1978. The Grutter case challenged the
University of Michigan School of Law’s (Law School) implementation of the Bakke
criteria as well as whether the Bakke ruling is still appropriate for student admissions at all
(Stohr, 2004). It is important for the courts to periodically reconsider the affirmative
action plans to ensure their appropriate usage and legitimate interests.
The Supreme Court’s final ruling in Grutter favored the University of Michigan
Law School, (Bollinger, the University of Michigan President), in a 5-4 decision,
affirming the Bakke case, with Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens
in the majority, and Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas in dissent. The
Grutter case upheld the Bakke decision which forbids quota systems, but allows race to
be one of many factors with which universities may consider when admitting students.
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The salient legal issue was whether it is a compelling interest for universities to use race
as a factor in student admissions. The compelling interest factor signifies the importance
of promoting a diverse student population because it is meaningful for the education for
students of all races, and because it develops leaders among different populations. Justice
O’Connor highlights the key legal issues in the case in the Opinion of the Court:
This case requires us to decide whether the use of race as a factor in
student admissions by the University of Michigan (Law School) is
unlawful. The Law School ranks among the Nation’s top law schools. It
receives more than 3500 applications each year for a class of around 350
students. Seeking to ‘“admit a group of students who individually and
collectively are among the most capable,’” the Law School looks for
individuals with ‘“substantial promise for success in law school’” and ‘“a
strong likelihood of succeeding in the practice of law and contributing in
diverse ways to the well-being of others.’” App. 110. More broadly, the
Law School seeks a “’mix of students with varying backgrounds and
experiences who will respect and learn from each other.’” Ibid. In the end,
the District Court concluded that the Law School’s use of race as a factor
in admissions decisions was unlawful. Applying strict scrutiny, the
District Court determined that the Law School’s asserted interest in
assembling a diverse student body was not compelling because “the
attainment of a racially diverse class … was not recognized as such by
Bakke and is not a remedy for past discrimination.” Id., at 246a. The
District Court went on to hold that even if diversity were compelling, the
Law School had not narrowly tailored its use of race to further that interest.
The District Court granted petitioner’s request for declaratory relief and
enjoined the Law School from using race as a factor in its admissions
decisions. The Court of Appeals entered a stay of the injunction pending
appeal (Opinion of the Court, section B).
Background of the Case
Amid growing concerns over the use of race in student admissions in higher
education across the nation, in 1995, University of Michigan professor Carl Cohen
exposed the depths of the University’s structured affirmative action policies. In
conjunction with the efforts of the Center for Individual Rights, public awareness of the
affirmative action policies significantly increased in the 1990s (Stohr, 2004). Stohr (p. 4)
contends that from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, universities tried to veil their
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admissions policies using generalities including “diversity” and “affirmative action”
while privately working to identify and recruit a significant number of minority students.
In 1989 and in 1995, the Supreme Court indicated a possible shift in the
commitment of the justices to the scope of affirmative action policies. In City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., [488 U.S. 469 (1989)], and in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, [515 U.S. 200 (1995)], the Supreme Court held that the strict scrutiny and narrowtailoring tests of affirmative action policies established in Bakke to ensure that affirmative
action policies were developed solely for a compelling interest to create a meaningful
diversity in a classroom, the military, or a business, were misused. Croson applied to
state and local affirmative action policies, and Adarand applied to federal programs.
Capitalizing on the momentum for limiting the scope of affirmative action policies in
Croson and Adarand, in the mid-1990s, through a public-interest law firm in Washington,
D.C., called the Center for Individual Rights, an opposition movement began to attack
affirmative action policies (Stohr, 2004).
Further, in 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in Hopwood v.
Texas, [78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)], that the University of Texas law school could not
take race into consideration unless it was to remedy past discrimination by the school
itself. This court interestingly could have chosen to rule that the Texas law school did
not pass the Bakke test, but it stated rather that a majority of the judges chose to declare
that Bakke no longer represented the view of the Supreme Court and that “the use of race
to achieve a diverse student body…simply cannot be a state interest compelling enough
to meet the steep (constitutional) standard of strict scrutiny” (Bowen and Bok, 1998, p.
14). Stohr (2004, p. 5) explains, “The court reasoned that Powell spoke only for himself
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in Bakke and that his opinion therefore wasn’t controlling.” This explanation resulted
from the divergent opinions presented by the majority of Supreme Court in the Bakke
opinion, as they failed to identify a uniform argument in support of affirmative action
admissions policies. Justice Powell’s opinion was selected as the majority opinion
representing the court despite the divergent arguments presented in the other justices’
opinions and dissents.
At the same time, Bowen and Bok (1998) explain that the Regents of the
University of California announced that the nine universities in the state system would no
longer be allowed to take race into account in student admissions. In a statewide
referendum, this policy was affirmed by the state of California. Lawsuits had also been
filed in other states challenging the efforts of selective institutions to increase the number
of black, Hispanic, and Native American students. It is in this context that Bowen and
Bok decided to conduct their study.
Bowen and Bok (1998) also explain that during the 1990s, only twenty to thirty
percent of all four year colleges and universities had enough applicants to be selective in
their admissions process. Therefore, race was not a significant issue because the vast
majority of undergraduate institutions accepted all of the qualified candidates. Thus, the
consideration for the Supreme Court in Grutter was actually geared toward select
institutions of higher education, corporations, and the military. Further, Bowen and Bok
argue that admissions officers at colleges and universities do seek admitting wellqualified students from low income backgrounds regardless of their race, but that as of
the 1990s, there were very few of these candidates from which to select. Thus, the
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greater challenge was ensuring that students from low-income backgrounds are qualified
for admission to selective institutions.
Additional research on affirmative action was conducted in the 1990s when the
University of Michigan became the primary focus of the affirmative action debate in
higher education student admissions, student defenders of affirmative action participated
in an organization called the Student Intervenors. The Student Intervenors commissioned
two scholars, Walter Allen and Daniel Solorzano (2000) of University of California at
Los Angeles, to conduct a campus climate study of the University of Michigan Law
School’s primary feeder institutions including Michigan State University, University of
California-Berkeley, Harvard University, and the undergraduate program at the
University of Michigan. The study includes surveys and focus groups regarding race and
gender climate issues as well as overall campus climate. In addition to raising the issue
of bias on the LSAT, the Intervenors argue that a hostile climate on university campuses
depressed the performance of students of color, imposing burdens to law school
admissions that white students did not encounter. Allen and Solorzano found "evidence
of persistent, extensive, debilitating discrimination against women and students of color"
at these institutions (Randall, 2008, p. 9). Their primary conclusion is that affirmative
action is a necessary tool to combat racism and entrenched white privilege in higher
education institutions (Allen and Solorzano, 2000; Randall, 2008). It is important to note
that the Student Interventors involved in the Grutter case paid Allen and Solorzano to
conduct this study. Thus, the results must be considered in that light.
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Timeline of the Grutter Case
The legal case that emerged came from forty-three year old Barbara Grutter who
was denied admission to the University of Michigan’s Law School despite a 3.8
undergraduate grade point average from Michigan State University and a LSAT score of
161 which ranked in the eighty-sixth percentile. Grutter sued the University of Michigan
alleging illegal discrimination on December 3, 1997 (Stohr, 2004). U.S. District Judge
Bernard Friedman struck down the Michigan Law School admissions policy in 2001
(Stohr, 2004). In 2002, the Sixth Circuit overruled Judge Friedman’s ruling, allowing the
Law School to continue its affirmative action admissions policy. Grutter appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. The Bush administration urged the Supreme Court to
strike down affirmative action policies, while the Court received more than seventy
friend-of-the-court briefs supporting the University of Michigan. Oral arguments were
held on April 1, hearing arguments from the lawyers for the university, the Bush
administration, Barbara Grutter, and the two plaintiffs from the accompanying Gratz v.
Bollinger case. On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court announced its ruling.
Gratz v. Bollinger
It is paramount to evaluate Grutter in light of Gratz v. Bollinger, [539 U.S. 244
(2003)], the accompanying case. In Gratz v. Bollinger, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick
Hamacher applied to the University of Michigan’s undergraduate program in the College
of Literature, Science, and the Arts, in the fall of 1995 and in the fall of 1997,
respectively. Both were denied admission (Stohr, 2004). Gratz and Hamacher were
approached by the Center for Individual Rights, which then filed a lawsuit in October,
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1997 (Stohr). They sued the University of Michigan citing the undergraduate affirmative
action admissions policy as the cause of their rejected applications.
The case was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan against the University of Michigan, the LSA, James Duderstadt, and Lee
Bollinger. Duderstadt was president of the university while Gratz's application was under
consideration, and Bollinger while Hamacher's was under consideration. Their classaction lawsuit alleged "violations and threatened violations of the rights of the plaintiffs
and the class they represent to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment... and for racial discrimination" Gratz v. Bollinger, [539 U.S. 244 (2003)].
In 2000, U. S. District Judge Patrick Duggan upheld the point system used by the
undergraduate program at the University (Stohr). Like Grutter, the case was first heard
in District Court, was then appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and was then
granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, which means that the Supreme
Court directed the Court of Appeals to send the records of Grutter and Gratz for review
(Stohr, 2004).
The Gratz case went before the Supreme Court simultaneously with Grutter. The
Gratz and Grutter decisions were evaluated and decided by the Justices conjointly.
Announced on June 23, 2003, the justices ruled that the university's point system, (which
systematically awarded points to underrepresented ethnic groups), was too structured in
its use of race as a factor in admissions, and was therefore unconstitutional (Stohr, 2004).
The difference between the Gratz and Grutter opinions was based on the structured use
of points in the undergraduate program in contrast to the flexible, “plus- factor” policy
used in the Law School admissions program. The undergraduate program used a 150-
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point scale to rank applicants, with 100 points needed to guarantee admission.
Underrepresented ethnic groups, including black citizens, Hispanics, and Native
Americans, were awarded an automatic 20-point bonus on this scale, while a perfect SAT
score was worth 12 points.Despite the fact that the Supreme Court decided in favor of
Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, it has been argued that Jennifer Gratz lacked
standing to bring file this law suit. First, Gratz applied in 1995, three years before the
University of Michigan adopted its points system. As a result, some argued that Gratz
could not claim injury as a result of the points system, and therefore, under traditional
legal practices, Gratz lacked standing. In addition, Gratz declined the University of
Michigan’s offer to be placed on a waiting list, and thus, chose not to attend the
university. As it turned out, every Michigan student who agreed to go onto the waiting
list in the spring of 1995 was admitted to the University of Michigan for the fall 1995
semester (Stohr). The Court, however, decided that Gratz and Hamacher had “standing
to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, relying on Northeastern Florida. Chapter,
Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, [508 U.S. 656 (1993)],
which held that the existence of a discriminatory barrier preventing a petitioner from
seeking a benefit on an equal basis sufficed to establish injury, regardless of ultimate
ability to obtain the benefit.”
An Analysis of the Social Context Leading up to the Grutter Decision
Between the 1938 Gaines case and the 2003 Grutter case, the social and political
climate in the United States changed significantly. By the time of Grutter, the social and
political climate in the United States had experienced the highs and lows of desegregation
litigation, affirmative action programs, and integrated schools and businesses. Notions of
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race realism, meaning the recognition that cultural backgrounds should be acknowledged
and celebrated, began to be represented in political and academic discussions, as well as
in popular culture references (Foster, 2005). However, the Supreme Court justices
appointed by Nixon, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush had shifted the judicial political
center in a conservative direction, adding new limits and restrictions to the legal advances
toward civil rights created by the Warren Court in the 1950s and the 1960s (Rosen, 2006).
When Barbara Grutter charged the University of Michigan Law School with reverse
discrimination, the Bush Administration capitalized on the conservative political climate
and led the counter argument against affirmative action programs (Stohr, 2004).
In a historical analysis of affirmative action, Hernandez (2010) identifies the
foundations of affirmative action. The term “affirmative action” was first used by
President John F. Kennedy in a 1961 executive order that created the Committee on
Equal Employment Opportunity. Kennedy stated that federal contractors should ‘“take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and employees are treated
during their employment, without regard to race, creed, color or national origin’” (p. 1,
Executive Order No. 10,925). Further, Lyndon Johnson stated in a 1965 speech at
Howard University that, ‘“You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by
chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of race and say, ‘you are free to
compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair’”
(Affirmative Action Challenged and Defended, p. 1). Although the Supreme Court has
clearly ruled against the use of quotas, the term is often used interchangeably with
affirmative action according to “Affirmative Action Challenged and Defended,” and the
way that the term is defined has an impact on public opinion surveys. For example, when
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the correct definition of affirmative action is applied, being a remedy for both past and
current discrimination based on race and gender, opinion polls show support for
affirmative action (p. 1, Affirmative Action Challenged and Defended).
The Shape of the River
In 1994, legal scholar Daniel Farber called for an end to an “outmoded” and
“bitter stalemate” debate over affirmative action policies. However, since that time,
several scholars have furthered the discussion in a meaningful way by conducting
research studies to evaluate the efficacy of affirmative action programs and to study the
impact of the programs on the students themselves. One of the most notable studies came
from Bowen and Bok in their 1998 book entitled, The Shape of the River, who assess the
effects of affirmative action policies among students of different races between the 1970s
and the early 1990s using a mixed-method approach, and hence I focus on this work.
Specifically, Bowen and Bok present the personal, academic, and employment histories
of 45,000 students who attended academically selective universities during that time.
Bowen, a former president of Princeton University, and Bok, former president of Harvard
and dean of Harvard Law School, consider the twin questions of how much of an affect
race conscious admission policies had on the composition of entering classes and how
much preference black applicants can be said to have been given. Bowen and Bok argue
that contrasting opinions had been the basis for the debate over the use of affirmative
action policies in higher education, and that their book presented the first “hard evidence”
to support the effectiveness of these programs. Their salient conclusion holds that a
racial-neutral admissions policy would reduce the share of black students in the 1989
entering classes at five highly selective colleges from 7.1 percent to between 2.1 and 3.6
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percent. Their findings showed that the adoption of a strict race-neutral admission policy
would reduce black enrollment at the institutions studied between 50 and 70 percent.
Assessing Bowen and Bok’s results, Stohr (2004, p. 3) explains that,
Black, Hispanic, and Native American students would be almost entirely
shut out from America’s single most important ticket to advancement: an
education at a premier school. More than a quarter century after the civil
rights movement promised racial equality, few if any university
administrators were prepared to accept numbers that low.
Bowen and Bok (1998) use the theory advanced by Brown University professor
Glenn Loury as one of their foundations for the effectiveness of affirmative action
programs. Loury explains that since people use race to conceptualize themselves, it is
important to be aware of the importance of race as people develop a just society. Loury
contrasts the ideologies of the “morality of color-blindness” with the “morality of racial
justice” to show how race-sensitive policies can help shape a society based upon social
justice for people. Acknowledging and celebrating the unique characteristics of the
various races while simultaneously valuing and respecting each race is the foundation for
social justice. Bowen and Bok were able to research the effects of affirmative action
policies among students of different races between the 1970s and the early 1990s using a
mixed-method approach. Bowen and Bok conclude that affirmative action policies
significantly increase the likelihood that blacks would be admitted to selective
universities.
Moreover, Bowen and Bok (1998) found that if black students had been admitted
in the same proportions as whites within each SAT interval, black matriculants in 1989
would have constituted 3.6 percent at most of the entering classes at the schools they
studied. Bowen and Bok state that the proportion of black students in the most selective
institutions of higher education would have decreased from seven percent to two percent,
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showing that the most selective institutions would have experienced the largest drops in
black enrollment.
Another significant finding that Bowen and Bok (1998) articulate is that in their
study, there were six times as many white students as black students who come from both
low-income backgrounds and have test scores that are above the minimum needed to be
considered for academically selective institutions. They contend that as a result, even if it
were financially viable to admit even more students from low-income backgrounds, the
number of minority students would be affected only marginally. This type of substitution
in applying a class-based system to admissions would thus reduce the quality of the
eligible pool of minority students, which would then impede the goal of preparing the
ablest minority students for leadership in professions and in society.
Additionally, Bowen and Bok (1998) show that the academic credentials of black
students who would have been rejected if a race-neutral admissions standard had been
applied were very good when judged on any absolute scale. They conclude that selective
schools attract highly talented minority students. Most selective schools use numerical
measures such as high school grade point averages and SAT scores to sort and sift
applicants, but these selective schools also look beyond numerical measures as they
consider student applications. Bowen and Bok contend, “But the truth is that admitting
students is far more an eclectic and interpretive art – with decisions based on judgment,
experience, and perhaps even accumulated wisdom- than a series of formulaic
calculations” (p. 142).
Bowen and Bok (1998) further describe the financial aid policies established by
selective institutions that are intended to minimize the economic barriers that prevent
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students from low-income backgrounds from being able to attend. Bowen and Bok
contend that for many institutions, financial aid policies are expensive, but are considered
an important institutional priority. According to Bowen and Bok, this educational
objective helps contribute to the social mobility of students from low-income families.
However, the academically competitive environment of selective institutions makes it
unrealistic to be able to serve large numbers of students from low-income backgrounds.
They also contend that it “usually requires more than a single generation to move up to
the highest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder” (p. 50).
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., a black Harvard professor and a Yale graduate, expresses
his concern that in the 1990s, the black community has become split between the ‘“haves
and the have nots’” (as cited by Bowen & Bok, 1998, p. 170). Bowen and Bok report,
It is, as Gates notes, “an awesome burden of leadership” that pulls these
black graduates both toward their roots and simultaneously away from
them. Some may argue that they could, or should, be doing even more.
Such a judgment is not ours to make. But they fact that this group is
consistently providing more civic leadership than its white peers indicates
that social commitment and community concerns have not been drawn
aside at the first sign of personal success. (p. 171)
Bowen and Bok rightly argue that the definition of “merit” as applied to qualifications for
admission into selective institutions is a subjective, non-numerical concept. They show
data from the 1976 and 1989 entering cohort class from the selective institutions that they
studied that suggest that many of the most advantaged black men and women are
contributing to their communities through civic activities, while also “forging links with
the broader American society” (p. 171). Bowen and Bok conclude,
This civic spirit, revealed through actions taken rather than good
intentions expressed, and demonstrated over time through volunteering in
schools, neighborhoods, museums, and civic associations of every kind, is
surely one important indicator of merit. (p. 192)
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Bowen and Bok (1998) address another counter argument to the benefits of
racially conscious admissions policies. In Illiberal Education, Dinesh D’Souza (1991)
wrote, ‘“American universities are quite willing to sacrifice the future happiness of many
young blacks and Hispanics to achieve diversity, proportional representation, and what
they consider to be multicultural progress’” (as cited by Bowen and Bok, p. 193). This
argument addresses the concern that despite the fact that minority students may have
higher graduation rates, higher incomes, and greater participation in civic duties, that they
may not be happier or better off ‘“where they might settle in more easily (and) compete
against evenly-matched peers?’” (D’Souza, as cited by Bowen and Bok, p. 193).
Bowen and Bok (1998) then studied the value of the educational experiences as
assessed by the minority students and whether they believed that they had made the right
choice in attending a selective college. They include opinions of many of their
participants on the positive value of their educational experience and how enriched their
academic program was because of its diversity.
Another significant result from their study was the success that the black students
had in their academic performance in comparison to their white classmates (Bowen and
Bok, 1998). Bowen and Bok add a further qualitative approach to their study by
providing the opinions of many of their participants on the value of their educational
experience and how enriched their academic program was because of its diversity. The
black students they researched also had a strong participation in civic and community
affairs.
Further, Bowen and Bok (1998) articulate the salient factors in the United States
social climate that prevailed during the years post-Bakke.
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Despite widespread recognition of the value of diversity, efforts to
increase the number of minority professionals through race-sensitive
admissions policies have never been fully accepted. For almost two
decades, the Bakke case seemed to have settled the issue from a legal
standpoint. Still, large segments of the public continued to object to the
use of race as a factor in deciding who should gain entry to selective
institutions. As the competition to enter leading colleges and professional
schools continued to intensify, this opposition became more vocal. (p. 13)
The final concern that Bowen and Bok (1998) address is how far to we still have
to go to achieve the ultimate objective. And for that matter, what is the ultimate objective?
‘“Our ultimate objective should be a situation in which every individual, from every
background, is unselfconsciously included’” (anonymous quote as cited by Bowen and
Bok, p. 289). In the concluding chapters, Bowen and Bok relate their findings to the
current debate about the wisdom of race-sensitive admissions. They consider whether
critics were correct in claiming that such policies harmed their intended beneficiaries by
forcing minority students to compete with academically superior classmates. They
examine alternative policies that have been proposed to increase diversity without relying
explicitly on race in the admissions process. They end by reflecting on the question of
whether the concept of "merit" is compatible with a deliberate effort to achieve a racially
diverse student body.
After the Grutter decision was handed down by the Supreme Court in 2003,
Green (2004) conducted a case study of how the University of Michigan became an
integral defendant in the debate over race conscious student admissions policies. Green
conducted formal, semi-structured interviews and focus group interviews with some of
the key participants in the Grutter case including the lead defendant, Lee Bollinger,
former president of the University of Michigan. Green utilized purposive sampling to
obtain data from the persons who would have the most information regarding the case,
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which resulted in a total of twenty-six participants. Green’s findings resulted in four
“responses strategies” that showed Michigan’s institutional participation in the defense of
affirmative action policies:
(a) developing the educational benefits of diversity argument,
(b) openly and effectively communicating Michigan’s stance,
(c) mobilizing allies, and
(d) developing and promoting diversity research.
Green’s case study of the University of Michigan revealed how the institution executed
its comprehensive, strategic plan to develop and to succeed in arguing that racial diversity
is a compelling interest. For example, during Green’s interview with Bollinger, the
University president explicated the basis for the University’s belief in the affirmative
action process:
We really decided to set out to prove the fundamental premise of Bakke,
that race is a significant factor in American life, and that significance
gives it salience in an educational setting. That is, it is intimately related to
our educational goals, and that people really are affected in their education
by being in a diverse environment. So, there are no other ways that we can
do this acceptably, then by using race as a factor in admissions. So that
has been the thrust and focus of our legal defense. (p. 738)
Bloom (2004) continues this discussion through a legal analysis of the Supreme
Court majority opinion in Grutter. His primary argument is to support the overall
majority opinion in favor of upholding the Bakke criteria of strict scrutiny of affirmative
action programs. However, his analysis articulates incongruence in the majority’s written
documents. According to Bloom, although the justices in the majority state that they are
applying the Bakke criteria to the Grutter case, they are not using strict scrutiny to
consider a quota-type system as they evaluate the use of the daily reports in the
University of Michigan Law School’s admissions procedures. Bloom argues that the
dissenting justices were more accurate in applying strict scrutiny to the probable use of a
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quota-type system. Bloom contends that the majority’s opinion was “poorly reasoned
and disingenuous” (p. 510). For example, Bloom asserts that rather than stay with the
Bakke foundation of the compelling interest being based upon creating a meaningful
diverse student population, the majority instead focuses on the need for developing
diversity in democratic leadership, taking the argument in a different direction.
Moreover, James Sterba (2009) has written one of the most current discussions
regarding affirmative action. In his book, Sterba uses Grutter as the foundation for his
arguments in favor of maintaining affirmative action policies in admissions programs in
higher education. For example, Sterba proposes that it takes between three and five
minority students among thirty classmates to “contribute to class dialogue without feeling
isolated” (p. 71) and to make a meaningful diverse student population in a classroom.
By contrast, Sweet (2010) argues against Sterba stating that Sterba’s evidence
consistently shows racial and gender discrepancies in the areas that Sterba includes such
as loan rejections and earning power, and that there is no evidence to the contrary. Sweet
argues that Sterba fails to “undertake a systematic look at black and white outcomes” (p.
2). Sweet asserts that Sterba neglects to present empirical evidence related to diversity
and education, although that was the main objective of his book. Sweet argues that
Sterba neglects to answer the primary question of the book, which is, “How does
environmental racism matter for obtaining a critical mass of black students in the
classroom so as to provide for a non-monolithic minority point of view?” (p. 2). Sweet
further contends that although Grutter has been a “monumental” case in school law, the
decision of the Court was 5-4, with Justice O’Connor shifting the balance of the majority
to uphold affirmative action. Sweet makes a valid, yet now, potentially moot point

115
against the long-term effects of Grutter by claiming that with the conservative
appointment of Justice Samuel Alito, who replaced the now retired Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, the Court shifted in a conservative direction. The evidence of this was shown
in the 2007 decision Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1, [551 U.S. 701 (2007)], in which the Court chose not to apply principles of prioritizing
diversity confirmed in Grutter to uphold the application of racial balancing policies while
designing secondary school attendance zones. Sweet contends, however, that Grutter is
merely a case waiting to be overturned.
Identification of the Primary Legal Themes
I was able to identify themes from the Supreme Court documents in the Grutter
case, which I organize into categories in the first two fieldnotes, and then use a coding
system to continue categorization in the last five fieldnotes. In the first set of fieldnotes, I
identify the following themes that emerge from the oral argument in the Grutter case:
Reverse Discrimination, Equal Access, Creating Diversity in Universities and in other
Contexts, Diverse Democratic Leadership (Hutcheson, 2010), Transcending
Race/Breaking-down Stereotypes, The Fourteenth Amendment, and Fixed Time Period.
I then organize key excerpts from the oral argument into the appropriate category to
identify and analyze the legal ideologies articulated by the attorneys and the justices. In
the Appendix of this paper, I add the Grutter documents themselves organized by theme
with my analysis explicated through Observer Comments (OC). In the Observer
Comments, throughout all seven fieldnotes, I provide historical, social, and political
context background information, judicial philosophy, and compare/contrast analyses. In
the second set of fieldnotes, in which I analyze the opinion of the court written by Justice
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O’Connor, I follow the same procedure, but add the following themes: Compelling
Interest and Narrow-Tailoring. In the third set of fieldnotes, I follow the same procedure
as I analyze Justice Ginsburg’s Concurring Opinion, adding the categories of Critical
Mass, Racial Preferences, and Quotas. I also develop a coding process during this set of
fieldnotes that I carry through and add to as I continue developing themes in my last four
fieldnotes. I have attached the final coding sheet with the complete set of coding
categories in the Appendix.
In the fourth set of fieldnotes, I conduct an analysis of Justice Rehnquist’s
dissenting opinion. I continue with coding and Observer Comments to provide
background information and legal analysis. Similarly, I analyze Justice Kennedy’s
dissenting opinion using the same procedure for my fifth set of fieldnotes. At this point
in my fieldnotes, I am able to provide more compare/contrast analysis and continue to
add to the data and analysis for several recurring themes, of which I will highlight three
in the following section. Additionally, I include the dissenting opinions of Justice
Thomas and Justice Scalia, including their arguments in the themes discussed.
Creating Diversity in Universities and in Other Contexts
The first emerging theme that I find consistently throughout all five sets of
fieldnotes is Creating Diversity in Universities and in other Contexts. The theme of
creating diversity is the most critical in the Grutter case. The majority opinion that was
written by Justice O’Connor and was confirmed in the concurring opinion by Justice
Ginsburg is based upon the compelling national interest held in the United States to
ensure that higher education classrooms and other contexts including corporations and
the military provide for a meaningful diverse population. The data show several
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arguments that consistently support the compelling interest of a diverse student
population including providing voice and agency to minority populations, contributing
significantly to the breaking-down of stereotypes, developing leaders among minority
populations, preventing isolation in classrooms for one or two minority students, and
providing a variety of cultural perspectives in classroom discussions. For example,
Justice O’Connor includes the University of Michigan Law School’s stated purpose as
seeking to ‘admit a group of students who individually and collectively are
among the most capable,’ the Law School looks for individuals with
“substantial promise for success in law school” and “a strong likelihood of
succeeding in the practice of law and contributing in diverse ways to the
well-being other others.” More broadly, the Law School seeks a ‘mix of
students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and
learn from each other.’ (pp. 8-9, Fieldnotes 2)
Further, O’Connor wrote,
The policy aspires to ‘achieve that diversity which has the potential to
enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger
than the sum of its parts. By enrolling a critical mass of underrepresented
minority students, the Law School seeks to ensure their ability to make
unique contributions to the character of the Law School.’
As I discuss in my fieldnotes, the legal ideology of a ‘critical mass’ is one of the most
controversial aspects of affirmative action policies. Those against affirmative action
programs view the “critical mass” as indicative of a quota system. Those supportive of
affirmative action programs argue that the “critical mass” is not a specific number or
quota, but does mean that a meaningful representative of minority students should be
included.
Contrasting data on the University of Michigan Law School’s intentions for
creating diversity came from the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist, which was
corroborated in a separate dissent by Justice Thomas, who echoed Frederick Douglass by
stating, “Do nothing with us,” referring to their opposition to preferential treatment based
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on race. Rehnquist’s primary disagreement with the majority opinion was his belief that
the Law School had spurious intentions when creating their diversity policy and was
intentionally favoring African-American students. He argued that the Law School’s
attempt to develop a “critical mass” of underrepresented students was a veil to cover a
quota system favoring African-American students over students from other race
categories, specifically, Caucasians, Native Americans, and Hispanics, which was
inconsistent with the idea of a critical mass.
Equal Access
The second emerging theme that I identify consistently throughout all five sets of
fieldnotes is equal access for students. Despite his dissenting opinion at the end of the
case because he believed that the Law School did not follow the Bakke criteria with strict
scrutiny in creating their race conscious student admissions policy, Justice Kennedy got
to the core of the issue of equal access in the questioning phase of the oral argument:
So if year after year after year there’s an underrepresentation, there is not cause
for the State or the Government or its educational experts to be concerned
whatsoever? Well, it’s a broad social and political concern that there are not
adequate members of . . . of the profession which is designed to protect
our rights and to promote progress. I would . . . I should think that’s a
very legitimate concern on the part of the State. [Oral Argument, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002)]
Another key point in the category of equal access was discussed by Justice O’Connor in
the majority opinion in which she cites Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, who was an expert
witness for the Michigan Law School, as stating that having a “race-blind admissions
system would have a ‘very dramatic,’ negative effect on underrepresented minority
admissions.” Corroborating Bowen and Bok’s study (1998), Dr. Raudenbush presented
statistics showing how the percentage of underrepresented minority students would have
been significantly less without the race-conscious admissions policy at the Law School.
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O’Connor explains the specifics of the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution to argue her point that government may treat people
differently based upon their race “only for the most compelling reasons.” Citing Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, [515 U.S. 200 (1995)], O’Connor argues, “This means that
such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests.” Finally, Justice Ginsburg writes that “conscious and
unconscious race bias…remain alive in our land….” [Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003), retrieved online]. Ginsburg addresses the concern of how long will government
regulation of equal access be necessary by stating in her concurring opinion that these
‘“temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality’ that ‘shall be
discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been
achieved’” [Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)].
Conflicting data from Justice Kennedy’s dissent is based upon his argument that
“Preferment by race, when resorted to by the States, can be the most divisive of all
policies, containing within it the potential to destroy confidence in the Constitution and in
the idea of equality” [Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)]. Despite the fact that
Kennedy remains supportive of narrowly tailored affirmative action programs, he
believes that in this case, the Law School’s use of daily reports did not comply with the
Bakke criteria for strict scrutiny of affirmative action policies. Thus, he wrote in
opposition, “The majority today refuses to be faithful to the settled principle of strict
review designed to reflect these concerns.”
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Diverse, Democratic Leadership
Finally, the third emerging theme that I identify consistently throughout all five
sets of fieldnotes is diverse, democratic leadership (Hutcheson, 2010). A priority for an
effective democracy is to have meaningful diversity represented in its leadership. The
data from the fieldnotes on the oral argument show the military and the corporate
documents that support the Law School’s primary argument that minorities must be given
the opportunity to participate in leadership training programs in order to provide fair and
balanced leadership in professional and military institutions. They argue that this
provides a check system to disciplinary as well as advancement personnel policies in
these institutions. New perspectives on leadership, ethnicity, and cultural backgrounds
also support a diverse, democratic leadership. In the oral argument, Justice Breyer
contends:
And many among other things that they tell us on the other side is that
many people feel in the schools, the Universities, that they way . . . the
only way to break this cycle is to have a leadership that is diverse. And to
have a leadership across the country that is diverse, you have to train a
diverse student body for law, for the military, for business, for all other
positions in this country that will allow us to have a diverse leadership in a
country that is diverse [Oral Argument, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
617 (2002)].
In the opinion of the Court, Justice O’Connor affirms the argument by Justice Powell in
Bakke, that United States leadership requires leaders who have been exposed to and
“trained to understand and represent our many ethnicities and cultures” [Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)]. O’Connor is affirming Powell’s assertion that the
United States’ leadership requires leaders who have been exposed to and trained to
understand and represent our many ethnicities and cultures.
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Publicity Regarding the Grutter and Gratz cases
Mathewson (2011) reports that all of the major news networks gave significant
media coverage to the Grutter and Gratz cases. CNN and ABC reported more
extensively on the cases including discussing the connection to the Bakke case and the
Equal Protection Clause as the legal bases for the arguments. Regional newspapers such
as the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and the Columbus Dispatch reported on the effect the
decision would have on the University of Georgia and Ohio State University, respectively
(Mathewson). As a result of the rulings, the University of Georgia would have to
reconsider allowing race to be a factor in student admissions, and Ohio State would have
to modify its point-based admissions system. Editorials in the Boston Globe and the
Santa Fe New Mexican endorsed both of the Court’s decisions. The Boston Globe
declared that, ‘“Diversity is a societal good and must be upheld. The court took a big
step yesterday in keeping the doors of higher education open for minority students”’ (as
cited by Mathewson, p. 328). The Santa Fe New Mexican stated that the decisions
‘“could be a blueprint for racial fairness on our college campuses and beyond”’ (as cited
by Mathewson, p. 328). However, the Wall Street Journal panned Justice O’Connor’s
“‘split-the-baby jurisprudence’” (as cited by Mathewson, p. 328).
Like the Bakke decision, the Grutter opinion affirms the admittance policies of
elite universities and confirms the Court’s acknowledgement of the tradition of
institutional autonomy twenty-five years later (Karabel, 2005, p. 543). According to
Karabel, both Bakke and Grutter affirm the belief articulated by elite university officials
including Harvard President James Conant (1933-1953) and Yale President Kingman
Brewster (1963-1977) that “the legitimacy of the American social order depend in good
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part on the public’s confidence that the pathways to success provided by the nation’s
leading universities were open to individuals from all walks of life” (p. 543). These
claims were explicitly addressed by Justice O’Connor in the Grutter opinion,
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes citizenry, it
is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity
of the educational institutions that provide this training.…Access to legal
education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all members of
our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions
that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in America.
[Grutter v. Bollinger et al., 539 U.S. 982, (2003)]
Karabel (2005) argues that racial diversity is more important to elite universities
than is class diversity. He contends that the process for admissions is still laden with
politics, particularly if the applicants have the hooks of legacy status, athletic
membership, or being a member of a historically underrepresented group. Karabel
further explains that in the brief submitted by the eight universities including Harvard,
Yale, and Princeton, one of the central arguments holds that student diversity is essential
to the fulfillment of their core educational purpose. Stating the importance of “’the
compelling pedagogical interests ’ served by ‘a diverse and inclusive education
experience,’” the brief cites the Harvard president from the late 1800s/early 1900s,
Charles W. Eliot’s declaration that higher education should represent the full diversity of
the American society including children of the “’rich and poor’ and the ‘educated and
uneducated’” (Karabel, p. 553).
The opinion in the Grutter case is valuable because it validates the primary
purposes of affirmative action policies, which is to create meaningful diversity in
universities, the military, and in corporations, to ensure equal access for all students to
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higher education, and to stimulate the growth of a diverse, democratic leadership in the
United States. The majority of the justices, including Anthony Kennedy who dissented in
the case because of the Law School’s implementation procedures, value these priorities,
and assert that affirmative action policies were still necessary in 2003 to ensure that they
are implemented in higher education classrooms.
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CHAPTER 6
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: APPLICATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO GAINES AND GRUTTER
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
generated as a result of Republican congressional concern for the protection and
guarantees of rights for newly freedmen during Reconstruction (Burns, 2009; Schwartz,
1993). After the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery in 1865, a
wave of terrorism against blacks, including lynchings, pillages, and massacres, swept
through the South. Republicans responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
granted full citizenship to all native-born Americans, and guaranteed them ‘“full and
equal benefit’” of the laws and ‘“security of person and property’” (Burns, p. 81). The
purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to empower the federal government to guarantee
these freedoms and protections. However, resistance from President Andrew Johnson
caused the Republicans to feel the need to make these rights part of the Constitution.
Congress began debate on the language of the Fourteenth Amendment in May of 1868,
which was intended to provide constitutional authority over citizenship rights outlined in
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The Fourteenth Amendment states,
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
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Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such state.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But
neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim
for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and
claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article. (Amendment XIV, United States
Constitution, 1868).
In section 1, the authors of the Equal Protection Clause intended it to ensure the
promise established in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal”
by empowering the judiciary to enforce rights and protections to all citizens against the
will of the states. In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes the national
citizenship of ‘“all persons born or naturalized in the United States.’” As it would turn
out, the Fourteenth Amendment became the primary constitutional support for civil rights
litigation during the twentieth century (Rehnquist, 2001).
According to Schwartz (1993), the Fourteenth Amendment was the most
significant of the legal changes imposed as part of the Southern defeat. Schwartz (p. 148)
explains that the Due Process Clause was an economic protection, “to serve as the Great
Charter for the protection of the private enterprise that was so transforming society.”
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Largely a result of the threat to the economic power structure held by white Southerners,
the guarantees of “due process” and “equal protection” would become the enduring
sources of conflict over their meaning more than any other clauses of the Constitution
(Burns; Schwartz). The final section of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress
to ‘“enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article’” (as cited by Burns,
p. 81).
Burns (2009) further explains that Congress ordered Southern states to organize
new governments with full black participation. In addition, to be represented in Congress,
the southern states had to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. According to Burns, this
declaration was how the Dred Scott, [Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)],
decision was reversed and “thrust into the Constitution” (p. 82).
The issue over state power versus national power that caused the disastrous
decision made by the Taney Court in Dred Scott plagued the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the civil rights legislation and amendments for decades. Burns (p. 85-86)
contends, “But the interpretation of these amendments – the extent of the rights and
liberties they guaranteed and the reach of federal power to enforce them – became the
province of the Supreme Court. But as the nation began a retreat from Reconstruction in
the 1870s, the Supreme Court fell into step.”
For example, during the first great test of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
Slaughterhouse Cases, [83 U.S. 36 (1873)], Justice Samuel Miller reinstates the two
classes of citizenship, state and national, and declared that the Supreme Court must
maintain ‘“the balance between States and Federal power’” (as cited by Burns, 2009, p.
86; Rehnquist, 2001). Miller states that the only federal privileges that exist were those
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already explicitly articulated in the Constitution and identified by a Supreme Court
precedent, such as the right of protection on the high seas, habeas corpus protections, (i.e.
prisoners released from unlawful detentions), and the right to travel to Washington, D.C.
Although the Slaughterhouse Cases involved Louisiana slaughterhouse operations,
Justice Miller's decision is best known for its distinction between the privileges and
immunities of state citizenship and United States citizenship. However, because Miller
contends that un-enumerated rights could not be litigated in federal courts, for newly
freed black men, the Court’s narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
reinstated their rights under the police powers of the state, significantly restricting their
federal protections. Thus, the 5-4 majority on the Miller Court reinstated the power of
the states to violate individual civil rights without being subject to federal intervention.
The original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was significantly impaired as a result of
Miller’s opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases (Burns; Irons, 2009; Schwartz, 1993).
This reinstatement of states rights in the Slaughterhouse Cases proved to the be
the basis for Supreme Court interpretation of civil rights cases until Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954, significantly restricting protections and freedoms for black citizens
and declaring void the guarantees that had been promised by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Burns contends,
Not long after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the
Supreme Court had narrowed the broad promise of its due process and
equal protection clauses to little more than a defense of property rights.
Almost a century later, Brown and other desegregation cases signaled a
dramatic shift, with the court moving, for the first time, to apply equal
protection in its intended form, as a shield for African-American rights
against state power. But that clause, as the Reconstruction Congress had
framed it, had a wider potential to secure all constitutional guarantees fully
and equally to all citizens. Such rights were to be asserted against the
states, a principle The court had promptly undermined in the
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Slaughterhouse Cases with its pinched construction of national
Citizenship, which insulated the states from most rights claims based on
the federal Constitution. (p. 189)
Tragically, the persistence of racial hatred, violence, segregation, and employment and
property discrimination in the South made black citizens the greatest victims as a result of
the Slaughterhouse Cases even though the case had nothing directly to do with them.
The Republican Congress then made another attempt to secure the rights of black
citizens in 1870. Senator Charles Sumner and Representative Benjamin Bulter proposed
a law to guarantee that every person regardless of race or previous condition of servitude
was entitled to participate in using the same public facilities such as theaters or inns. The
Civil Rights Act of 1875 is entitled, “An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal
rights,” and was the ultimate statute passed by the Republican Congress during
Reconstruction. The text of the Act includes the following language: "all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on
land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the
conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every
race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude" [Civil Rights Act, ch.
114, §§ 1-4, 18 Stat. 335 (1875)]. The second provision provides criminal and civil
penalties to violators. The third section gives federal jurisdiction over litigation arising
under the act. The fourth provision prohibits state and federal jury selection to be
predicated on race. The significance of the Act is that it clearly reversed Dred Scott by
prohibiting public places from excluding persons based on race from equal participation
at their facilities [Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-4, 18 Stat. 335.] The Act finally
passed Congress in 1875 and was signed by President Ulysses Grant. However, after the
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1876 election of Rutherford B. Hayes to the presidency, and the withdrawal of federal
troops from the South, the law was rarely enforced. In addition, the judicial reversal from
the civil rights advances during Reconstruction became increasingly ossified in United
States v. Cruikshank [92 U.S. 542 (1876)], and similarly in United States v. Harris, [106
U.S. 629 (1883)], also referred to as the Ku Klux Case, which relegates the prevention
and punishment of criminal violence, including murder, to the states, regardless of
whether the attacks were racially motivated.
In 1883, the Civil Rights Cases, [109 U.S. 3 (1883)], came before the Supreme
Court to challenge the racial discrimination that had been occurring despite the passage
of the Civil Rights Act. The Civil Rights Cases involved five consolidated cases
emerging from lower courts in which black citizens had sued hotels, theaters, and transit
companies which had refused them service or admittance. With a devastating response
by Justice Joseph Bradley who wrote the majority opinion, the Supreme Court declared
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional, stating that the although the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits discrimination by the state, it does not empower the state to
prohibit discrimination by private individuals. In addition, Bradley argues that the
Thirteenth Amendment applies to private citizens, but only to the extent that it prohibits
slavery, but not to outlaw discriminatory behaviors. Bradley wrote,
it would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply
to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to
guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or
cab or car; or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters
of intercourse or business. [Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)]
In contrast to the other justices, Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion
in which he challenges his colleagues’ narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He argues that Congress was attempting to overcome the refusal of the
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states to provide protection for the rights of black citizens. The language in Harlan’s
dissent becomes a valuable component in the legal argument for equal rights for citizens
of color for cases to come throughout the first half of the twentieth century:
My brethren say that when a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid
of beneficient legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that
state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes
the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws,
and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary
modes by which other men's rights are protected. It is, I submit, scarcely just
to say that the colored race has been the special favorite of the laws. What the
nation, through Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that race is,
what had already been done in every state in the Union for the white race, to
secure and protect rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens; nothing
more. The one underlying purpose of congressional legislation has been to
enable the black race to take the rank of mere citizens. The difficulty has been
to compel a recognition of their legal right to take that rank, and to secure the
enjoyment of privileges belonging, under the law, to them as a component
part of the people for whose welfare and happiness government is ordained.
The Civil Rights Cases tragically ended the efforts of the Republicans to work
toward protection of civil rights for black citizens. The legal significance of the outcome
of the Cases was that they replaced the Dred Scott decision as the judicial precedent for
restricting Congress’ power to protect individual civil rights. The Civil Rights Cases
undercut federal efforts to end civil rights violations until passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which revived many of the protections of rights that had originally been
established in the 1875 Civil Rights Act.
Other cases that shaped the application of the Fourteenth Amendment in litigation
before the Gaines opinion in 1938 include Strauder v. West Virginia [100 U.S. 303,
(1880)], and Yick Wo v. Hopkins [118 U.S. 356, (1886)]. In Strauder, the Supreme Court
overturned laws that prevented black citizens from serving on juries. The Strauder case
was one of the most important early civil rights cases and was a tremendous victory for
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the rights of black defendants. However, the case upheld the right of states to prevent
women and other classes of citizens from serving on juries. Justice Strong argues that a
state
may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons
within certain ages, or to persons having educational qualifications. We do
not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit
this.... Its aim against discrimination because of race and color." (as cited
by Schmidt, 1983)
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, which prohibits discrimination against Chinese Americans in the
the operation of laundry businesses, the Supreme Court ruled that a law which appears
race-neutral on the surface, but is implemented in a prejudicial manner, is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. Both Stauder and Yick Wo upheld the original intent of the
Equal Protection Clause which is to provide protection for individual civil rights.
However, one of the most infamous Supreme Court rulings came ten years after
Yick Wo, in Plessy v. Ferguson, [163 U.S. 537 (1896)]. As discussed in chapter three, the
Supreme Court held in Plessy that states could legally impose segregation of facilities as
long as the facilities were deemed similar, forming the “separate but equal” doctrine that
endorsed Jim Crow laws for nearly sixty more years. Even further, the Supreme Court
similarly limited the application of the Equal Protection Clause in Berea College v.
Kentucky, [211 U.S. 45 (1908)], by asserting that states could force private actors to
discriminate by prohibiting colleges from having both black and white students. The
force of the Equal Protection Clause had been so impaired by the Slaughterhouse ruling,
the Civil Rights Cases, Plessy, and Berea College that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
discounted it as “the usual last resort of constitutional arguments” [Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200 (1927)].
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Again, Justice Harlan provided meaningful dissents. In Berea, Harlan stated:
The right to impart instruction, harmless in itself or beneficial to those
who receive it, is a substantial right of property— especially, where the
services are rendered for compensation. But even if such right be not
strictly a property right, it is, beyond question, part of one's liberty as
guaranteed against hostile state action by the Constitution of the United
States. [Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908)]
The Plessy doctrine was the dominant legal ideology followed by the Supreme Court
until the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education opinion (Aaseng, 2003).
The Fourteenth Amendment Applied in Gaines
As discussed in chapters three and four, in the first part of the twentieth century,
the NAACP organigized and created a legal strategy for challenging the rulings in the
Slaughterhouse Cases, the Civil Rights Cases, United States v. Cruikshank, United States
v. Harris, Berea College v. Kentucky, and Plessy v. Ferguson. The strategy of the
NAACP was based on the idea of first challenging the “separate but equal” doctrine by
showing that educational resources and opportunities were not being provided in an equal
fashion. Next, the plan would challenge the inequal opportunities in admission to higher
education, focusing on completely invalidating the separate but equal doctrine. An early
success was obtained in University of Maryland v. Murray, [169 Md. 478 (1936)], in
which the Maryland Court of Appeals requires the University of Maryland to admit
Donald Murray to its law school because there was no other law school available within
the state of Maryland. The significance of the decision was that although segregation in
education was not yet outlawed, the state’s requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment
was to provide substantially equal treatment in the facilities provided by public funds.
Thus, Thurgood Marshall was able to take this significant victory and apply the Equal
Protection Clause to the discrimination occuring in Missouri as four black students had
applied to the University of Missouri for graduate school. The following discussion and
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textual excerpts are from my document analysis of the ruling in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, [305 U.S. 337 (1938)]. I organize the document into themes that focus on the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the opinion in the case written by Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes. The themes I identify are The Fourteenth Amendment,
Equal Protection, and Economic and Political Repression. Despite the victory in favor of
Gaines, the opinion and the separate opinion in the case include elements of the
continued white stronghold over access to higher education in the 1930s and 1940s,
indicating continued economic and political repression against persons of color. The
remaining text from the opinion and the dissent in the Gaines case in addition to my
reflections written in the Observer Comments are located in the Appendix of this paper.
Equal Protection
Chief Justice Hughes explicates the University of Missouri’s argument that the
law schools in the adjacent states of Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Illinois are equal to the
one offered the University of Missouri in Columbia, and there is no advantage to
attending law school within the state of Missouri. In addition, the state of Missouri
courts found that the burden placed on Gaines to attend school in another state is not too
great to violate his right to an education. Hughes dismisses Gaines’ argument that
attending a law school outside of the state of Missouri does not provide the advantages of
attending the University of Missouri. Hughes contends that this is irrelevant.
Rather, Hughes supports equal protection under the law for students to receive the
same education within a state regardless of their race. Hughes points out that black
students in Missouri are, thus, “citizens of Missouri.” They should not have to be sent to
another state to receive their education. Hughes points out that what other states provide

134
or do not provide, is not a consideration for Missouri. Missouri as a state is responsible
for its own equal, if still dual, educational system. Hughes contends:
The question here is not of a duty of the State to supply legal training,
or of the quality of the training which it does supply, but of its duty
when it provides such training to furnish it to the residents of the State
upon the basis of an equality of right. By the operation of the laws of
Missouri, a privilege has been created for white law students which is
denied to negroes by reason of their race. The white resident is afforded
legal education within the State; the negro resident having the same
qualifications is refused it there, and must go outside the State to obtain
it. That is a denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the
privilege [p350] which the State has set up, and the provision for the
payment of tuition fees in another State does not remove the discrimination.
[Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349-350, (1938)]
The Fourteenth Amendment
To provide the education for white students, but not for black students, is a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. The provision to offer
scholarships to attend universities in another state does not remove the discrimination.
Hughes cites Yick Wo v. Hopkins as the federal legal precedence enforcing equal
protection:
The equal protection of the laws is "a pledge of the protection of equal
laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369. Manifestly, the obligation
of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be performed only
where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is there that
the equality of legal right must be maintained. That obligation is imposed
by the Constitution upon the States severally as governmental entities -each responsible for its own laws establishing the rights and duties of
persons within its borders. It is an obligation the burden of which cannot
be cast by one State upon another, and no State can be excused from
performance by what another State may do or fail to do. That separate
responsibility of each State within its own sphere is of the essence of
statehood maintained under our dual system. It seems to be implicit in
respondents' argument that, if other States did not provide courses for
legal education, it would nevertheless be the constitutional duty of
Missouri, when it supplied such courses for white students, to make
equivalent provision for negroes. [Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350,
(1938)]
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Political and Economic Repression
In the paragraph below, officials at Lincoln University are urged to expedite the
process of implementing an equal legal program to the University of Missouri for black
students. Tuition to a university in another state is a temporary, but limited solution. The
burden is placed on Lincoln University to create a sufficient legal program for black
students in an expedited manner. Hughes chooses to support the state of Missouri’s plan
to pay for Gaines to attend a law school in another state as a temporary plan rather than
require the University of Missouri in Columbia to accept him. This is an affirmation of
Plessy v. Ferguson’s doctrine of separate but equal. Hughes ignores the burden that
Gaines will have to endure as far as travel and living expenses within another state in
addition to the advantages that he would have had if he had been able to attend a law
school which included Missouri law, observation of Missouri court rooms, and
developing relationships with other members of the law profession within the state.
Hughes states:
It is urged, however, that the provision for tuition outside the State is a
temporary one -- that it is intended to operate merely pending the
establishment of a law department for negroes at Lincoln University.
While, in that sense, the discrimination may be termed temporary, it
may nevertheless continue for an indefinite period by reason of the
discretion given to the curators of Lincoln [p352] University and the
alternative of arranging for tuition in other States, as permitted by the
state law as construed by the state court, so long as the curators find it
unnecessary and impracticable to provide facilities for the legal
instruction of negroes within the State. In that view, we cannot regard
the discrimination as excused by what is called its temporary character.
[Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351, (1938)]
Hughes disregards the technicalities purported by the Missouri officials to argue for
tuition scholarships outside of the state. Hughes recognizes the legal consequences of the
ruling, acknowledging the attempts by the Missouri officials to justify their acts of
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political and economic discrimination. Hughes identifies the primary constitutional
provision of equal protection under the law. What Hughes fails to do, that will not occur
until the ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, is to identify that the separate but equal
ideology from Plessy v. Ferguson itself is also a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hughes argues:
The board of curators of the Lincoln university shall be authorized and
required to reorganize said institution so that it shall afford to the negro
people of the state opportunity for training up to the standard furnished at
the state university of Missouri whenever necessary and practicable in
their opinion. To this end the board of curators shall be authorized to
purchase necessary additional land, erect necessary additional buildings, to
provide necessary additional equipment, and to locate, in the county of
Cole the respective units of the university where, in their opinion, the
various schools will most effectively promote the purposes of this article.
(Laws of 1921, p. 86, § 3)
Hughes also cites the Maryland state case of University of Maryland v. Murray,
argued by Charles Houston and Thurgood Marshall through the NAACP LDF as a legal
precedent, although as a state, rather than federal issue. The Gaines case is thus a federal
affirmation of the Murray state case.
Political and economic oppression is not expressly addressed by Hughes in his
opinion. However, it is implied. For example, Hughes contends that the consideration of
whether with any amount of scholarship, i.e., finances, is it acceptable to send black
students to another state for legal instruction is “unnecessary to discuss,” shows the
justices’ recognition of the fact that black students are deliberately being provided a
lesser opportunity for a meaningful legal education. Although not expressly
acknowledged by the justices, this lesser form of education implies the political and
economic repression of black students by not allowing them to have equal educational
opportunities as provided to white students. Hughes continues:
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The Supreme Court of Missouri in the instant case has distinguished the
decision in Maryland upon the grounds -- (1) that, in Missouri, but not in
Maryland, there is "a legislative declaration of a purpose to establish a law
school for negroes at Lincoln University whenever necessary or practical",
and (2) that, pending the establishment of such a school, adequate
provision has been made for the legal education of negro students in
recognized schools outside of this State. [Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,
346, (1938)]
The officials in Missouri contradict themselves by initially stating that the responsibility
for providing a black legal education lies solely on Lincoln University. In this court
document, however, the state of Missouri contends that they will provide a legal program
for black students when it becomes “necessary or practical.” This contradiction reveals
the mal-intentions of the state officials in Missouri to provide a meaningful education for
black students. Rather, they are contributing to the economic and political oppression of
black students by denying them equal opportunities. In addition, white control of access,
resources, and the quality programs in higher education remains affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court. This political domination by white educators and government
officials is reflected in their control of economic access and resources as well,
significantly limiting opportunities for advancement for black citizens.
The Fourteenth Amendment Is Finally Realized in Brown
Despite the reinforcement of separate but equal, the acknowledgement of some
level of equal protection in Gaines spurred the hopes and the legal momentum to move
further with the plan to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson completely, outlawing separate but
equal in all contexts, but specifically in higher and public education. The Equal
Protection Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment were finally fully validated in Brown.
The Court rules in Brown that even if the separate facilities were deemed equal,
segregation itself was harmful to black students and was thus unconstitutional. As
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dicussed in chapter four, Kluger (2004), Rowan, (1993), and Tushnet (1987) describe
each critical case that led to the legal end of segregation through the landmark case of
Brown, [347 U.S. 483 (1954)], widely considered one of the most significant cases in
Supreme Court history. After Gaines, the Supreme Court made additional advances
toward the end of segregation in education in Sweatt v. Painter, [339 U.S. 629 (1950)],
and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, [339 U.S. 637 (1950)]. The rulings in Sweatt
and McLaurin together successfully applied the Equal Protection Clause to end the
separate but equal doctrine in graduate and professional education. In Brown, the Court
ruled that even if segregated black and white schools were of equal quality in teachers,
resources, and facilities, segregation by itself was harmful to black students and so was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment had finally been
interpreted as it had been intended in 1868.
The Fourteenth Amendment was additionally applied in post-Brown cases to
determine if busing strategies and school attendance zone strategies were appropriately
designed to integrate the nation’s public schools [Green v. County School Board of New
Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)]; and [Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)]. School boards needed to find the most effective strategies
for developing integrated classrooms in the context of segregated neighborhoods. Green
and Swann provided school boards with specific guidelines for developing a school
integration plan. Another significant application of the Equal Protection Clause has been
to extend its reach to other historically disadvantaged groups such as women and
illegitimate children in United States v. Virginia, [518 U.S. 515 (1996)], and Levy v.
Louisiana, [391 U.S. 68 (1968)], respectively.
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In addition, the United States Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, [Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241]. The Civil Rights Act reinstated many of the provisions
originally established in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It prevented discrimination by
government agencies that receive federal funding. The law states in Title VI:
This title declares it to be the policy of the United States that
discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin shall not
occur in connection with programs and activities receiving Federal
financial assistance and authorizes and directs the appropriate Federal
departments and agencies to take action to carry out this policy. This title
is not intended to apply to foreign assistance programs. Section 601 – This
section states the general principle that no person in the United States shall
be excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against on
the ground of race, color, or national origin under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.
Opinion in Bakke and in Grutter: Affirmative Action Plans Do Not Violate the
Equal Protection Clause
As discussed in chapters four and five, affirmative action plans to promote equal
access to higher education, create a meaningful diversity in higher education, and to
develop a diverse, democratic leadership, were affirmed by both Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, [438 U.S. 265 (1978)], and Grutter v. Bollinger. In
Bakke, Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the majority, arguing that the quota system
applied at the University was unconstitutional, therefore admitting Bakke to its medical
school. However, an enduring, essential component to the ruling was that using race as
one of many factors can be considered when admitting students to higher education
programs as long as a quota system is not applied. Powell and the majority affirm the
compelling interests proposed by the University of California at Davis for promoting
diversity in their medical program. The compelling interests include the following:
obtaining the educational benefits resulting from having a meaningful diversity in the
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student population; reduce the historic deficit disfavoring the admission of minority
students to medical school; counter the effects of racial discrimination; and increase the
number of doctors who will be able to practice in underserved communities. However,
Justices Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens argued in dissent that any type of
affirmative action policies was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, causing reverse
discrimination against white students.
The Bakke case was affirmed in Grutter v. Bollinger, [539 U.S. 306, (2003)],
which held that race may still be considered a factor in determining student admissions to
higher education as long as a quota system was not applied. For this discussion focusing
on equal protection through the Fourteenth Amendment, I will provide textual excerpts
from the Supreme Court documents in the Grutter case. I will provide analysis on the
following themes: The Fourteenth Amendment, Compelling Interest, Breaking-Down
Stereotypes, and Reverse Discrimination. The documents in the Grutter case are
including in the Appendix of this paper, including my reflections discussed in the
Observer Comments.
The Fourteenth Amendment
The official holding in the Grutter cases is stated by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor: “Held: The Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body is not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI,
[Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)].” Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment has been
used in equal access cases as recently as Grutter and Gratz cases, which confirmed the
use of affirmative action in admitting students the University of Michigan Law School,

141
but reafffirmed the strict scrutiny principle established in Bakke (Stohr, 2004).
According to O’Connor’s opinion, strict scrutiny involves the process of careful review
of the implementation of racial preference policies in school admissions in order to
prohibit the use of quotas, and to minimize the effect of the policies on white students,
namely reverse discrimination. The legal question evaluated in the Grutter and Gratz
cases is: “A state university's admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because its ranking system gave an automatic point increase
to all racial minorities rather than making individual determinations.”
In the Grutter opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote of the Bakke decision, “Justice
Powell began by stating that ‘[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another
color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal, [Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)].’” Affirmative action policies must be developed to
serve the larger compelling national interest of establishing a meaningful diversity in
student populations. In Justice Powell’s view, when governmental decisions “touch upon
an individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that
the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest” (Bakke).
The Court found no violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the Law School’s
policy considering race along with factors such as an applicant’s essay, the enthusiasm of
the letters of recommendation, and the difficulty of the applicant’s undergraduate course
selections, all considered part of an effort to admit more members of underrepresented
minority groups (Mathewson, 2011).
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In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court held that the University of Michigan’s
undergraduate admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because it gave
minority applicants twenty points out of one hundred needed for acceptance. This
structured, point-based system was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s
compelling interest to promote diversity.
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist contends in his dissenting opinion that the use
of race to favor one group of citizens over another is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Rehnquist plainly states, “I do not believe that the Constitution gives the Law
School such free rein in the use of race” [539 U.S. 306 (2003)]. His argument represents
his judicial ideology that the Constitution should be not be interpreted to provide
additional rights other than the ones already given to it in the text of the law. Justices
Thomas and Scalia concur with this argument.
Additionally, Justice Thomas finds any preferential treatment based upon the
consideration of race a violation of the Constitution. Being the only black justice on the
Supreme Court, Justice Thomas’ arguments in the case shed a unique perspective. With
Justice Thomas’ staunch belief in a conservative judicial interpretation of the text of the
Constitution, his opinion is consistent with his judicial ideology. Thomas begins his
dissent with an emotional plea he quotes from Frederick Douglass:
Frederick Douglass, speaking to a group of abolitionists almost 140
years ago, delivered a message lost on today’s majority: “[I]n regard
to the colored people, there is always more that is benevolent, I
perceive, than just, manifested towards us. What I ask for the negro
is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The
American people have always been anxious to know what they shall
do with us… . I have had but one answer from the beginning. Do
nothing with us! Your doing with us has already played the mischief
with us. Do nothing with us! If the apples will not remain on the tree
of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the core, if they are
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early ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! … And if the negro
cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give him a
chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! … [Y]our
interference is doing him positive injury.” What the Black Man
Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts, on 26
January 1865, reprinted in 4 The Frederick Douglass Papers 59, 68 (J.
Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds. 1991) (emphasis in original).
Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life
without the meddling of university administrators. Because I wish to see all
students succeed whatever their color, I share, in some respect, the sympathies of
those who sponsor the type of discrimination advanced by the University of
Michigan Law School (Law School). The Constitution does not, however, tolerate
institutional devotion to the status quo in admissions policies when
such
devotion ripens into racial discrimination. [Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003)]
Compelling Interest
A legal argument based upon a compelling state and/or national interest must be
strong enough when compared with the burden it may cause on others as a result. In this
case, the government must approve the appropriate use of affirmative action plans as
necessary for specific educational programs as well as for national interests. One of the
key arguments in the compelling interest argument that eventually decided the case in
favor of the Law School was presented by Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, who argued that
without the Law School’s flexible admissions policy, there would not be a meaningful
representation of minority students in the law program. Justice O’Connor explains in the
opinion of the Court:
Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, the Law School’s expert, focused on the
predicted effect of eliminating race as a factor in the Law School’s
admission process. In Dr. Raudenbush’s view, a race-blind admissions
system would have a “ ‘very dramatic,’ ” negative effect on underrepresented minority admissions. App. to Pet. for Cert. 223a. He testified
that in 2000, 35 percent of underrepresented minority applicants were
admitted. Ibid. Dr. Raudenbush predicted that if race were not considered,
only 10 percent of those applicants would have been admitted. Ibid. Under
this scenario, underrepresented minority students would have comprised 4
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percent of the entering class in 2000 instead of the actual figure of 14.5
percent. Ibid. [Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, (2003)]
Furthermore, O’Connor explains that the compelling interest in the Grutter case is
focused on the importance of diversity in the classroom for enhancing the learning for all
students. She writes, “The hallmark of that policy is its focus on academic ability
coupled with a flexible assessment of applicants’ talents, experiences, and potential to
contribute to the learning of those around them” [Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
(2003)]. This statement also provides the shift in the ideology that affirmative action
policies approved by the courts are no longer based on remedying past discrimination, but
are based on the compelling interest of creating a diverse student population.
Additionally, O’Connor provides academic research to support the notion of a compelling
interest in this case, including the Bowen and Bok study in The Shape of the River
examined earlier in this dissertation.
The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered
by its amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from
student body diversity. In addition to the expert studies and reports
entered into evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student
body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and “better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better
prepares them as professionals.” Brief for American Educational
Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae 3; see, e.g., W. Bowen &
D. Bok, The Shape of the River (1998); Diversity Challenged:
Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action (G. Orfield &
M. Kurlaender eds. 2001); Compelling Interest: Examining the
Evidence on Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities
(M. Chang, D. Witt, J. Jones, & K. Hakuta eds. 2003). [Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, (2003)]
Breaking-Down Stereotypes
One of the important phrases in the opinion for the Court is ‘“contributing in
diverse ways to the well-being of others.’” Further, O’Connor cites the testimony of the
dean of Vanderbilt University Law School who submitted several expert reports on the
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educational benefits of diversity. O’Connor presents his testimony in her opinion
explaining the notion of breaking-down stereotypes as a component of the compelling
interest for diversity in student populations. O’Connor writes, “Syverud’s testimony
indicated that when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present,
racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn there is no
“‘minority viewpoint’ ” but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students.”
Further, O’Connor contends:
These benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law
School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps
to break down racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better
understand persons of different races.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 246a. These
benefits are “important and laudable,” because “classroom discussion is
livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting”
when the students have “the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.” Id.,
at 246. O’Connor is reinforcing a primary benefit that a diverse student
population contributes to race realism and racial respect and harmony
among students. [Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, (2003)]
Reverse Discrimination
Justice O’Connor cautions that affirmative action policies must be narrowlytailored and restricted to avoid reverse discrimination, “We are mindful, however, that a
core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally
imposed discrimination based on race” (Grutter). Affirmative action policies are to be
extended only for a limited amount of time, until meaningful diversity in universities and
political, corporate, and military leadership can be achieved without such practices. The
fixed time period is a reflection of the significant concern that racial classifications,
however meaningful their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they must be limited in
time and in scope.
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Justice O’Connor specifically addresses the concerns of non-minority applicants
in their beliefs that the Bakke and Grutter decisions affirm reverse discrimination:
As Justice Powell recognized in Bakke, so long as a race-conscious
admissions program uses race as a “plus” factor in the context of
individualized consideration, a rejected applicant “will not have been
foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not
the right color or had the wrong surname… . His qualifications would
have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no basis
to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 438
U.S., at 318.
In addition, O’Connor argues that the Law School still values and prioritizes
highly qualified non-minority candidates despite their flexible consideration of race as a
soft variable in assessing minority applicants. O’Connor states, “We are satisfied that the
Law School’s admissions program does not. Because the Law School considers “all
pertinent elements of diversity,” it can (and does) select nonminority applicants who have
greater potential to enhance student body diversity over underrepresented minority
applicants’” [Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, (2003)]. The Law School’s balanced
admissions criteria emphasizes qualities beyond academics, while still prioritizing
intellectual achievement. This provides a comprehensive and meaningful review of an
applicant, which enriches the student population in the students’ program.
Comparative Analysis of the Application of the Fourteenth Amendment
in Gaines and Grutter
Gaines and Grutter have similar themes of validating equality of access to quality
higher education programs. Both Gaines and Grutter explore the text and the judicial
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. In addition, Gaines and Grutter both
manifest significant effects upon the access to higher education for students of color.
Gaines and Grutter both made a significant impact upon the policies and practices of
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admitting students of color to higher education programs. In addition to prioritizing
equal access to higher education, both Gaines and Grutter instigated the discussion in
academia and in the media of ensuring that professions such as the medical and legal
professions, the military, corporations, and higher education programs are wellrepresented with highly-trained representatives from all citizens of color.
Reflecting on Gaines and Grutter allows citizens to appreciate the importance of
equality of opportunity for all students to have a meaningful educational program, and to
value and prioritize diversity in the classroom. Not only do students of different races
and cultures learn more about each other and eliminate cultural stereotypes, but we learn
to respect and celebrate our unique cultural backgrounds as well as identify our
similarities. Valuable class discussions about struggles with racial and cultural
differences in all classroom contexts strengthen the individual student, the emerging
professional qualities of each student as they enter their respective professions better
prepared to contribute positively to the quality of their professions, and in turn,
strengthen racial harmony in the democratic process. As Justice Breyer (2005) reminds
us, active democracy as designed by the Founding Fathers requires a ‘“positive passion
for the public good’” and that freedom to participate in the government involves the right
to contribute to the nation’s public acts. These are the values that can best be sustained
and strengthened by meaningful diversity and racial respect in the nation’s classrooms.
In contrasting Gaines with Grutter, scholars can identify the transformation of
educational and legal priorities and policies that emerged throughout the twentieth
century. The twentieth century began with rigid Jim Crow practices and the emerging
political unification of black citizens to challenge legally the political, economic, social,
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and educational discrimination that white citizens had been imposing on people of color
for centuries. As McWhirter (2011) contends, due to the horrific surge in violence and
lynchings targeting black citizens, the summer of 1919 became the catalyst for the
momentum in the challenge to racial hatred and discriminatory practices. As the NAACP
solidified, the myriad issues plaguing racial hatred and discriminatory practices translated
into specific legal challenges to the mis-application of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Supreme Court case law. The legal team at the NAACP LDF
articulated and successfully employed their strategic plan to challenge each illegal
practice and policy one at a time. The Gaines case provided them with a transformational
victory to move strategically ahead with outlawing segregation practices altogether.
Between the Gaines victory and the Grutter case affirming the value of equal access that
had been initially established in Gaines, the United States experienced a period of
significant and meaningful shift in educational priorities and practices. The NAACP
LDF and the citizens it represented had to weather years of massive, intense, and violent
resistance primarily from the white South between Gaines and the integration of
secondary public schools that slowly, and finally, occurred in the 1960s and 1970s.
However, the discussion shifted in the 1970s in the area of equal access to higher
education from providing equality and protection to students of color to charges of
favoring students of color against white students. In Bakke and in Grutter, despite
argument over the strict or loose interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, a narrow
majority of justices expressed their commitment to prioritizing equality of opportunity
and meaningful diversity in the nation’s higher education classrooms.
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Justice Breyer (2005, p. 18) contends that the constitutional language articulated
in the due process and equal protection clauses were not designed to be precise and were
intended to provide “’positive directions for rules of actions.’” A judge must be cautious
to not enforce his or her own beliefs, but rather must consider different points of view
with the attitude of expressing the “’spirit of liberty.’” Throughout all of the legal
victories and set-backs and all of the assessment of educational practices and policies to
provide fair and high-quality programs to students from all races, the one common theme
holding all of the issues of equal access together is the Fourteenth Amendment. It is
through the collective dialogue and appreciation of its meaning that scholars and citizens
can always endeavor to protect it for the assurance of liberty in the democratic process.
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CHAPTER 7
IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF ACTIVE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
IN CONTRAST WITH JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN GAINES AND GRUTTER
The legal contention of strict construction versus loose construction in
constitutional interpretation has played a significant role in debating educational issues.
The debate originally emerged with the Founding Fathers. On the one hand, Thomas
Jefferson supported the strict construction of the Constitution, meaning that he believed
that judges should follow exactly what is stated in the document (Burns, 2009;
McCullough, 2001). On the other hand, Alexander Hamilton believed in loose
construction of the Constitution in that judges could take liberties with interpreting and
applying the language of the document to make decisions as long as the document did not
specifically prohibit the practice (Burns, McCullough).
Burns (2009, p. 2) explains that Article III of the United States Constitution,
where judicial power is articulated, makes no mention of judicial review or, “veto” of
legislation. Burns argues that the authors of the Constitution intentionally left the power
of judicial review out, stating that the Framers knew what they were putting in as well as
what they were leaving out. Burns asserts that the Supreme Court acquired the power of
judicial review through a political coup led by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1803. In
Marbury v. Madison, [5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)], Marshall enacted what he believed
the Supreme Court should be, the final authority in all matters constitutional. He stated,
“It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.” This power of the judiciary “extended to all cases arising under the constitution” (as
cited in Burns, p. 31). Marshall declared that it was the “exclusive duty of the Supreme
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Court - not the Congress or the president - to say what the law is.” The Constitution,
Marshall insisted, was nothing more and nothing less than what a majority of the justices
said it was (Burns, p. 2). According to Burns, the Supreme Court has, thus, held itself at
the center of constitutional action over the past two centuries. As a result, the Supreme
Court has become a “magnet for partisan conflict” (Burns, p. 3). Presidents have
strategically pushed for loyalists to pack the Court to gain political and ideological
control of the judiciary.
Contrasting Judicial Activism with Judicial Restraint
Judicial activism is defined as a judicial decision that involves personal or
political considerations rather than based on the textual elements of the law (Blacks Law
Dictionary, 2009). Judicial activism is considered the antonym of judicial restraint. The
purpose of contrasting these two ideas of judicial interpretation is to reveal the salient
characteristics of judicial interpretation in its most conservative extreme, judicial restraint,
versus its most liberal extreme, judicial activism.
The notion of judicial activism was first labeled by Arthur Schlesinger in a 1947
article in Fortune magazine (Kmiec, 2004). Schlesinger listed Justices Hugo Black,
William O. Douglas, Frank W. Murphy, and John Rutledge as judicial activists, and Felix
Frankfurter, Harold Burton, and Robert H. Jackson as exercising judicial restraint.
Justice Stanley Reed and the Chief Justice, Fred Vinson, were labeled moderates in the
article (Kmiec). Judicial activism is a controversial term, popularly used when observers
are disappointed with a Supreme Court ruling in order to criticize members of the Court.
The salient aspects of judicial activism involve separation of powers, constitutional
interpretation, and statutory interpretation (Kmiec). Much scholarship has been
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conducted to evaluate the meaning of the term and its dangers and contributions to
judicial interpretation, and to identify elements of judicial activism and judicial restraint
in court opinions and dissents (Burns, 2009; Eisgruber, 2009; Kmiec).
Judicial activism involves a loose construction of the United States Constitution,
while restraint is aligned with the doctrine of originalism, the strict interpretation of the
words of the Constitution. Judicial activists are more inclined to interpret the
Constitution liberally to allow for expanding rights and protections for individuals. By
contrast, justices who exhibit judicial restraint are resistant to new individual rights and
liberties as interpreted from the Constitution (Burns, 2009; Eisgruber, 2009).
Eisgruber (2009) explores the idea of judicial philosophy in his recently published
book, The Next Justice: Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Process. Eisgruber
defines a judicial philosophy as the views that a judge holds when he or she interprets
abstract principles from constitutional language. These views reveal a judge's beliefs on
judicial interpretation and the proper role of the courts in the United States government.
Eisgruber argues that the process for appointing Supreme Court justices is broken for
both conservatives and liberals. Eisburger proposes that during presidential and
congressional deliberations `regarding the nomination of a candidate for the Supreme
Court that the nominees should have to show that their judicial ideologies and political
beliefs are acceptable to the president, senators, and citizens. The salient question that
Eisgruber proposes that nominees must answer and defend is: when and why is it
beneficial for judges to overturn the decisions of elected officials? This answer would
reveal the nominee’s true beliefs regarding specific precedents and the Framer’s
intentions when interpreting abstract constitutional language. Nominees should provide
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evidence of their interpretations including their writings, speeches, and opinions if they
have previously served as a judge. Further, Eisgruber hails the value of judicial
moderates when applying political philosophy to judicial interpretation.
Active Liberty Defined by Justice Stephen Breyer
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer (2005) develops a reasonable and
meaningful analysis of the contrasting legal ideologies of judicial activism and judicial
restraint by explicating the idea of active liberty, or flexible judicial interpretation of
constitutional and statutory law. Breyer describes the foundation for active liberty as
originating with Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, who, despite their political
differences, agreed that effective democracy rests on “the freedom of the individual
citizen to participate in the government and thereby to share with others the right to make
or to control the nation’s public acts” (Breyer, p. 3; McCullough, 2001). Breyer’s
primary contention is that courts should consider with greater emphasis the democratic
nature of the Constitution when they interpret constitutional and statutory texts. Breyer’s
objective in encouraging courts to apply active liberty through their judicial decision
making is to “yield better law-law that helps a community of individuals democratically
find practical solutions to important contemporary social problems” (p. 6).
Simultaneously, judges should consider practical consequences valued in terms of
constitutional purposes, when the interpretation of constitutional language is the
consideration.
Breyer (2005) outlines the process of judicial interpretation of constitutional and
statutory law. First, as judges read the text’s language, they consider language used in
other parts of the document. They evaluate the history of the language, including the
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likely intent of what the language meant to those who wrote it. Judges look to tradition to
identify how the relevant language was, and is, applied in the law. Accordingly, they
examine judicial precedents that interpret the phrase, considering what the phrase means
and how it has been applied (Breyer). Further, judges seek to understand the purpose of
the phrase in respect to other constitutional phrases. They consider the likely
consequences of different interpretive alternatives. Breyer states that these core judicial
elements – of “language, history, tradition, precedent, purpose, and consequence” - are
commonly shared by judges (p. 8). The disagreement emerges from where and how to
apply them. Some judges emphasize the use of language, history, and tradition, in
contrast with those who emphasize purpose and consequence. Similarly, Justice William
J. Brennan stated, ‘“The genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it
might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current needs” (as cited by Burns, 2009,
213). By contrast, William Rehnquist, also declared that there was not a “single,
discoverable meaning to the Constitution,” but that while he and Brennan both believed
in the original intent of the Constitution, they might come to different conclusions. Burns
argues that Rehnquist was a “results-oriented activist of the right,” a judicial conservative
who staunchly believed in exercising judicial restraint (p. 213).
Breyer (2005) further contends that Supreme Court work is different from lower
courts because although it is appellate in nature, the justices view the Constitution as a
whole. Breyer explains:
I see the document as creating a coherent framework for a certain kind of
government. Described generally, that government is democratic; it
avoids concentration of too much power in too few hands; it protects
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personal liberty; it insists that the law respect each individual equally; and
it acts only upon the basis of law itself. (p. 9)
Breyer points out that his judicial interpretation would also include how a particular
objective will influence the interpretation of a broader provision, rather than just the
specific provisions under direct evaluation.
Another important aspect of Breyer’s (2005) explication of judicial interpretation
is how members of historically different Supreme Courts have emphasized different
constitutional objectives or themes, which allow scholars to characterize a Court during a
certain period of its history and to contrast the changes in the Court’s judicial ideology
over time. In those instances relevant to my study, Breyer characterizes post-Civil War
Courts as having
wrongly underemphasized the basic objectives of the Civil War
amendments. It tended to ignore that those amendments sought to draw
all citizens, irrespective of race, into the community, and that those
amendments, in guaranteeing that the law would equally respect all
“persons,” hoped to make the Constitution’s opening phrase, “We the
People,” a political reality. (p. 10)
Additionally, Breyer describes the New Deal Court and the Warren Court as having
emphasized the ways in which the Constitution protects a citizen’s ‘“active liberty,’ the
scope of the right to participate in government” (p. 10). For example, the Warren Court’s
emphasis on the need to make the law’s constitutional promises a legal reality to include
black citizens as full members of the United States “community of self-governing
citizens,” which later extended suffrage to women, led it to evaluate how the Civil War
amendments had changed the scope of pre-Civil War constitutional language including
the premises upon which previous constitutional interpretations had rested (Breyer, p. 11).
Interestingly, Breyer characterizes his own Court as having swung back too far, “often
underemphasizing or overlooking the contemporary importance of active liberty” (p. 11).
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As Breyer (2005) acknowledges above, one of the most monumental events in
Supreme Court history was the nomination of Earl Warren to Chief Justice by President
Dwight Eisenhower in 1953. Burns (2009) argues that Warren viewed the Fourteenth
Amendment as the Republicans who had written the Amendment had intended. Warren’s
leadership on the Court resulted in sixteen years of unprecedented transformations in
First and Fourteenth Amendment protections for individual rights (Burns; Schwartz, 1993;
Irons, 1999). The Warren Court’s activism was unleashed by the nomination of Arthur
Goldberg to replace Felix Frankfurter on the Court by President Kennedy in 1962 (Burns).
Along with Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Warren, Goldberg became the fifth
vote in the activist bloc. When Goldberg resigned in 1965 to become the United States
ambassador to the United Nations, his replacement, Abe Fortas, continued the Warren
Court’s campaign to provide equal rights. During these sixteen years, the Warren Court
struck down sixteen federal statutes between 1963-1969 and overturned forty-five
precedents (Burns). The Warren Court was arguably the most liberal activist court
interpreting the Constitution loosely to provide protections for citizens previously
marginalized by strict or errant interpretations of the United States Constitution. Chief
Justice Warren considered judicial review from the perspective of “rightness” rather than
“reasonableness.” “If the law was contrary to his own conception of what the
Constitution demanded, it did not matter that a reasonable legislator might reach the
opposite conclusion” (Schwartz, p. 276). Warren is remembered for the sweeping
decisions of his court, which championed civil rights and the use of judicial power to
effect social progress in the United States (Cray, 1997; White, 1982). As a result of his
loose interpretations of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, Warren became widely
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regarded as one of the most influential Supreme Court Justices in United States history,
and the single most important justice of the twentieth century (Cray; White).
The Warren Court has been compared to the John Marshall Court of the early
1800s in that they both vigorously used judicial power to reshape the Constitution to
support civil liberties (Burns, 2009). While there was much public controversy regarding
the break from the traditional conservancy of the Warren Court, the Justices argued that
they were simply making explicit the constitutional rights and protections that politicians
and the Court itself had long ignored or betrayed (Burns). Burns contends, “Decisions
like Brown gave impetus to African-American activism that in turn pressured the political
branches to finally deliver on the promise of civil and political equality for blacks”
(Burns, p. 194).
By contrast, in comparing the Rehnquist Court to the Fuller Court that decided the
Plessy v. Ferguson decision, [163 U.S. 537 (1896)], Pettigrew (2004) as well as Orfield
and Eaton (1996) show similarities in decisions made by both Courts. For example, both
Court eras followed significant government efforts to reform racial discriminatory
practices and injustices, Reconstruction, and the 1960s and 1970s following the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Both Courts had justices who were appointed by presidents who had
opposed civil rights remedies: Rutherford Hayes in 1876, and Nixon, Reagan, and
George H. W. Bush for the post Civil Rights Movement. Pettigrew and Orfield and
Eaton argue that both of these Courts were part of the Republican efforts to appease the
white South, to establish a political and regional unified base, and that resistance efforts
from the Democratic Party were grossly inadequate in both eras. Finally, both Courts
held that racial segregation is a naturally occurring practice and that courts are limited in
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their abilities to influence the integration of races. For example, Justice O’Connor stated
that white flight from urban areas to suburban was caused either by desegregation
policies or by “natural, if unfortunate, demographic forces” (as cited by Pettigrew, 2004).
Merritt (2005) advances this argument by asserting that after Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, [347 U.S. 483, (1954)], courts began to use the federal Constitution
to achieve social justice goals. However, while Merritt hails Brown as one of the
“greatest achievements of the American judicial system,” she argues that judicial power
can also be abused to serve the interests of elites by “helping to marginalize more
democratic forms of policy making” (p. 51). For example, Merritt asserts that recent
conservative-majority courts have rejected claims that involve constitutional protections
for housing segregation and economic inequalities in education. In the area of
affirmative action, Merritt contends that white elites have turned litigation to their
advantage by developing conservative constitutional arguments that depict affirmative
action as reverse discrimination. Merritt states, “Elites have succeeded on these issues in
the courts precisely because they have been able to exclude the reality of racism from the
discussion” (p. 52).
Elements of Breyer’s Active Liberty in Grutter
Breyer contends, “The concept of active liberty . . . refers to a sharing of a
nation’s sovereign authority among its people” (2005, p. 15). Breyer argues that this pure
definition of democracy should value the rights and the duties of the whole people. This
calls for judicial restraint, meaning that government should provide minimal interference
into the individual rights of citizens. In this light, Breyer explains that given
constitutional and statutory textual interpretation, a judge should identify the purpose of
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the text. The judge should interpret constitutional language connecting the purpose of the
law with the present issue under judicial consideration. In addition, Breyer acknowledges
that the framers of the Constitution could not anticipate issues that arise today. Thus, to
best apply the framers’ intent to a judicial interpretation, a judge should first identify the
purpose of the language, apply it to current issues, and then anticipate the consequences
of his/her interpretation as it would affect contemporary political, economic, and social
conditions. Judges must exercise restraint and an attitude that represents the “voice of the
law” in order to avoid being ‘“willful, in the sense of enforcing individual views’”
(Breyer, p. 18). Importantly, one of Breyer’s objectives is to show the connection
between later decisions that “…gave life to the Constitution’s liberty-protecting
promises” that now breathes full meaning to the phrase ‘“We the People’” to include
those whom the Constitution previously and intentionally ignored (p. 20).
In light of these concepts of judicial interpretation, Breyer directly addresses the
issue of active liberty with relation to affirmative action. Breyer calls for democratic
decision-making in addition to judicial modesty, and the increased acknowledgement of
the Constitution’s democratic objective. Like other modern day government-related
issues, affirmative action policies call for a democratically based interpretation by the
courts. Using the Grutter case as his example, Breyer explains the meaning behind the 54 judicial decision that allows a narrowly-tailored affirmative action student admissions
policy to continue at the University of Michigan School of Law. Breyer connects the
issue of using race as a soft variable in considering student admissions with the Equal
Protection Clause, which forbids any state to deny persons the “equal protection of the
laws” (p. 76).
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Breyer (2005) contrasts the two legal ideologies presented in the Supreme Court’s
judicial interpretation of the Grutter case. One is “color-blind” and the other is
“purposive” (Breyer, p. 78). First, as Justice Clarence Thomas argues in his dissent, the
Equal Protection Clause must be “color-blind” in instances of state activity. Thomas
contends that classifying students based on race is prohibited by the Constitution harms
individuals as well as society. Breyer, however, concurs with the majority on the
argument that the Equal Protection Clause should be understood as more narrowly
purposive. The Equal Protection Clause was developed out of the United States effort to
end slavery and segregation during Reconstruction. The Equal Protection Clause should
thus, reflect that history. Breyer asserts, “It consequently demands laws that equally
respect each individual; it forbids laws based on race when those laws reflect a lack of
equivalent respect for members of the disfavored race; but it does not similarly disfavor
race-based laws in other circumstances” (p. 77). With the inability of the Civil War
amendments to provide full citizenship to those long denied that protection, Breyer
argues that experience suggests that a “’colorblind’ interpretation of those amendments
was insufficient to provide full and equal rights to all. Breyer cites Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg as corroborating his argument in the case, “In implementing (the Constitution’s)
equality instruction . . . government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between
policies of exclusion and inclusion. Actions designed to burden groups long denied full
citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when
entrenched discrimination and its after effects have been extirpated” (p. 78).
One of Breyer’s (2005) most important points is that the two views, one colorblind, and the other purposive, are not polar opposites, but reflect different judicial
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interpretations. For example, justices who favor the color-blind interpretation, such as
Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia, will concede that there are rare occasions that the Equal
Protection Clause may be used to permit distinctions based on race. Likewise, Justices
O’Connor, Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer favor purposive class distinctions that
are narrowly-tailored and strictly scrutinized in order to eliminate class distinctions that
are malign in intent and to minimize harm to once-preferred groups.
In explicating the opinion in Grutter, Breyer (2005) asserts that because the
University of Michigan Law School considered each application individually, the justices
in the majority found that the school’s admissions program allowing race to be a soft
variable was narrowly-tailored to achieve a compelling rationale of having a meaningful
diversity in their student population. The decision includes a twenty-five year fixed time
period to end the time necessary to apply racial preferences to student admissions.
Moreover, in Grutter, the justices consider the notion of equality as the
underlying purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. In reference to early affirmative
action cases, Judge John Minor Wisdom explains the connection of equality to racial
preferences, as the ‘“Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being
perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination’” (Breyer, 2005, p. 80).
However, in Grutter, the Law School avoids the equality-based remedial claim likely
because courts began to discount the justification for affirmative action based on a
remedy for past discrimination. Rather, the Law School chose to support its argument
based on the notion of individual equality in the classroom for a meaningful, diverse
student population. The Law School counselors successfully argue that not only are legal
scholars needed for all races, but the United States is in need of a diverse base for
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democratic leadership. Justice O’Connor argues in the opinion for the Court, “Major
American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global
market-place can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas and viewpoints.” In addition, O’Connor argues, “High-ranking retired officers and
civilian leaders of the United States military assert that ‘based on (their) decades of
experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the
military’s ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national security” (as cited by
Breyer, p. 81). O’Connor expresses the value of higher education as the place where
openness to the cultures of other ethnicities and the path to leadership must include
individuals from every race. Breyer shows how these components of active liberty
provide equality in a participatory, democratic nation.
Judicial Restraint Reasoned by Justice Scalia
Breyer’s commentary on judicial interpretation is in contrast to Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia’s 1998 book, A Matter of Interpretation. Scalia’s interpretations
of the Constitution are considered strict even though Scalia argues that strict
constructionist is a misleading term. Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas are thus
associated with the “doctrine of originalism,” meaning they “look to the language of the
Constitution and the way it was originally understood” (Greenburg, 2007, p. 179).
Specifically, Justices Scalia and Thomas will decline to allow new constitutional rights
(Greenburg). Scalia, the justice most identified with the term, has said that he is "not a
strict constructionist and no-one ought to be," and has called the philosophy "a degraded
form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute." Scalia further
distinguishes the two philosophies by stating that "[a] text should not be construed strictly,
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and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all
that it fairly means” (Scalia). Scalia argues that laws mean what they actually say; not
what legislators intended them to say but did not include in the laws text for others to
read. Scalia states that words do have a limited range of meaning, and that interpretations
should not go beyond that. When interpreting consistutional or statutory law, judges
should do their best to determine the first, origianl meaning of the text. Second, judges
must identify practical implications for the original meanings.
In addition, some scholars question the constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s
policymaking powers. The Grutter case is a primary example of the Supreme Court’s
impact on the implementation of local, state, and federal policies. Naff (2004, p. 1)
published a report on the Supreme Court’s policymaking role “through the lens of
affirmative action.” Although the Supreme Court’s policymaking role is indirect because
it is conducted through judicial review, the Founding Fathers debated the wisdom of
allowing an unelected government body to declare policies to be in accordance with or in
violation of the Constitution (Naff). The central query in the debate is whether to protect
the interests of the minority whose voice can little be heard in the wake of majority
opinion, or whether the will of the representatives of the people will not be protected in
the interests of a few. In the case of affirmative action, Naff argues that the particular
personalities and ideologies of the members of the Supreme Court have shaped the
implementation of affirmative action and that as those members change, support for
minority interests will change accordingly.

164
Document Analysis in Gaines and in Grutter
The following analysis reveals the primary themes from the Gaines case and from
the Grutter case that required the justices to interpret the Equal Protection Clause in an
active style or in a restrictive style. The result of both cases advanced the cause of equal
access to higher education. This discussion will first highlight key arguments from the
Gaines’ text followed by the Grutter text. I provide theme organization and reflection to
present the analysis.
The Gaines analysis for judicial interpretation will focus on the following themes:
Equal Access and Political and Economic Repression. The Grutter analysis will focus on
the sub-themes of Critical Mass, Narrow-tailoring, Strict Scrutiny, and Fixed Time
Period. The documents are provided in full in the Appendix of this paper in addition to
my reflections noted in the Observer Comments.
In Figure 1, I provide a timeline of the progress of Gaines and Grutter through the
appellate process in the Hughes court and in the Rehnquist court, respectively. It is
provided to help make connections between the two cases in order to proceed with the
comparison analysis.
Judicial Interpretation in Gaines
In the following excerpts from my fieldnotes of my document analyses of the
Gaines’ case, I identify elements of judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to ensure the right of equal access to higher education is available to all students in the
United States regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender. However, I find no evidence of
active judicial liberty nor judicial restraint. I argue that the justices on the Hughes Court
supporting the majority opinion to allow Lloyd Gaines’ right to equal access for a legal
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education within the state of Missouri are simply interpreting the Equal Protection Clause
as it was written and intended in its purist, textual form. In addition, I argue that the
justices are not being activists by simply providing protections that were already there
that had been illegally denied to black citizens. Even further, the justices stop short of
declaring that separate was not equal, failing to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson, not
exhibiting judicial restraint, but failing to acknowledge the rights and protections already
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established by the original text of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. While the
majority of the justices on the Hughes’ Court made an important step toward providing
equal access for all citizens to higher education, the two dissenting justices, McReynolds
and Butler, exhibit judgment based upon their social beliefs seeded in the attitude of
white superiority and their political beliefs demanding white control of access to higher
education. In addition, McReynolds and Butler reflect the social and political climate of
the racist white South of the 1930s.
Equal Access
Hughes immediately addresses the point that Gaines was an equally, wellqualified student for admission into the University of Missouri School of Law, and was
not admitted directly due to state statutes prohibiting students from African decent to
attend the University of Missouri. The state of Missouri makes it clear in statute and in
policy that white students and negro students should be provided a separate, but equal,
education. Black students were to be provided tuition to attend a university in another
state until Lincoln University was able to provide a quality legal program.
Hughes calls the efforts of the state of Missouri “commendable” as the first state
to consider making the separate educational institution at Lincoln “equal” in quality.
This statement shows that Hughes’ commitment to separate, but equal, remained intact.
What Hughes argued against then, was not to overturn the separate but equal precedent
established in Plessy v. Ferguson, but rather affirm that separation of the races in
education is acceptable if equality in programs is provided.
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Themes of Political and Economic Repression Dominate McReynolds’ Dissent in
Gaines
I argue that McReynolds’ dissent posted below should not be considered judicial
restraint. Judicial restraint indicates that the justices interpreted the constitutional
language in the original textual form, limiting the intentions of the authors of the
language. Justices exercising judicial restraint are hesitant to generate new liberties and
rights based on constitutional language, limiting the extension of Fourteenth Amendment
in this particular case. The notion of judicial restraint is not appropriate here because the
dissent of McReynolds and Butler is errant and a mal-interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The justices state, “For a long time,
Missouri has acted upon the view that the best interest of her people demands separation
of whites and negroes in schools. Under the opinion just announced, I presume she may
abandon her law school, and thereby disadvantage her white citizens without improving
petitioner's opportunities for legal instruction; or she may break down the settled practice
concerning separate schools and thereby, as indicated by experience, damnify both
races.” These statements reflect the social and political climate of the 1930s, the racist
attitude prevailing in a large part of the United States, and the white demand for control
of higher education to prevent black citizens from gaining access to quality legal
programs. These statements to not reflect the rights and protections guaranteed by the
Equal Protection Clause.
In addition, the judicial precedent provided by Justice McReynolds is mis-applied.
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education [175 U.S. 528, (1899)] does uphold
the Tenth Amendment by supporting the right of the states to conduct their own
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education of their citizens. However, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal
national rights and protections to all citizens as they participate in that education that is
provided by the states. The full rights and protections of citizens cannot be inhibited by
the states according to the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the context.
Document Analysis in Grutter v. Bollinger
Critical Mass
Scalia’s arguments, like Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, have carried
the traditional idea of interpreting the Constitution as close to the written documents as
possible. For example, in the oral argument conducted in Grutter, the following excerpt
reveals Scalia’s tactics in getting the attorney for the University of Michigan to admit that
its affirmative action program was a quota system:
Justice Scalia: Is 2 percent a critical mass, Ms. Mahoney?
Ms. Mahoney: I don’t think so, Your Honor.
Justice Scalia: Like 8, is 8 percent?
Ms. Mahoney: Now, Your Honor.
Justice Scalia: Now, does it stop being a quota because it’s somewhere
between 8 and 12, but it is a quota if it’s 10? I don’t understand that
reasoning. Once you use the term critical mass and…you’re…you’re into
quota land.
Ms. Mahoney: Your Honor, what a quota is under this Court’s cases is a
fixed number. And there is no fixed number here. The testimony was that
it depends on the characteristics of the applicant pool. [Oral Argument,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002)]
The above excerpt between Scalia and the attorney illustrates the central factor in
affirmative action cases. President George W. Bush highlighted Scalia’s argument in a
public speech stating that the law school used a quota system which resulted in reverse
discrimination against white students, articulating the conservative perspective on the use
of affirmative action programs. In Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Dissent on the Grutter case,
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which was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Anthony Kennedy, Rehnquist explains
that their primary disagreement with the majority opinion was based on their belief that
the Law School’s attempt to develop a “critical mass” of underrepresented students was a
veil to cover a quota system favoring African -American students over students from
other race categories, specifically, Caucasians, Native Americans, and Hispanics, which
was inconsistent with the idea of a critical mass. Rehnquist argues that the unequal
application of the law school’s admittance policy for minority students proved that the
law school’s intentions were not to create a meaningful diverse student population
through the idea of the critical mass, but were to favor African-American student
admissions (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003).
Further, O’Connor writes in the opinion of the case that the majority of the
justices value having a meaningful critical mass of minority students represented in
higher education programs.
‘The policy aspires to ‘“achieve that diversity which has the potential to
enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger
than the sum of its parts.’” Id., at 118. The policy does not restrict the
types of diversity contributions eligible for ‘“substantial weight’” in the
admissions process, but instead recognizes ‘“many possible bases for
diversity admissions.” Id., at 118, 120. The policy does, however,
reaffirm the law School’s longstanding commitment to ‘“one particular
type of diversity,”’ that is, ‘“racial and ethnic diversity with special
reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been
historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and
Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented
in our student body in meaningful numbers.’” Id., at 120. By enrolling a
‘“critical mass’” of (underrepresented) minority students, ‘“the Law
School seeks to ‘“ensure their ability to make unique contributions to the
character of the Law School.’” Id., at 120-121. [Grutter v. Bollinger 539
U.S. 306 (2003)]
The legal ideology of “critical mass” is controversial. Those against affirmative
action programs view the “critical mass” as indicative of a quota system. Those
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supportive of affirmative action programs argue that the “critical mass” is not a specific
number or quota, but does mean that a meaningful representative of minority students
should be included for two reasons. First, the “critical mass” provides a substantial voice
from different races, and second, it restricts the isolation feeling that individual students
might have in being a singular representative of their race in the classes, that students in
the early stages of higher education integration into graduate programs reported feeling.
This feeling is not only difficult to bear emotionally, but could lead to program drop-out
and the like.
Narrow-Tailoring
The following comments by Justice O’Connor in the opinion for Grutter make a
clear and justifiable case for support race as a factor in considering student admissions
within the cautions of narrowly-tailoring the policies:
To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot
use a quota system–it cannot “insulat[e] each category of applicants
with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other
applicants.” Bakke, supra, at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.). Instead, a
university may consider race or ethnicity only as a “ ‘plus’ in a
particular applicant’s file,” without “insulat[ing] the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.” Id., at
317. In other words, an admissions program must be “flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the
particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the
same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according
them the same weight.” Ibid.
We find that the Law School’s admissions program bears the
hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. As Justice Powell made clear
in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be
used in a flexible, nonmechanical way. It follows from this mandate
that universities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial
groups or put members of those groups on separate admissions tracks.
See id., at 315—316. Nor can universities insulate applicants who
belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for
admission. Ibid. Universities can, however, consider race or ethnicity
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more flexibly as a “plus” factor in the context of individualized
consideration of each and every applicant. Ibid.
We are satisfied that the Law School’s admissions program,
like the Harvard plan described by Justice Powell, does not operate
as a quota. Properly understood, a “quota” is a program in which a
certain fixed number or proportion of opportunities are “reserved
exclusively for certain minority groups.” Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., supra, at 496 (plurality opinion). Quotas “ ‘impose a fixed
number or percentage which must be attained, or which cannot be
exceeded,’ ” Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and
“insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates
for the available seats.” Bakke, supra, at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.).
In contrast, “a permissible goal … require[s] only a good-faith
effort … to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself,” Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOC, supra, at 495, and permits consideration of
race as a “plus” factor in any given case while still ensuring that each
candidate “compete[s] with all other qualified applicants,” Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987).
Justice Powell’s distinction between the medical school’s
rigid 16-seat quota and Harvard’s flexible use of race as a “plus”
factor is instructive. Harvard certainly had minimum goals for
minority enrollment, even if it had no specific number firmly in mind.
See Bakke, supra, at 323 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“10 or 20 black
students could not begin to bring to their classmates and to each other
the variety of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks
in the United States”). What is more, Justice Powell flatly rejected
the argument that Harvard’s program was “the functional equivalent
of a quota” merely because it had some “ ‘plus’ ” for race, or gave
greater “weight” to race than to some other factors, in order to
achieve student body diversity. 438 U.S., at 317—318. [Grutter v.
Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003)]
The Justices developed the idea of narrow-tailoring to show their concern that the
law school’s admission policy and other affirmative action policies are used appropriately
and only when no other means were possible in developing meaningful diversity in their
student populations. School officials should attempt every other means possible to
achieve diversity and use affirmative action programs only as a last resort. The Justices
admit the imperfection of the plans, but reiterate its necessity until a better situation exists.
They affirm the law school’s good intention behind their admissions program.
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Quotas
The passage below describes one of the key disagreements among the Justices in
deciding Grutter. O’Connor explains that the “daily reports” used by the law school to
keep track of the ethnicity, race, gender, and residency status of the applicants was
viewed by the Justices in two different ways. Dissenting Justices viewed the charts as
keeping a tally, which implies that a minimum number, or potentially a quota, was being
applied to their decision-making process. O’Connor states the other side of the argument,
which was that the “daily charts” were used to keep track of their admissions progress
and not necessarily used to create a quota system.
The Law School’s goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented
minority students does not transform its program into a quota. As the
Harvard plan described by Justice Powell recognized, there is of course
“some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be
derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing
a reasonable environment for those students admitted.” Id., at 323.
“[S]ome attention to numbers,” without more, does not transform a
flexible admissions system into a rigid quota. Ibid. Nor, as Justice
Kennedy posits, does the Law School’s consultation of the “daily reports,”
which keep track of the racial and ethnic composition of the class (as well
as of residency and gender), “suggest[ ] there was no further attempt at
individual review save for race itself” during the final stages of the
admissions process. See post, at 6 (dissenting opinion). To the contrary,
the Law School’s admissions officers testified without contradiction that
they never gave race any more or less weight based on the information
contained in these reports. Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 43, n. 70
(citing App. in Nos. 01—1447 and 01—1516 (CA6), p. 7336). Moreover,
as Justice Kennedy concedes, see post, at 4, between 1993 and 2000, the
number of African-American, Latino, and Native-American students in
each class at the Law School varied from 13.5 to 20.1 percent, a range
inconsistent with a quota. [Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003)]
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion reflects a different perspective on the law
school’s use of daily reports in its student admissions process. The following quote from
Rehnquist presents one of the salient disagreements in the outcome of the Grutter case.
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“The admissions officers consulted the daily reports which indicated the composition of
the incoming class along racial lines.” Rehnquist goes further to argue that the law
school attempts to conceal its quota system under the terminology of daily reports for a
flexible admissions process. He argues:
The tight correlation between the percentage of applicants and admittees
of a given race, therefore, must result from careful race based planning by
the Law School. It suggests a formula for admission based on the
aspirational assumption that all applicants are equally qualified
academically, and therefore that the proportion of each group admitted
should be the same as the proportion of that group in the applicant pool.
See Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 43, n. 70 (discussing admissions
officers use of periodic reports to track the racial composition of the
developing class). Not only do respondents fail to explain this
phenomenon, they attempt to obscure it. [Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S.
306 (2003)]
With his own unique evaluation of the Grutter case, Justice Kennedy supports the use of
race as a soft factor in considering student admissions to higher education, but dissented
in the Grutter opinion, concurring with Rehnquist, Thomas, and Scalia that the “daily
reports” served as a mask for a quota system, a violation of the strict scrutiny criteria
established in the Bakke case.
Strict Scrutiny
In the respect of considering affirmative action policies as quotas, both Justice
Powell and Justice O’Connor discuss the importance of developing and evaluating
student admissions policies with strict scrutiny to ensure that they are implemented
according to the criteria outlined in Bakke. In conjunction with the theme of Creating a
Diverse Student Body, Justices Powell and O’Connor reiterate the importance of
affirmative action policies being based on one compelling interest only: that of being
absolutely necessary for creating a diverse student body.
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In Justice Kennedy’s dissent, however, he asserts that the Law School’s
implementation of daily reports as part of their student admissions process is a violation
of Justice Powell’s criteria, which is outlined in Bakke. In the following excerpt from
Powell’s dissent, he states his belief in the right of higher education admissions officers
to allow race to be a soft factor in student admissions, but only if done legally under the
Bakke criteria, which would consider the use of daily reports as a quota system.
It is regrettable the Court’s important holding allowing racial minorities to
have their special circumstances considered in order to improve their
educational opportunities is accompanied by a suspension of the strict
scrutiny which was the predicate of allowing race to be considered in the
first place. If the Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict
scrutiny to the use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority
to approve the use of race in pursuit of student diversity. The Constitution
cannot confer the right to classify on the basis of race even in this special
context absent searching judicial review. For these reasons, though I
reiterate my approval of giving appropriate consideration to race in this
one context, I must dissent in the present case. [Grutter v. Bollinger 539
U.S. 306 (2003)]
Thus, the disagreement among the justices on the use of the daily reports is the salient
consideration for Kennedy’s dissent. It shows the lack of consensus on what constitutes
strict scrutiny, and how do we know when it has been effectively applied to an
admissions policy.
Fixed Time Period
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer concur in the majority opinion and support
Justice O’Connor’s argument for a fixed time period on the preference of race in student
admissions policies. Justice Ginsburg writes:
The Court’s observation that race-conscious programs “must have a
logical end point,” ante, at 29, accords with the international
understanding of the office of affirmative action. The International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
ratified by the United States in 1994, see State Dept., Treaties in Force
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422—423 (June 1996), endorses “special and concrete measures to ensure
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or
individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the
full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” But
such measures, the Convention instructs, “shall in no case entail as a
consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different
racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have been
achieved.” [Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
Ginsburg is reiterating O’Connor’s opinion for the Court that the Law School’s
admission policy is not a perfect solution to the problem for ensuring equal access and
fulfilling the primary objective for the Law School, which is creating a diverse student
population. She continues, “From today’s vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly
forecast, that over the next generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and
genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.”
Chief Justice Rehnquist counters Ginsburg’s assertions by discounting the
arguments of applying strict scrutiny and a fixed time period to ensure the legal
implementation of the Bakke criteria in student admissions.
Finally, I believe that the Law School’s program fails strict scrutiny
because it is devoid of any reasonably precise time limit on the Law
School’s use of race in admissions. We have emphasized that we will
consider the planned duration of the remedy in determining whether a
race-conscious program is constitutional. [Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S.
306 (2003)]
In addition, Justice Scalia argues in his dissent that the split decision in Gratz and Grutter
will only continue further argument and litigation over the issue. He states:
Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state
educational institutions are impermissible, or even a clear
anticonstitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational
institutions are OK, today’s Grutter-Gratz split double header seems
perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation. [Grutter
v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003)]
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The Supreme Court will revisit the case this year as it has agreed to hear argument
in Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 11-345. The twenty-five year time period set to be
revisited around 2028, will be reviewed only a decade after the Grutter decision. Likely,
Anthony Kennedy’s vote will be critical to deciding the majority.
Judicial Language
As Breyer describes above, constitutional or statutory language is interpreted by
judges in an active, restrained, or moderate fashion. The previous discussion provides an
analysis of how a judge makes an interpretation of judicial language based on his/her
beliefs about the history and intentions of the text. An interpretation may include
political and personal beliefs as well, although this practice can lead to capricious or
maligned judgments. Notably, Novick (1988) quotes Edward Said in Orientalism stating
that truth is ‘“embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and
political ambience of the representer’” (1988, p. 545). With this truth in mind, scholars
must tackle the important, yet enduring task of analyzing judicial language in congruence
with the social and political context during the litigation, the political ideology of the
judge, and with utilization of relevant judicial precedents.
For example, when Plessy v. Ferguson was decided establishing the separate but
equal doctrine to legitimize segregation practices, the language used by Justice Henry B.
Brown to articulate the opinion was written to convey the message that separation of the
races was not inherently unequal, and any inferiority felt by blacks at having to use
separate facilities was an illusion: "We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
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any-thing found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it” (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896). Scholars can connect the racist, white
domination of the political and social climate with the language used by Justice Brown to
legitimize the political, social, and economic oppression of black citizens. In addition,
Brown’s decision has been characterized as reflecting the era’s racial, social, and legal
assumptions that blacks were inferior to whites, and that Brown himself was a typical
lawyer of his time (Irons, 1999). Irons contends the Brown “virtually ignored the
constitutional issues raised by Plessy’s lawyers; he relied heavily on cases that had little
or no authority as precedent; and he based his decision on thinly veiled racism, dressed
up in polite language (p. 227).
By contrast, alone in dissent, Harlan argued that the Louisiana law at issue, which
forced separation of white and black passengers on railway cars, was a "badge of
servitude" that degraded black citizens. Harlan also predicted that the Court's ruling
would become as infamous as its ruling in the Dred Scott case. In one of the most
important dissents written in Supreme Court history, Justice Harlan eloquently articulated
the essence of equality and equal protection under the law that the Fourteenth
Amendment had intended. He wrote:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in
this country. And so it is in prestige, in achievements,
in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it
will continue to be for all time if it remains true to its
great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class
of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.
The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards
man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his
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color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law
of the land are involved. [Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, (1896)]
Moreover, other examples of the use of judicial language to convey political
messages may be found in the implementation of non-inflamatory language in the civil
rights cases from the 1930s-1960s supporting the NAACP’s arguments, but written using
benign language. According to Wilkinson (1979), using temperance in order to minimize
the reaction of the South, the Warren Court presented a short, bland, moral opinion ruling
against segregation in public schools in Brown I, and a vague, conciliatory plan for
implementation in Brown II. Similarly, Philip Daniel (2005) argues that these decisions
are framed in a language that provides at least the appearance of justice without upsetting
large groups whose resistance can frustrate efforts for relief and undermine judicial
authority.
Judicial Policy-Making
The above discussion over judicial restraint in contrast with judicial activism also
illustrates the point that Supreme Court justices have an effect on policy making despite
the constitutional definition that they are not a policy-making body. Justice Louis D.
Brandeis said that what the Court did not do was often more important than what it did do
(Schwartz, 1993, p. 24). The Court pointed out in 1911 that judicial power is ‘“the right
to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in the
courts of proper jurisdiction”’ (as cited by Schwartz, p. 24). Justices can only decide
actual cases between a conflict that has arisen between litigants, which intentionally
restricts their policy-making power, leaving that government practice to the legislature
and the executive branches. Some legal scholars will thus argue that by definition, the
judicial branch is unable to make policy. However, a closer, more critical examination of
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Supreme Court opinions and their implications reveals the power that an opinion can
have in establishing new policy in education. ‘“No one today can defensibly argue that
courts do not make policy for schools”’ (Fischer, 1989, as cited by Wadel, 1991, p. 55).
Although legislative bodies have the power to enact laws, courts shape the law by
exercising their authority in judicial review (Wadel, 1991).
Compare and Contrast Analysis of Judicial Interpretation in Gaines and in Grutter
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the justices involved in the Grutter case and the
justices involved in the Gaines case. The purpose of creating these charts is to identify
the time period, the typical political ideology of the justices, the connection between the
presidents who appointed them, and the justices’ ruling in the cases. I have already
highlighted a few connections among these characteristics of the justices already, such as
with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, (who were all
appointed by conservative presidents), who reflected the conservative political and social
climates in their dissents, and who favor a strict interpretation of the Constitution.
The justices who exhibit moderate, or swing vote, decisions have typically been a
surprise to the presidents who appointed them. For example, Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy were both appointed by the very conservative Ronald Reagan, who worked to
restrict or overturn civil rights advances for minorities. However, O’Connor and
Kennedy both act as swing votes, purporting a more moderate interpretation of the
Constitution, and favor the use of race in affirmative action policies that are narrowlytailored and strictly-scrutinized. One should note, however, Kennedy’s dissent in the
Grutter case. His belief in the improper use of daily reports by the University of
Michigan Law School caused his dissent in this case.
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In the Gaines case, while Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes failed to overrule
Plessy v. Ferguson, his opinion marked a significant stride toward the equalization of
opportunties and resources for black students. Hughes was appointed by President Taft
in 1910, and exhibited a pragmatic approach to making decisions (Irons, 1999). Hughes
shifted his judicial ideology from conservative to liberal throughout his tenure on the
Court, which is reflected in his arguments and decision in Gaines. Hughes is quoted as
contending, ‘“The Constitution is what the judges say it is,’” in similar style with Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes (as cited by Irons, p. 260). Further, Hughes felt the Court should
reflect the social change being experience at the time, which is also reflected in his
decision in Gaines (Irons).
Interestingly, Irons (1999, p. 262) describes Justice James McReynolds, who
wrote the dissenting opinion in Gaines as a “judicial reactionary, with a violent temper
and a vicious streak of anti-Semitism.” McReynolds refused to speak with Justice Louis
Brandeis, the first justice who was Jewish. McReynold’s was appointed by Woodrow
Wilson, who also appointed Louis Brandeis. The two justices were the opposite extremes
in judicial ideology and in temperament. Justice Brandeis was known as ‘“the people’s
lawyer’” and had exemplary legal skills (Irons, p. 262). Justice Brandeis joined Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone and Justice Hugo Black as those who considered the protection of
civil rights a judicial priority.
On the other hand, some justices have exhibited a marked difference in the
expectation that was set for them as nominees to the Court. Justice Stevens was
appointed by Gerald Ford, a Republican president, but he tended to vote with the liberal
side of the court. It has often been said that during President Ford’s short tenure as
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president, that appointing Justice Stevens was one of the most significant legacies he left.
In addition, President Eisenhower famously said that appointing Justice Earl Warren to
the Supreme Court was the worst decision he made as president (Burns, 2009).
Eisenhower staunchly opposed intervention with Plessy. Warren surprised Eisenhower
and his fellow Republicans with a determination to end discrimination and oppression for
black citizens through several case including Brown. Burns contends that Republicans
and Southern Democrats were both surprised and dismayed that Eisenhower’s nominees
were more liberal and activist than the Roosevelt and Truman justices they replaced,
including Warren, Potter Stewart, John Marshall Harlan, and William Brennan.
The themes in this chapter unveil the complex factors that affect judicial decisionmaking. First, Justice Breyer’s (2005) analysis of active liberty highlights the salient
characteristics of judicial restraint, judicial activism, and active liberty. Along with
Justice Salia’s (1998) analysis of strict constructionism and judicial restraint, historians of
education law are able to use the judicial perspectives on constitutional interpretations as
a guide to create compare and contrast analyses of judicial decision-making.
The Grutter case reveals elements of active liberty defined by Justice Breyer
(2005) on the part of the majority opinions, and restraint by the dissenting justices. The
majority of the justices chose to interpret the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment with active liberty (Breyer) to ensure that the intent of the Constitution was
applied to the ruling to provide equal access to education and the protection of student
rights. The justices address the importance of applying strict scrutiny and narrowtailoring to the development and implementation of affirmative action policies to prevent
quotas from being used in student admissions. The justices also press for a fixed time
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period of allowing race to be a factor in student admissions so that equal access and
meaningful classroom diversity are prioritized, but do not exceed the scope of their intent.
In Gaines, however, despite the ruling allowing Gaines temporary enrollment at
the University of Missouri, the opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes reveals his
limited view of equal access by arguing that a meaningful, but still separate, law school
for black students should be made available within the state of Missouri. By contrast, the
separate opinion written by Justice McReynolds in the Gaines case is dominated by
themes of political and economic oppression intended to prevent black students from
having equal access to higher education. As a result of the contrast in themes of equal
access discussed in this chapter, it is valuable for historians of the law, law students, and
members of the legal profession to consider the notion of active liberty articulated by
Justice Breyer (2005) when developing their interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
and how it should be applied.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The study of education law is rich with history, compelling stories, engaging
political debate, and an unpredictable future. In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote
of the importance of law in the United States, ‘“Scarcely any political question arises in
the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question’” (as cited
by Irons, 1999, p. 147). In this fashion, education law reflects the larger questions of
society. Through the analysis of extensive litigation, members of the judiciary, lawyers,
and scholars have explored the myriad issues related to the legal struggle for equal
student access and the implications of ensuring diversity in the student population.
Remnants of social injustice live on despite extraordinary progress in civil rights.
The primary contention in Brown was that even if segregated black and white schools
were of equal quality in teacher, resources, and facilities, segregation alone is harmful to
black students and unconstitutional. Drawing on research conducted by Kenneth Clark,
the Justices found that a significant psychological and social disadvantage was given to
black children from the nature of segregation ([Footnote 11, Brown v. Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, (1954)]. The rulings of Brown I and II proved difficult at best
to overcome racial prejudices and injustices. The seeds of Plessy took decades to uproot,
and there are still many that linger today. The recent cases of Gratz, Grutter, and Parents
Involved v. Seattle School District provide scholars an opportunity to reflect upon the
progress and gaps that remain for equality in education through school law history.
Most notably, though, is the upcoming decision that the Supreme Court will make
to confirm Bakke and Grutter, or, to overrule the constitutionality of the use of race in
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higher education student admissions policies. The justices are currently considering
Abigail Fisher, et al. v. State of Texas, et al., from the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court
of Appeals that was decided on January 18, 2011. It is expected that Justice Anthony Kennedy
will be the deciding vote to continue the consideration of race in student admissions or to end
affirmative action completely in higher education.

The value of this dissertation is based on critical inquiry of judicial practices
affecting higher education. It is important for educators to know and understand
education law in order to contribute to its implementation. In addition, it is important for
educators to exercise critical thought and agency in order to recommend changes to the
law as needed. In researching equal access to higher education, educators can appreciate
the burden and the cost that black citizens endured in order to achieve equal opportunity
in education, and for their political and economic rights. Students who research the law
and dialogue with other educators and students of law provide a valuable resource to the
democratic process of public education.
Exploration of the Gaines case enlightens the scholar into deep aspects of racism,
United States history, and the strength of the human spirit. Evaluating the United States
Constitution, the established case law of the United States and of Missouri, and the
opinions of the judges and Justices through the lens of Gaines, Charles Houston and his
team at the NAACP, reveal how the social and political ideology of the dominant race
controls the legal structure to which our citizens are bound. It is important for scholars to
identify, analyze, and evaluate the lived experiences of the citizens abiding under our law.
Most important, Lloyd Gaines said to a friend at one time during the case, ‘“If I don’t go,
I will have at least made it possible for some other boy or girl to go’” (as cited in Linder,
2000, p. 21).
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In examining the effects of judicial language and judicial interpretation, I have
shown the relationships among the political ideology, presidential appointments of
justices, and the impact on the Gaines and Grutter cases. Alexis de Tocqueville (1835)
explains the importance of judicial language on every day society:
Consequently the language of everyday party-political controversy has to
be borrowed from legal phraseology and conceptions. As most public
men are or have been lawyers, they apply their legal habits and turn of
mind to the conduct of affairs. Juries make all classes familiar with this.
So legal language is pretty well adopted into common speech; the spirit of
the law, born within schools and Courts, spreads little by little beyond
them; it infiltrates through society right down to the lowest ranks, till
finally the whole people have contracted some of the ways and tastes of a
magistrate. (as cited by Wadel, 1991, p. 11)
Further, a recurring theme throughout my dissertation is the importance of race in
connection with education and judicial analysis. Wilkinson’s central theme in From
Brown to Bakke is that, “Race is the perpetual American dilemma,” (1976, p. 8), in which
the Supreme Court must protect “minority rights in a nation of majority rule” (p. 310).
Minorities should be able to seek refuge in the Supreme Court’s principle of “resistance
to majority moods” required by the Constitution. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg claimed in
her dissent in the undergraduate Gratz case, “’The stain of generations of racial
oppression is still visible in our society, and the determination to hasten its removal
remains vital’” (as cited in Caldas and Bankston, p. 252). Kluger concludes his 2004
version of Simple Justice with the advances and disappointments experienced by black
Americans in the last fifty years since Brown in an epilogue entitled, “Visible Man.”
More recent court cases have shown to be more cautious to support redress for past
prejudice and less receptive to force integration efforts. This point is illustrated mostly
recently in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, [551 U.S.
701 (2007)]. However, as judges and educators consider school populations, it is
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important for them to remember Justice O’Connor’s salient argument in Grutter that a
diverse student population is desirable because, ‘“Numerous studies show that student
body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.’”
[Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)]
In reviewing the most recent Supreme Court cases connecting the issue of race
and education, public school leaders should take from this discussion that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits unreasonable classifications.
Methods of classifying students are still common practice today, even mandated, by
federal law such as No Child Left Behind. However, school leaders are to avoid arbitrary
use of classifications. For example, a reasonable relationship with an educational
objective must exist to develop classifications between such factors as gender, age,
intelligence, conduct, test scores, and social economic status (Wadel, 1991). Further,
school administrators should apply the fairness standard from Barbeir v. Connolly, [113
U.S. 27 (1885)], that if the state renders a benefit to one person within a class, all persons
within that class must equally receive that benefit (Wadel).
Significance for Future Research
Our society has now become oriented on being a color-blind society, an ideology
which is reflected in the Gratz, Grutter, and Parents cases. By writing this dissertation,
my goal is to unveil the multiple explanations and interpretations resulting from these
cases in light of the past to enlighten readers on new perspectives and issues in education
law. Educators can learn from research and provide support to students, communities,
and teachers.
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In addition, as they consider their role in creating historical scholarship, legal
historians should seek truth when developing documentation and providing interpretation,
and should be aware of the dour consequences that result when careful judgment is not
exercised. Scholars who utilize historical research methods with the priorities of truth,
reflexivity, and counter interpretations enhance their legal expertise and their impact on
the legal community. My goal is to provide a comprehensive and meaningful
contribution to the legal discourse of equal access and diversity in higher education.
Future research to advance the ideas discussed in this dissertation includes evaluating the
impact of the implementation of the Parents ruling on school district attendance zones in
connection with increasing or decreasing integration of public schools. In addition,
ideological shifts among members of the Supreme Court and the influence of judicial
interpretation on opinions and dissents remain a constant area in need of study.
Personal Reflection
I contend that affirmative action strategies, while imperfect and complicated in
their implementation, helped to bring the races together in public institutions to provide
hope that racial unity and harmony would be improved, and I believe that it has. I was a
student in an all-white private elementary institution, and then attended a public,
integrated high school. I greatly value the years I had at the public institution in
particular. It shaped my perspective as a student, an educator, and as a citizen. I made
treasured friendships with students of different races, and I expanded my political and
cultural beliefs of my community, the nation, and the world. Having educational
experiences that value equality and diversity are paramount to students’ perceptions of
themselves and other students, and shape the choices and behaviors that students will
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make as they become adults. Democratic citizenship is only developed and exercised
effectively with citizens who value the unique historical and cultural backgrounds of each
other, and seek to celebrate the special contributions that each other can make to a
community.
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APPENDIX A
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
PRECEDENTS FOR GAINES
Year Decided

Case

1857

Dred Scott v. Sandford

1866

Civil Rights Act

1868
1873

Fourteenth Amendment
Slaughterhouse Cases

1875

Civil Rights Act of 1875

1876
1880

United States v. Cruikshank
Strauder v. West Virginia

1883

United States v. Harris

1883
1886

Civil Rights Cases
Yick Wo v. Hopkins

1896
1908

Plessy v. Ferguson
Berea College v. Kentucky

1936

University of Maryland v. Murray

Ruling Affect on
Equal Protection for
Persons of Color
Restricted federal protection
and rights
Support for equal rights for
black men
Support for equal protection
Restricted federal protection
and rights
Support equal rights and
protection
Restrict federal protections
Support for black participation
on juries
Restrict federal protections –
Ku Klux case
Invalidated Civil Rights Act
Support for federal protection
of minorities
Established separate but equal
Support for state control of
education – restricted
integration of higher education
Support equal access
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APPENDIX B
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
PRECEDENTS FOR GRUTTER
Year
Decided

Case

Ruling affect on
Equal Protection for
Persons of Color

1938

Gaines v. Canada

1944
1950

Smith v. Allwright
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents

1950

Sweatt v. Painter

1954
1964

Brown v. Board of Education
Civil Rights Act

1968
1968

Green v. County School Bd. New Kent County
Levy v. Louisiana

1971
1978
1980

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
Fullilove v. Klutznick

1989

City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.

1995

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena

Support for equalization of
resources in higher education
Support for equal voting rights
Support for equal access in higher
education
Support for equal access in higher
education
Overruled separate but equal
Support for equal access and
equal rights
Support for integration
Support for the rights of other
minorities
Support for busing
Support for affirmative action
Support for remedy of past
discrimination
Upheld requirement of
compelling interest
Upheld requirement of strict
scrutiny
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APPENDIX C
Fieldnotes
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada
United States Supreme Court, 1938
Background facts of the case as articulated in official Supreme Court document
OC: The opinion of the court was written by Chief Justice Charles Hughes. He
introduces the case by stating the facts of the case and the progress of the case
through the court system. He addresses the primary constitutional argument
considered in the case, which is the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to
provide equal access to higher education for all students regardless of race. Hughes
also reports on the argument of the defense which is that Lloyd Gaines’ opportunity
to attend higher education had been met by the state’s agreement to pay his tuition
to a university in another state until the Board of Curators at Lincoln University
was able to provide a program of legal studies for black students at their institution.

HUGHES, C.J., Opinion of the Court
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
305 U.S. 337
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
No. 57 Argued: November 9, 1938 --- Decided: December 12, 1938
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Lloyd Gaines, a negro, was refused admission to the School
of Law at the State University of Missouri. Asserting that this refusal
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constituted a denial by the State of the equal protection of the laws in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
petitioner brought this action for mandamus to compel the curators of
the University to admit him. On final hearing, an alternative writ was
quashed and a peremptory writ was denied by the Circuit Court. The
Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment. 113 S.W.2d 783.
We granted certiorari, October 10, 1938.
Petitioner is a citizen of Missouri. In August, 1935, he was graduated
with the degree of Bachelor of Arts at the Lincoln University, an
institution maintained by the State of Missouri for the higher education
of negroes. That University has no law school. Upon the filing of his
application for admission to the law school of the University of
Missouri, the registrar advised him to communicate with the president
of Lincoln University, and the latter directed petitioner's attention to
§ 9622 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri (1929), providing as follows:
Sec. 9622. May arrange for attendance at university of any
adjacent state -- Tuition fees. -- Pending the full
development of the Lincoln university, the board of [p343]
curators shall have the authority to arrange for the
attendance of negro residents of the state of Missouri at the
university of any adjacent state to take any course or to
study any subjects provided for at the state university of
Missouri, and which are not taught at the Lincoln
university and to pay the reasonable tuition fees for such
attendance; provided that, whenever the board of curators
deem it advisable, they shall have the power to open any
necessary school or department. (Laws 1921, p. 86, § 7.)
I will bold Observer Comments (OC) for the remainder of the document to help
with clarity.
Equal Protection
OC: Hughes points out that black students in Missouri are thus,
“citizens of Missouri.” They should not have to be sent to another
state to receive their education. Hughes points out that what other
states provide or do not provide, is not a consideration for Missouri.
Missouri as a state is responsible for its own equal, if still dual,
educational system.
The state court stresses the advantages that are afforded by the law
schools of the adjacent States -- Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa and Illinois -which admit nonresident negroes. The court considered that these were
schools of high standing where one desiring to practice law in Missouri
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can get "as sound, comprehensive, valuable legal education" as in the
University of Missouri; that the system of education in the former is the
same as that in the latter, and is designed to give the students a basis for
the practice of law in any State where the Anglo-American system of
law obtains; that the law school of the University of Missouri does not
specialize in Missouri law, and that the course of study and the case
books used [p349] in the five schools are substantially identical.
Petitioner insists that, for one intending to practice in Missouri, there
are special advantages in attending a law school there, both in relation
to the opportunities for the particular study of Missouri law and for the
observation of the local courts [n3] and also in view of the prestige of the
Missouri law school among the citizens of the State, his prospective
clients. Proceeding with its examination of relative advantages, the
state court found that the difference in distances to be traveled afforded
no substantial ground of complaint, and that there was an adequate
appropriation to meet the full tuition fees which petitioner would have
to pay.
OC: Hughes dismisses Gaines’ argument that attending a law
school outside of the state of Missouri does not provide the
advantages of attending the University of Missouri. Hughes
contends that this is irrelevant. Rather, Hughes supports equal
protection under the law for students to receive the same education
within a state regardless of their race. To provide the education
for white students, but not for black students, is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. The provision
to offer scholarships to attend universities in another state does not
remove the discrimination. Hughes cites Yick Wo v. Hopkins as the
federal legal precedence enforcing equal protection.
We think that these matters are beside the point. The basic
consideration is not as to what sort of opportunities other States provide,
or whether they are as good as those in Missouri, but as to what
opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students and denies to
negroes solely upon the ground of color. The admissibility of laws
separating the races in the enjoyment of privileges afforded by the State
rests wholly upon the equality of the privileges which the laws give to
the separated groups within the State. The question here is not of a duty
of the State to supply legal training, or of the quality of the training
which it does supply, but of its duty when it provides such training to
furnish it to the residents of the State upon the basis of an equality of
right. By the operation of the laws of Missouri, a privilege has been
created for white law students which is denied to negroes by reason of
their race. The white resident is afforded legal education within the
State; the negro resident having the same qualifications is refused it
there, and must go outside the State to obtain it. That is a denial of the
equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege [p350] which
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the State has set up, and the provision for the payment of tuition fees in
another State does not remove the discrimination.
The equal protection of the laws is "a pledge of the protection of equal
laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369. Manifestly, the
obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be
performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own
jurisdiction. It is there that the equality of legal right must be
maintained. That obligation is imposed by the Constitution upon the
States severally as governmental entities -- each responsible for its own
laws establishing the rights and duties of persons within its borders. It
is an obligation the burden of which cannot be cast by one State upon
another, and no State can be excused from performance by what
another State may do or fail to do. That separate responsibility of each
State within its own sphere is of the essence of statehood maintained
under our dual system. It seems to be implicit in respondents' argument
that, if other States did not provide courses for legal education, it would
nevertheless be the constitutional duty of Missouri, when it supplied
such courses for white students, to make equivalent provision for
negroes. But that plain duty would exist because it rested upon the
State independently of the action of other States. We find it impossible
to conclude that what otherwise would be an unconstitutional
discrimination, with respect to the legal right to the enjoyment of
opportunities within the State, can be justified by requiring resort to
opportunities elsewhere. That resort may mitigate the inconvenience of
the discrimination, but cannot serve to validate it.
Nor can we regard the fact that there is but a limited demand in
Missouri for the legal education of negroes as excusing the
discrimination in favor of whites. We had occasion to consider a
cognate question in the case [p351] of McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry. Co., supra. There, the argument was advanced, in relation to the
provision by a carrier of sleeping cars, dining, and chair cars, that the
limited demand by negroes justified the State in permitting the
furnishing of such accommodations exclusively for white persons. We
found that argument to be without merit. It made, we said, the
constitutional right
depend upon the number of persons who may be
discriminated against, whereas the essence of the
constitutional right is that it is a personal one. Whether or
not particular facilities shall be provided may doubtless be
conditioned upon there being a reasonable demand
therefor, but, if facilities are provided, substantial equality
of treatment of persons traveling under like conditions
cannot be refused. It is the individual who is entitled to the
equal protection of the laws, and if he is denied by a

204
common carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of
a state law, a facility or convenience in the course of his
journey which under substantially the same circumstances
is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain
that his constitutional privilege has been invaded.
Id. pp. 161, 162.
Here, petitioner's right was a personal one. It was as an individual that
he was entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and the State was
bound to furnish him within its borders facilities for legal education
substantially equal to those which the State there afforded for persons
of the white race, whether or not other negroes sought the same
opportunity.
OC: In the paragraph below, officials at Lincoln University are
urged to expedite the process of implementing an equal legal
program to the University of Missouri for black students. Tuition
to a university in another state is a temporary, but limited solution.
It is urged, however, that the provision for tuition outside the State is a
temporary one -- that it is intended to operate merely pending the
establishment of a law department for negroes at Lincoln University.
While, in that sense, the discrimination may be termed temporary, it
may nevertheless continue for an indefinite period by reason of the
discretion given to the curators of Lincoln [p352] University and the
alternative of arranging for tuition in other States, as permitted by the
state law as construed by the state court, so long as the curators find it
unnecessary and impracticable to provide facilities for the legal
instruction of negroes within the State. In that view, we cannot regard
the discrimination as excused by what is called its temporary character.
We do not find that the decision of the state court turns on any
procedural question. The action was for mandamus, but it does not
appear that the remedy would have been deemed inappropriate if the
asserted federal right had been sustained. In that situation, the remedy
by mandamus was found to be a proper one in University of Maryland
v. Murray, supra. In the instant case, the state court did note that
petitioner had not applied to the management of Lincoln University for
legal training. But, as we have said, the state court did not rule that it
would have been the duty of the curators to grant such an application,
but, on the contrary, took the view, as we understand it, that the
curators were entitled under the state law to refuse such an application
and, in its stead, to provide for petitioner's tuition in an adjacent State.
That conclusion presented the federal question as to the constitutional
adequacy of such a provision while equal opportunity for legal training
within the State was not furnished, and this federal question the state
court entertained and passed upon. We must conclude that, in so doing,
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the court denied the federal right which petitioner set up and the
question as to the correctness of that decision is before us. We are of
the opinion that the ruling was error, and that petitioner was entitled to
be admitted to the law school of the State University in the absence of
other and proper provision for his legal training within the State.
The Fourteenth Amendment
OC: Since no other opportunity within the state of Missouri
existed for Gaines, he should have been admitted to the University
of Missouri School of Law. I respect that Hughes disregards the
technicalities purported by the Missouri officials to argue for
tuition scholarships outside of the state. Hughes recognizes the
legal consequences of the ruling, acknowledging the attempts by
the Missouri officials to justify their acts of political and economic
discrimination. Hughes identifies the primary constitutional
provision of equal protection under the law. What Hughes fails to
do that will not occur until the ruling in Brown v. Board of
Education is to identify that the separate but equal ideology from
Plessy v. Ferguson itself is also an abomination to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is reversed, and the
cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed. [p353]
1.

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346, 347; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S.
370, 397; Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447; Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587, 589.
2.

Section 9618, R.S.Mo.1929, is as follows:
Sec. 9618. Board of curators authorized to reorganize. -The board of curators of the Lincoln university shall be
authorized and required to reorganize said institution so
that it shall afford to the negro people of the state
opportunity for training up to the standard furnished at the
state university of Missouri whenever necessary and
practicable in their opinion. To this end the board of
curators shall be authorized to purchase necessary
additional land, erect necessary additional buildings, to
provide necessary additional equipment, and to locate, in
the county of Cole the respective units of the university
where, in their opinion, the various schools will most
effectively promote the purposes of this article. (Laws of
1921, p. 86, § 3.)
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3.

See University of Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 486.

OC: However, Hughes decides that despite Missouri’s stated
intentions to provide equality in legal studies through Lincoln
University, that since that provision is not yet available, that black
students are excluded from the opportunity to attend an equal legal
program within the state of Missouri. Being provided tuition to
attend a university in another state is therefore, not acceptable.
Hughes states that this is a violation of equal protection under the
law through the Fourteenth Amendment. Hughes cites the
Maryland state case of University of Maryland v. Murray, also
argued by Charles Houston and Thurgood Marshall through the
NAACP LDF as a legal precedent, although state, rather than
federal. The Gaines case is thus a federal affirmation of the
Murray state case, requiring states to follow through on providing
equal education.
It is manifest that this discrimination, if not relieved by the provisions
we shall presently discuss, would constitute a denial of equal protection.
That was the conclusion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
circumstances substantially similar in that aspect. University of
Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590. It there appeared that
the State of Maryland had "undertaken the function of education in the
law," but had "omitted students of one race from the only adequate
provision made for it, and omitted them solely because of their color";
that, if those students were to be offered "equal treatment in the
performance of the function, they must, at present, be admitted to the
one school provided." Id., p. 489. A provision for scholarships to
enable negroes to attend colleges outside the State, mainly for the
purpose of professional studies, was found to be inadequate (Id. pp. 485,
486), and the question "whether with aid in any amount it is sufficient
to send the negroes outside the State for legal education" the Court of
Appeals found it unnecessary to discuss. Accordingly, a writ of
mandamus to admit the applicant was issued to the officers and [p346]
regents of the University of Maryland as the agents of the State
entrusted with the conduct of that institution.

Political and Economic Oppression
OC: Political and economic oppression is not expressly addressed
by Hughes in his opinion. However, it is implied. For example,
Hughes contends that the consideration of whether with any
amount of scholarship is it acceptable to send black students to
another state for legal instruction is “unnecessary to discuss,”
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shows the justices’ recognition of the fact that black students are
deliberately being provided a lesser opportunity for a meaningful
legal education. Although not expressly acknowledged by the
justices, this lesser form of education implies the political and
economic repression of black students by not allowing them to have
equal educational opportunities as provided to white students.
The Supreme Court of Missouri in the instant case has distinguished
the decision in Maryland upon the grounds -- (1) that, in Missouri, but
not in Maryland, there is "a legislative declaration of a purpose to
establish a law school for negroes at Lincoln University whenever
necessary or practical", and (2) that,
pending the establishment of such a school, adequate
provision has been made for the legal education of negro
students in recognized schools outside of this State.
OC: The officials in Missouri contradict themselves by
initially stating that the responsibility for providing a black
legal education lies solely on Lincoln University. In this
court document, however, the state of Missouri contends that
they will provide a legal program for black students when it
becomes “necessary or practical.” This contradiction reveals
the mal-intentions of the state officials in Missouri to provide
a meaningful education for black students. Rather, they are
contributing to the economic and political oppression of
black students by denying them equal opportunities.
113 S.W.2d p. 791.
As to the first ground, it appears that the policy of establishing a law
school at Lincoln University has not yet ripened into an actual
establishment, and it cannot be said that a mere declaration of purpose,
still unfulfilled, is enough. The provision for legal education at Lincoln
is at present entirely lacking. Respondents' counsel urge that, if, on the
date when petitioner applied for admission to the University of
Missouri, he had instead applied to the curators of Lincoln University,
it would have been their duty to establish a law school; that this
"agency of the State," to which he should have applied, was
"specifically charged with the mandatory duty to furnish him what he
seeks." We do not read the opinion of the Supreme Court as construing
the state statute to impose such a "mandatory duty" as the argument
seems to assert. The state court quoted the language of § 9618,
R.S.Mo.1929, set forth in the margin, [n2] making it the mandatory
[p347] duty of the board of curators to establish a law school in Lincoln
University "whenever necessary and practicable in their opinion." This
qualification of their duty, explicitly stated in the statute, manifestly
leaves it to the judgment of the curators to decide when it will be
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necessary and practicable to establish a law school, and the state court
so construed the statute. Emphasizing the discretion of the curators, the
court said:
The statute was enacted in 1921. Since its enactment, no
negro, not even appellant, has applied to Lincoln
University for a law education. This fact demonstrates the
wisdom of the legislature in leaving it to the judgment of
the board of curators to determine when it would be
necessary or practicable to establish a law school for
negroes at Lincoln University. Pending that time, adequate
provision is made for the legal education of negroes in the
university of some adjacent State, as heretofore pointed
out.
113 S.W.2d p. 791.
The state court has not held that it would have been the duty of the
curators to establish a law school at Lincoln University for the
petitioner on his application. Their duty, as the court defined it, would
have been either to supply a law school at Lincoln University as
provided in § 9618 or to furnish him the opportunity to obtain his legal
training in another State, as provided in § 9622
Thus, the law left the curators free to adopt the latter course. The state
court has not ruled or intimated that their failure or refusal to establish
a law school for a very few students, still less for one student, would
have been an abuse of the discretion with which the curators were
entrusted. And, apparently, it was because of that discretion, [p348] and
of the postponement which its exercise in accordance with the terms of
the statute would entail until necessity and practicability appeared, that
the state court considered and upheld as adequate the provision for the
legal education of negroes, who were citizens of Missouri, in the
universities of adjacent States. We may put on one side respondent's
contention that there were funds available at Lincoln University for the
creation of a law department and the suggestions with respect to the
number of instructors who would be needed for that purpose and the
cost of supplying them. The president of Lincoln University did not
advert to the existence or prospective use of funds for that purpose
when he advised petitioner to apply to the State Superintendent of
Schools for aid under § 9622. At best, the evidence to which argument
as to available funds is addressed admits of conflicting inferences, and
the decision of the state court did not hinge on any such matter. In the
light of its ruling, we must regard the question whether the provision
for the legal education in other States of negroes resident in Missouri is
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of equal protection
as the pivot upon which this case turns.
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APPENDIX D
The document below is the dissenting opinion written by Justice McReynolds and
concurred with Justice Butler.
OC: This is the dissenting opinion offered by Justice James C. McReynolds and
supported by Justice Pierce Butler. They cite Cumming v. Richmond County Board
of Education and Gong Lum v. Rice to contend that Missouri has the sole right to
regulate their own educational system without interference from the state. They
also express their agreement with the state court of Missouri, which refused to upset
the dual educational system, fearing uprising from the white citizens of Missouri.
MCREYNOLDS, J., Separate Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
305 U.S. 337
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
No. 57 Argued: November 9, 1938 --- Decided: December 12, 1938
Separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS.
Considering the disclosures of the record, the Supreme Court of
Missouri arrived at a tenable conclusion, and its judgment should be
affirmed. That court well understood the grave difficulties of the
situation, and rightly refused to upset the settled legislative policy of
the State by directing a mandamus.
In Cummming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528,
545, this Court, through Mr. Justice Harlan, declared:
The education of the people in schools maintained by state
taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and
any interference on the part of Federal authority with the
management of such schools cannot be justified except in
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the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights
secured by the supreme law of the land.
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85 -- opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taft
-- asserts: "The right and power of the state to regulate the method of
providing for the education of its youth at public expense is clear."
For a long time, Missouri has acted upon the view that the best interest
of her people demands separation of whites and negroes in schools.
Under the opinion just announced, I presume she may abandon her law
school, and thereby disadvantage her white citizens without improving
petitioner's opportunities for legal instruction; or she may break down
the settled practice concerning separate schools and thereby, as
indicated by experience, damnify both races. Whether by some other
course it may be possible for her to avoid condemnation is matter for
conjecture.
Economic and Political Repression
OC: McReynolds seems to question the intent of Gaines in the first
place by stating below “if perchance that is the thing really
desired.” McReynolds questions the legitimacy of the Gaines case,
that the NAACP LDF counselors perhaps were manufacturing the
case to support their greater cause of equal access in higher
education. Nevertheless, McReynolds contributes to the economic
and political repression of black citizens by contending that a legal
education in another state is a sufficient provision for the black
student. McReynold’s argues that the black students’ rights have
thus been provided equal protection. In these statements, Justices
McReynolds and Butler have denied the full protection of
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment for political rights.
In addition, McReynolds and Butler have denied equality of
economic opportunity by refusing black students equal access to a
legal program tailored to Missouri state law, observation in
Missouri courtrooms, and affiliation with other members of the
Missouri legal profession.
The State has offered to provide the negro petitioner opportunity for
study of the law -- if perchance that is the thing really desired -- by
paying his tuition at some nearby school of good standing. This is far
from unmistakable disregard of his rights, and, in the circumstances,
[p354] is enough to satisfy any reasonable demand for specialized
training. It appears that never before has a negro applied for admission
to the Law School, and none has ever asked that Lincoln University
provide legal instruction.
The problem presented obviously is a difficult and highly practical one.
A fair effort to solve it has been made by offering adequate opportunity
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for study when sought in good faith. The State should not be unduly
hampered through theorization inadequately restrained by experience.
This proceeding commenced in April, 1936. Petitioner, then twentyfour years old, asked mandamus to compel his admission to the
University in September, 1936, notwithstanding plain legislative
inhibition. Mandamus is not a writ of right, but is granted only in the
court's discretion upon consideration of all the circumstances. Duncan
Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U.S. 308, 311; United States ex rel. Arant v.
Lane, 249 U.S. 367, 371.
The Supreme Court of Missouri did not consider the propriety of
granting the writ under the theory of the law now accepted here. That,
of course, will be matter open for its consideration upon return of the
cause.
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APPENDIX E
Fieldnotes
Grutter v. Bollinger
Key excerpts from the Supreme Court of the United States Oral Argument
April 1, 2003
Background information on the case comes from the official syllabus of the case
submitted with the opinion of the Court by the Reporter of Decisions.
(OC: I have selected key passages and organized them into seven themes, which are:
Reverse Discrimination, Equal Access, Creating Diversity in Universities and in
other Contexts, , Diverse Democratic Leadership (Hutcheson), Transcending Race/
Breaking-down Stereotypes, The Fourteenth Amendment, and Fixed Time Period.
Going through the transcripts has highlighted all of the key legal arguments that the
Justices grappled with in making their opinions, which has provided the depth of
understanding that I needed to examine the primary factors in this case.
(OC: I begin with the theme of reverse discrimination first because provides the
key argument for Barbara Grutter’s lawsuit. The University of Michigan Law
School, (here on referred to as “Law School”), is one of the United States’ top law
schools, and follows an official admissions policy which is designed to promote a
diverse student population in compliance with the practices deemed appropriate
through the Bakke case. School officials review students’ undergraduate GPA,
LSAT scores, an essay on how the applicant will contribute to university life and
diversity, and recommendations. The university calls for the officials to look further
at “’soft variables,’” (p. 1, Syllabus), which include recommenders’ enthusiasm, the
quality of the applicant’s undergraduate institution and essay, and the difficulty
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level of the applicant’s course work. The policy does not “define diversity solely in
terms of racial and ethnic status, and does not restrict the types of diversity
contributions eligible for ‘substantial weight,’ but it does reaffirm the Law School’s
commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclusion of African-American,
Hispanic, and Native-American students…” (p. 1, Syllabus). These students are
included because they might not be “represented in the student body in meaningful
numbers” otherwise (p. 1, Syllabus). This “’critical mass’ of underrepresented
minority students” is intended to “ensure their ability to contribute to the Law
School’s character and to the legal profession (p. 1 Syllabus).”
Barbara Grutter was denied admittance to the Law School. She was a white
Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and a 161 LSAT score. She filed suit arguing
that the University discriminated against her on the basis of race, which violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Grutter contended that she was not admitted
because the Law School used race as a “’predominant’” (Syllabus, p. 2) factor,
allowing minority students with similar credentials a greater chance of admission
and that the University did not have a compelling interest to justify their use of race
in admitting students. The District Court found in favor of Grutter and decided
that the University’s use of race in admittance policies was unjustified and unlawful.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s opinion, and held that Justice Lewis
Powell’s opinion in Bakke “was a binding precedent establishing diversity as a
compelling state interest, and that the Law School’s use of race was narrowly
tailored because race was merely a ‘potential plus factor’” (Syllabus, p. 2). Further,
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the Sixth District found that the Law School was virtually identical to the Harvard
University admissions policy articulated by Justice Powell as acceptable in the
Bakke opinion.)

(OC: United States Supreme Court (2003) - “Held: The Law School’s narrowly
tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in
obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI,” (p. 2, Syllabus).
The following excerpts are organized by theme, and each excerpt is numbered under its
respective theme. The excerpts are direct quotes from the oral argument:
Theme One
Reverse Discrimination (Defined by Petitioners as the Use of Quotas):
(OC: The first theme that I identified from the transcripts of the oral argument is
what is charged by Barbara Grutter, which is reverse discrimination. In Bakke, the
UC-Davis Medical School had set aside 16 out of 100 seats for members of certain
minority groups. Alan Bakke charged that this “quota” policy was reverse
discrimination in 1978. Justice Lewis Powell wrote the official opinion for the
Supreme Court, although the disagreement among the Justices was considerable.
Four Justices held that affirmative action policies were justifiable on the basis of
redress for past discrimination in which the government can use race as a remedy.
Four other Justices struck down affirmative action policies altogether. Justice
Powell, casting the fifth, deciding vote, wrote that the specific quota system used by
the UC-Davis Medical School was invalid, but that universities may use race as one
of many factors when considering applicants for the purpose of creating diverse
student body.)
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The Grutter case returned the issue of reverse discrimination to the Supreme Court
twenty-five years later. Here is one excerpt from the transcript that falls under this
theme:
(Barbara Grutter was represented by Mr. Kirk Kolbo)
(1) Attorney Mr. Kirk O. Kolbo: Barbara Grutter applied for admission of the University
of Michigan Law School with a personal right guaranteed by the Constitution that she
would not have her race counted against her.
The law school intentionally disregarded that right by discriminating against her on the
basis of race as it does each year in the case of thousands of individuals who apply for
admission.
The law school defends its practice of race discrimination as necessary to achieve a
diverse student body.
With the loss…with the diversity that the law school is committed to ensuring and
meaningful numbers or critical mass, is of a narrow kind defined exclusively by race and
ethnicity.
The constitutional promise of equality would not be necessary in a society composed of a
single homogeneous mass.
It is precisely because we are a nation teeming with different races and ethnicities…one
that is increasingly interracial, multiracial, that it is so crucial for our Government to
honor its solemn obligation to treat all members of our society equally without preferring
some individuals over others.
Justice O’Connor: Well, of course, you… I mean, a university or a law school is faced
with a serious problem when it’s one that gets thousands of applications for just a few
slots. Where it has to be selective.
And inherent in that setting is making choices about what students to admit.
So you have an element here that suggests that there are many reasons why a particular
student would be admitted or not.
And a lot of factors go into it.
So how do you single this out and how are we certain that there’s an injury to your client
that she wouldn’t have experienced for other reasons?
Mr. Kolbo: Well, Your Honor, first of all, race is impermissible because of the
constitutional command of equality.
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The university is certainly free to make many different kinds of choices in selecting
students.
And to look for all kinds of different diversity, experiential diversity, prospective
diversity without regard to race, but race because, Your Honor, of the constitutional
command of equality, must be beyond the bounds.
(OC: Mr. Kolbo should be specific about which constitutional stature or
amendment is what he is referring to.)
Justice O’Connor: You say that’s not…it can’t be a factor at all.
Is that it? Is that you position that it cannot be one of many factors?
Mr. Kolbo: Our view, Your Honor, is that race itself should not be a factor among others
in choosing students because of the Constitution
Justice O’Connnor: Well, you have some…some precedents out there that you have to
come to grips with, because the Court obviously has upheld the use of race in making
selections or choices in certain contexts, for instance, to remedy prior to discrimination in
other contexts.
Mr. Kolbo – Oh, absolutely, Your Honor.
(OC: Mr. Kolbo contradicts himself here.)
Justice O’Connor: All right.
Mr. Kolbo: And I want to be clear about that.
We areJustice O’Connor: Well, but you are speaking in absolutes and it isn’t quite that. I think
we have given recognition to the use of race in a variety of settings.
Mr. Kolbo: And we absolutely agree, Justice O’Connor.
Justice Kennedy: Is it cause for concern with your…if you’re the dean of the law school
or the president in the university or the Governor of the State that the minority students,
particularly from the Black and Hispanic community are underrepresented by a large
factor, according to their…their share of the population.
Suppose you have a law school with two or three percent Hispanic and …and black
students, is that a legitimate concern for the university and for the State officials?
Mr. Kolbo: We believe not, Your Honor, for the reason that we need to get away from
the notion that there’ some right number for each racial group.
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(OC: The importance of the following excerpt (2) is that it gives the background
and explanation of a quota system – what it is and what it is not.)
(2) Ms. Maureen Mahoney (attorney for the Law School) on quotas:
Ms. Mahoney: Well, Your Honor, the…there has to be evidence in the record that would
support the conclusion that it’s a quota.
And what this Court has said that means is a fixed number…that is sufficiently rigid that
no matter what the qualifications of the applicant pool, the law school is going to adhere
to a fixed minimum and I think it’s important to say what the judge found on this issue, at
230A of the position of appendix, the judge says in conclusion, the Court finds that the
law school wants, 10 to 17 percent of each class to consist of African Americans, Native
Americans, and Hispanics.
Wants. That’s an aspiration.
That’s an aspiration, that is not a fixed minimum.
He made no findings that there was a fixed minimum.
Justice Ginsburg: Is there in fact a difference between the Michigan plan that the
Harvard plan is touted in Bakke, it seems to me, that they were pretty close and is there
any suggestion that here I am sure is looking for critical mass that Harvard didn’t look for?
Ms. Mahoney: Absolutely not, Your Honor. The evidence indicates that the Harvard
plan works in exactly the way the Michigan plan does. In fact, Harvard’s brief in this
case indicates that under their plan over the last four years, they enrolled eight to 9
percent African Americans which is a stable range. In the last four years of the record
evidence here, the University of Michigan Law School enrolled 7 to 9 percent African
Americans.

(OC: The importance of the (3) excerpt under Reverse Discrimination is that it
articulates the policies generated from Bakke that the United States Department of
Education interpreted and enacted for public universities for the past twenty-five
years. This is the central argument that the Grutter case has raised.)
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(3) Justice Scalia: But…but without a quota? Just sufficient number, but that’s not a
quota?
Ms. Mahoney: Your Honor it is not a quota.
Justice Scalia: When you say sufficient numbers, you’re …I mean that suggests to me
that there is …there is some minimum. Now, you don’t name it. But there has to be
some minimum. But you say there isn’t a minimum.
Ms. Mahoney: Your Honor there isn’t a minimum. Your honor, it…it can be related to
numbers without being a quota. In fact, the Department of Education in 1979 after Bakke
came out, issued a policy interpretation at 44 Federal register 58510 which specifically
authorizes schools to establish and pursue numerical goals, end quote, as long as they
don’t set aside a fixed number of places or make race the sole crieriaen (sic) for eligibility.
That was the Department of Education’s interpretation.
Chief Justice Rehnquist: Certainly they don’t interpret the Constitution?
Ms. Mahoney: No, they don’t Your Honor, but that is what Bakke held.
(OC: The following excerpt (4) defines the most controversial factor in this case and
in all affirmative action policies: What is a critical mass and is it lawful and
justifiable?)
(4)Justice Scalia: Is 2 percent a critical mass, Ms. Mahoney?
Ms. Mahoney: I don’t think so, Your Honor.
Justice Scalia: Like 8, is 8 percent?
Ms. Mahoney: Now, Your Honor.
Justice Scalia: Now, does it stop being a quota because it’s somewhere between 8 and 12,
but it is a quota if it’s 10? I don’t understand that reasoning. Once you use the term
critical mass and…you’re…you’re into quota land.
Ms. Mahoney: Your Honor, what a quota is under this Court’s cases is a fixed number.
And there is no fixed number here. The testimony was that it depends on the
characteristics of the applicant pool.
(OC: The above excerpt (4) between Scalia and Mahoney is the central factor in
this case. President George Bush II highlighted Scalia’s argument in a public
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speech (see quote below) stating that the Law School used a quota system,
articulating the conservative perspective on the use of affirmative action programs.
Mahoney’s argument that there is no fixed number used by the Law School has
been and, even after the opinion in the Grutter case, remains that race may be a
factor as long as it is not the sole criterion and that there is no established minimum
number of minorities to be admitted.)

(OC: Notes from “On the Docket: U. S. Supreme Court News” – retrieved on
2/16/10:
Quote from a televised address to the nation given by President George Bush on January 15,
2003, the day before the Grutter brief was filed:
“At their core, the Michigan policies amount to a quota system that
unfairly rewards or penalizes perspective students, based solely
on their race," Bush said. "Our Constitution makes it clear that
people of all races must be treated equally under the law," Bush said.
"Yet we know that our society has not fully achieved that ideal.
Racial prejudice is a reality in America. It hurts many of our citizens.
As a nation, as a government, as individuals, we must be vigilant
in responding to prejudice wherever we find it. Yet, as we work to
address the wrong of racial prejudice, we must not use means that
create another wrong, and thus perpetuate our divisions." America
is a diverse country, racially, economically, and ethnically. And our
institutions of higher education should reflect our diversity," Bush
added. "A college education should teach respect and understanding
and goodwill. And these values are strengthened when students live
and learn with people from many backgrounds. Yet quota systems
that use race to include or exclude people from higher education
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and the opportunities it offers are divisive, unfair and impossible to
square with the Constitution.”)

(OC: And later in the case, a final word from the Law School on the use of quotas
(5):
(5) Ms. Mahoney (attorney for the University of Michigan): Because I think…certainly
if it’s a fixed number that you’re going to take no matter what, then that is a quota, but I
think the difference between a quota and a goal is the flexibility.
And what this Court, for instance, said in Johnson when talking about, they authorized
the use of a goal and they said that the line between a goal and a quota is in fact whether
or not you have to automatically and blindly promote people in order to meet the goal or
whether it is a factor that is taken into account and that’s exactly what occurs here.
There..Bakke applied, there were four spaces available in the special admissions program,
but he couldn’t be considered for them, because of his race.
That doesn’t happen at the University of Michigan.
When someone applies, whether they’re white, it doesn’t matter how my (sic) minorities
have been accepted or rejected.
They are considered on their merits just like every other applicant.
That’s the defining difference between happened in the UC Davis program.

(OC: Justice Stevens brings up an important, yet sensitive, point in this case in this
section (6). How do we deal with resentment and frustration from those applicants
to universities who are negatively affected by affirmative action policies such as
Barbara Grutter? We don’t want to create additional hostility when we have made
so much progress in establishing racial respect and harmony in educational
institutions. Ms. Mahoney’s reply is very enlightening to this subject.)
(6) Justice Stevens: Ms. Mahoney, may I ask you a question that is really prompted by
Justice O’Connor’s question about the terminal point in all of this point and we’re all
hoping some day race will be a totally irrelevant factor in all decisions, but one of your
arguments on the other side of your case is that there’s actually…these programs actually
generate racial hostility particularly on the part of the excluded members.
And that in turn delays the ultimate day we are all hoping for.
What is your comment about that?
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Ms. Mahoney: The record certainly does not support that inference under this program.
And the reason is this: The program…one of the ways to prevent that from happening is
to have a narrowly tailored program to have very limited consideration of race and not to,
for instance, have two great a disparity between the qualifications of the white students
who are admitted and the minority students who are admitted under the program.
Here it’s actually quite limited.
In fact, you know, the vast…the most…the most of the minorities who are admitted are
in the top 16 percent of all LSAT takers in the country.
So we’re talking about a really exceptional group of students.
By keeping the relative qualifications fairly close, like that, you really minimize the
potential for any kind of stigmatizing or hostility, that sort of thing.
And what the record shows is that in the Orfield study which was done of Harvard and
University of Michigan’s students, it’s in the record at Exhibit 167, that there is
overwhelming support by the students at Harvard and Michigan Law Schools for
maintaining the diversity program, because they regard it as so positive.
Justice Breyer: If Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke can be viewed as yes, you can used
(sic) race as a plus factor, where the program is not against anyone, but you cannot go too
far, and it says individualized consideration is necessary there, what in your opinion
would be going too far, other than quotas?
How would this be maintained within limits?
Ms. Mahoney: I think there are really three things other than a quota to look for.
The first is whether there is flexible consideration of the diversity contributions of every
potential student, which Michigan program clearly statistics, whether the minorities who
are being admitted are well qualified, because you don’t want to have a situation where
they can’t contribute to the class and can’t succeed, and the third is the degree of the
burden on the rejected applicants, that’s certainly relevant under any narrow tier learning
program.
And here, what the record tells us is that 95 percent of all the admissions decisions that
are made each year are not affected by the consideration of race.
That the chance…that there are about 2500 students who are rejected each year probably
only 80 of them would have been...would have gotten an offer of admission from
Michigan under a race-blind system.
That is a very small and diffuse (sic) burden.
It’s not one to be minimized.
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It’s certainly something that the Court has to pay attention to, but this is extremely
limited in scope and relative to the benefits to students of all races and to our Nation.
It has to be weighed in the balance and this Court certainly should conclude that the
interests that are being served, the legitimate interests that are being served are
sufficiently compelling to allow this kind of limited consideration of race.
Mr. Kolbo’s rebuttal: We see it very differently.
The Constitution protects the rights of individuals, not racial groups.
The Bakke case opening up 16 spaces in the class when that system was struck down
meant that about 2500 students, 2500-3000 students who had previously been
discriminated against now had an opportunity to compete for those seats.
So it seems to me the question is not answered by how many have been discriminated
against.
The question is whether in fact discrimination is occurring against the individual and it
certainly is in this particular case.
Creating Diversity in Universities and in other Contexts

(OC: Here, the “compelling interest” ideology comes into play. Under Bakke,
universities have been allowed to use race in admitting students when it is of a
compelling interest to have students of diverse backgrounds, perspectives, and
philosophies in their student population, which enriches the educational
environment for all students in the Law School.)
(1) Justice Ginsburg: Why…why do you draw the line at…you said you can
recruit…you can use a race criterion, if I understood you correctly, to recruit, you could
have minority students only give the benefit of scholarships to go to these preparatory
schools. You were surely recognizing the race criterion there. Why is that permissible?
Mr. Kolbo: Because it doesn’t prevent someone from applying. The key is to be able to
compete on the same footing at the point of competition.
(OC: Mr. Kolbo is basically arguing that the race criterion should be used in the
recruiting phase, but not in the application phase – which seems to be a puzzling
contradiction to me.)
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(OC: The following excerpt (2) is a critical part of the argument for using
affirmative action policies. Justice Breyer clearly articulates the need for minority
representation in school populations.)
(2) Mr. Ted Olson (attorney for Grutter):
Justice Breyer: Well, what they do is they use race.
Mr. Olson: Exactly.
Justice Breyer: I know. But they have a reason for it.
The reason for it is they want to produce a diverse class and the reason they want to do
that, using it as a plus, they say, is to do the things I said before. They think it breaks
down stereotypes within the class. They think it’s educationally beneficial. They think it
supplies a legal profession that will be diverse and they think a legal profession like
business and the military that is diverse is good for America from a civics point of view,
et cetera, breaks the cycle. Those are the arguments which you well know. So what is
your response?

(OC: The purpose of the following excerpts (3) and (4) is to unfold the factors in the
debate over the government’s ability to regulate diversity as an institutional goal.)
(3) Justice Kennedy: Would you disagree with his use of the term diversity as being a
permissible governmental goal?
Mr. Olson- Well, the only way to answer that Justice Kennedy is that the word diversity
means so many things to so many different people. It means to both a means to get
experience and a diversity of experience. It also means, I think what the law school has
done, it’s an end in and of itself. If it’s an end in and of itself, obviously it’s
constitutionally objectionable that this CourtJustice Breyer: So is the Texas plan constitutional? It it’s designed solely in order to
have a diverse mix in the colleges they take 10 percent, but their motive stated and their
purpose is to have diversity in the college?
Mr. Olson: Justice Breyer, I don’t believe that that is the stated motive of the Texas plan
or the California or the Florida plan. Those are intended to open up those institutions to a
broader selection, one of the ways in which this Court has accepted the institution such as
universities may operate is to make sure that barriers are broken down, accessibility is
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made more available and that is one very race neutral means of accomplishing that
legitimate objective.
(O.C.: I’m still not clear on specifics – Mr. Olson is saying that these plans are race
neutral, but he is not specific as to what those “race neutral” plans/programs are.)
Justice Souter: General what do you say to the argument that the only reason
accomplishes it is because it depends on segregation at the lower level of the schools,
otherwise it would not accomplish that?
Mr. Olson: No there is no evidence that it depends upon segregation of the schools in
Texas or in any other place. It is a diverse selection of the high schools in that state.
(O.C.: There is data stating that schools are more segregated now than they were in
the 1970s and 1980s due to neighborhood and school district populations (Pettigrew,
2004; Harvard report entitled, A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are
We Losing the Dream?, 2003, Frankenberg, Lee, and Orfield).
(4) Ms. Maureen E. Mahoney (arguing for the University)
Ms. Mahoney: The Solicitor General acknowledges the diversity may be a compelling
interest but contends that the University of Michigan Law School can achieve a diverse
student body through facially race neutral means. His argument ignores the record in this
case.
Justice Kennedy: I’m not sure…in his brief does he acknowledge that can be a
compelling interest?
Ms. Mahoney: The brief says that it is one of the paramount interests of government to
have diversity in higher education. And it has certainly been the consistent position of
the Department of Education for the past 25 years that Bakke is the governing standard,
that schools are encouraged to use programs to achieve diversity, because of the
important interests it serves for students of all color.
Chief Justice Rehnquist: Ms. Mahoney, supposing that after our Bakke decision came
down, whereas Cal. Davis set aside 16 seats for disadvantaged minorities, and Cal. Davis
said we’re going to try to get those 16 seats in some way, we’re going to try high school
graduates, we’re going to try socioeconomic and none of the …none of those methods get
the 16 seats that they want. Can they then go back and say we’ve tried everything, now
we’re entitled to set aside 16 seats?
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Ms. Mahoney: I don’t think so, Your Honor. I think what the Court’s judgment in
Bakke said and certainly what Justice Powell’s opinion said is that it’s simply not
necessary to do a set aside because a plan like the Harvard plan, which takes race into
account as one factor can be used as an effective means to –
Chief Justice Rehnquist – But my hypothesis was, they wanted 16 seats and that plan just
won’t give it to them?
Ms. Mahoney – Well, if…if the program was designed to have a fixed 16 seats, no matter
what the qualifications of the applicant pool, no matter what the disparities between the
minority and majority students would be, then I think it’s fair to say that that would be a
quota. If that is the nature of the program. But here the record indicates that the…the
law school’s program is nothing of the kind. That what has occurred over the years with
this program is that there have been offers that have ranged from 160 to 232 over the
course of eight years there have been enrollments that went from 44 to 73. It has been a
very flexible program.
Justice Scalia: Ms. Mahoney, I …I find it hard to take seriously the State of Michigan’s
contention that racial diversity is a compelling State interest, compelling enough to
warrant ignoring the Constitution’s prohibition of distribution on the basis of race. The
reason that I say that is that the problem of Michigan’s own creation, that is to say, it has
decided to crate an elite law school, it is one of the best law schools in the country. And
there are few State law schools that…that get to that leve. Now, it’s done this by taking
on the best students with the best grades and the best SATs or LSATs knowing that the
result of this will be to exclude to a large degree minorities. It is ….it’s not
unconstitutional to do that, because it’s …that’s not …not the purpose of what Michigan
did, but it is the predictable result. Nonetheless, Michigan says we want an elit law
school. Now, considering created this situation by making that decision, it then turns
around and says, oh, we have a compelling State interest in eliminating this racial
imbalance that ourselves have created. Now if Michigan really cares enough about that
racial imbalance, why doesn’t it do as many other State law schools do, lower the
standards, not have a flagship elite law school, it solves the problem.
Transcending Race/ Breaking-down Stereotypes
(OC: In this section (1), Justice Breyer refers to educational leaders’ at the
University of Michigan and leadership within the military’s use of racial
preferencing to encourage the breaking down of stereotypes. So as argued in the
excerpts below, clearly, there is a difference of opinion on how affirmative action
plans help or hurt the breaking down of stereotypes, although the ultimate goal of
actually breaking down stereotypes is at least a stated unified goal for both sides of
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this case. I do believe that for most educational and military leaders that this is the
case – that they truly do want racial respect and harmony in their institutions.
There are always those who have spurious intentions, but I do believe that more
than ever before, most people in the United States want people of both genders and
all races to be treated fairly and will work together toward accomplishing this goal).
(1) Mr. Olson: Secondly, it overtly employs stigmatizing and divisive racial stereotypes,
what the law school calls diversity-relevant characteristics. It identifies persons by
diversity-relevant characteristics.
Justice Breyer: I know. But they have a reason for it.
The reason for it is they want to produce a diverse class and the reason they want to do
that, using it as a plus, they say, is to do the things I said before. They think it breaks
down stereotypes within the class. They think it’s educationally beneficial. They think it
supplies a legal profession that will be diverse and they think a legal profession like
business and the military that is diverse is good for America from a civics point of view,
et cetera, breaks the cycle. Those are the arguments which you well know. So what is
your response?
Mr.Olson: well, a response to those many arguments is that they’ve ... they’re using
stereotypes to in an effort, they say to break down stereotypes, they’re using race as a …a
surrogate for experience. And if they want to look at experience, they can look at
experience. If they want to improve the educational opportunities of minority groups,
one of the biggest problems –
Justice Breyer: That’s not what they say. They say they’re not using race as a surrogate
for anything, because if you have a person who went to Exeter who’s very rich and
happens to be black and is a conservative Republican, it’s great for the class to know that,
too.
And that’s why they want a certain number.
Mr. Olson: But that person…that person if he went to Exeter and he has a great GPA and
so forth gets an extra opportunity either a portion of the class is set aside for the
individual solely on the basis of race, irrespective of his experience.
And the…and the application isn’t examined for the type of experience or the type of
viewpoint that race-diversity characteristic is used as a substitute for any examination of
the individual on the individual.
Justice Breyer: They think it breaks down stereotypes within the class.
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(OC: There is a significant amount of discussion among the African American
community that what Mr. Olson charges is true. In an article from the Marietta
Daily Journal from Friday, January 29, 2010, posted by the Associated Press Writer
Jesse Washington entitled, “Do blacks truly want to transcend race?”, Dr. Imani
Perry, a professor at Princeton’s Center for African American studies stated, “As a
black American, I want people to remember who I am and where I come from
without attaching assumptions about deficiency to it. The ideal is to be able to see
and acknowledge everything that a person is, including the history that he or she
comes from, as well as his or her comptencies and qualities, and respect all of those
things.” The article states further that, Kevin Jackson, a black conservative and
author of “The BIG Black Lie,” purports that people should be judged on their
merits, not their color, but does not want his blackness to be forgotten because “we
have an amazing history.” This article is an African American perspective
supporting the argument of Mr. Olson, and should be included in the
debate/discussion.)
(OC: The other side of the debate is presented by Ms. Mahoney in which she argues
that the affirmative action programs have had minimal impact on negative
stereotyping.)
(2) Ms. Mahoney: In addition, the whites who are seeing their performance in the class
and who are confirming that they find it highly beneficial to have the…the chance to
share the experiences of the minority students when they are learning about the law, has
to be given substantial weight in considering whether this is somehow stigmatizing or
perpetuating historic stereotypes, which is really the test that this Court used in VMI to
determine whether or not something should really be condemned because of its potential
to stigmatize.
The Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection Clause

228
(OC: Justice Breyer articulates the use of the Equal Protection Clause in a reverse
discrimination charge in the section (1) below.)
(1) Mr. Kolbo: Because very simply, Justice Breyer, the Constitution provides the right
of…individuals with the right of equal protection. And by discriminating on the basis of
race at a point of competition, innocent individuals are being injured in their
constitutional rights. That’s the distinction between that and simply truing to cast a wider
net, recruiting spending money won outreach efforts, a very principal line it seems to me
can be drawn between those two things.
Justice Breyer: The reason that the injury is more severe to the white person who doesn’t
get in when that white person doesn’t get in because she’s not an athlete or he’s not
a …he’s not an alumnus or he’s not any of the other things that fits within these other
criteria?
What is the difference there is?
Mr. Kolbo: The difference is the Equal Protection Clause, Your Honor.
It does not apply to alumni preferences in scholarships.
It applies to race.
Justice Breyer: That’s the legal conclusion. But the reason if I thought for example, that
there is a difference under the Equal Protection Clause, between a system that says to the
discriminated-against people, the law does not respect you, and a system that says the law
does respect you, but we are trying to help some others, suppose I though that that is a
sound legal distinction as reflected in this Court’s cases, you would reply that?
Mr. Kolbo: Sound and reasonable, Your Honor, is not enough when it comes to race. It
must be a compelling purpose. And that is the difference. There are many policy choices
a university can make that I may disagree or agree with, and that I have no legal standing
or no client has a legal standing to challenge, because they don’t implicate important
constitutional rights. There is something special about race in this country. It’s why we
have a Constitution about it. It’s why we have a constitutional amendment.

Fixed Time Period
(OC: Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in Grutter. Her
primary concern was over the amount of time needed to continue to use race as a
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method of balancing student populations in universities and in ensuring that student
access to quality education is fair for all races. The following excerpt (1) provides a
discussion of her concern. Ms. Mahoney’s reply is eloquently articulated and
provides a critical point in the oral argument.)
Justice O’Connor: Ms. Mahoney may I shift focus away from this to another point before
you’re finished that I …I am concerned about. In all programs which this Court has
upheld in the area of …you want to label it affirm tisk, there’s been a fixed time period
within which it would operate. You could see at the end…an end to it, there is none in
this is there? How do we deal with that aspect?
Ms. Mahoney: What the policy says, of course, is that it will only take race into account
as long as it is necessary in order to achieve the educational objectives. I don’t think that
this Court should conclude that this is permanent, because there are two things that can
happen that will make this come to an end.
The first is that the number of high-achieving minorities will continue to grow and that
law school will be able to enrole (sic) a sufficient number to have a critical mass or
meaningful numbers with substantial presence without having to take race into account.
The second thing that can happen, Your Honor, is that we could reach a point in our
society where the experience of being a minority did not make such a fundamental
difference in their lives, where race didn’t matter so much that it’s truly salient to the law
school’s educational mission.
While that I can’t say when that will happen, we certainly know that as a nation, we have
made tremendous progress in overcoming intolerance.
And we certainly should expect that that will occur with respect to minorities.
Justice O’Connor: We approved any other affirm tisk program with such a vague distant
termination base?
Ms. Mahoney: Well, in Bakke itself, Your Honor.
In Bakke itself, there were five votes to allow the University of California Davis to use a
plan modeled on the Harvard plan.
It’s been in effect for about 25 years.
It has repeated extraordinary benefits for this country’s educational system.
And I think it’s far too soon for this Court to included that(OC: This excerpt (2) is important for the Justices’ to evaluate the effectiveness of
the Bakke criteria over the last 25 years.)
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(2) Chief Justice Rehnquist: Can…can we tell from the statistics whether things have
been achieved say, more and more minorities are getting in on their own to the University
of Michigan Law School without the quotas?
Ms. Mahoney: Yes
Chief Justice Rehnquist: Or whetherMs. Mahoney: Yes, they’re not quotas, Your Honor.
Chief Justice Rehnquist: The critical mass?
Ms. Mahoney: We know aspirations. At per rations moan (sic??) but we do know Your
Honor that there has been improvement, in fact, Justice Powell cited to a study, it was
done by manning it’s in footnote 50 of Justice Powell’s opinion and it gives the number
of minorities who had achieved a 165 and a 3.5 on the LSAT.
Chief Justice Rehnquist: How about say the last 15 years, at the University of Michigan,
which wasn’t being under consideration which (sic) Justice Powell’s opinion.
Ms. Mahoney: I think the answer would be that we do know that in 1964 when there was
a race-blind policy, there were no blacks admitted, and under a race-blind policy today,
probably six blacks would be admitted without consideration of race.
So there has not been enough progress to allow for meaningful numbers at this point, but
there has been progress.
Justice O’Connor: Do we know what’s happened in the law schools in California since it
was determined by State law affirm tisk?
Ms. Mahoney: Yes, Your Honor.
We know that for the first time…I think 4 or 5 years, both only enrolled about…between
I think zero and 7 African American students.
They do better on Hispanics because of the demographics of that State, where it’s
virtually 50 percent Hispanic at the college-age level.
But what we have learned is that in the…they changed their program 2 years ago and this
fall they succeeded in enrolling 14 African-American students, but what we know from
talking to the law school admissions counsel with Bolt’s permission is that the AfricanAmericans who were enrolled under that program have a 9 point LSAT score gap from
the whites who have been enrolled, so the same gapMs. Mahoney: And if I could go back to Bolt for just another minute, because that is
something that the petitioners raised in their reply brief, is that given that we know that
they have exactly the same 9-point LSAT gap that Michigan gets under its program, there
is no reason to think that what they are doing would satisfy the petitioner’s conception of
the Equal Protection Clause.

231

Diverse democractic leadership (from Dr. Philo Hutcheson)
(OC: The military and corporate briefs submitted to support the University of
Michigan’s case center on the fact that minorities must be given the opportunity to
participate in leadership training programs in order to provide fair and balanced
leadership in professional and military institutions. This provides a check system to
disciplinary as well as advancement personnel policies in these institutions. New
perspectives on leadership, ethnicity, and cultural backgrounds also enhance a
diverse democratic leadership. See sections (1) and (2) below for key excerpts on
this topic.)
(1) Justice Ginsburg: Mr. Kolbo, may I call your attention in that regard to the brief that
was filed on behalf of some retired military officers who said that to have an officer corps
that includes minority members in any number, there is not way to do it other than to give
not an overriding preference, but a plus for race. I cannot be done through a percentage
plan, because of the importance of having people who are highly qualified. What is your
answer to the argument made in that brief that there simply is no other way to have
Armed Forces in which minorities will be represented not only largely among the enlisted
members, but also among the officer cadets?
Mr. Kolbo: I believe race could not be used, Your Honor. I think that other solutions
could be looked addressing the problem why they are not minorities in the military. I
not e that the United States has not taken a position. …the military academies have not
taken a position.
Justice Stevens: Yes, they have, if the brief is accurate about the regulations, the
academies have taken a position?
Mr. Kolbo: As I understand it, Justice Stevens, the briefs are filed on the behalf of
individuals.
Justice Stevens: I understand that. But they are quoting material that the academies have
distributed, which indicate they do give preferences.
Mr. Kolbo: Well, Your HonorJustice Stevens: Do you challenge the fact…that that is a matter of fact?
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Mr. Kolbo: We don’t challenge what they say, your Honor.
We’re just suggestion…we don’t have a record in this case.
Justice Souter: No, but do you challenge the fact that they are giving the preference?
Mr. Kolbo: We don’t have enough information on it to know whetherJustice Souter: Are you serious that you think there is a serious question about that?
That we cannot take that green brief as a representation of fact?
Mr. Kolbo – I just don’t know. Your Honor, what the facts are with respect to the
military because this case wasJustice Scalia – It depends on what factor you’re talking about doesn’t it? You accept the
fact that they’re don’t give preferences, but that doesn’t convert to the fact that if they
didn’t give preferences, there is no other way to get an officer corps that includes some
minority people, does the brief say that?
Mr. Kolbo – It does not, Your Honor. We have no evidence as to what the extent of the
representation is.
Justice Souter: The issue as I understand it is not whether without preferences there can
be a military academy population with some minorities, the question is whether without
the…the weighting of race that they do in fact give, they can have an adequate number of
minorities in the academies to furnish ultimately a reasonable number of minorities in the
officer corps, that the issue, isn’t it.
Mr. Kolbo: Well, Your Honor, again, the …the terms you’ve used, reasonable and
adequate, we have no information in this record on which I can make those(OC: The specific constitutional amendments, statutes, or judicial opinions are not
made clear by Mr. Kolbo to support his argument.)
Justice Souter: The object…but the object I would have assumed given the dialogue, the
object is to increase the racial number of the percentage of minorities. If that is the object,
than whatever it is, it’s not a race neutral measure.
Justice Breyer: Fine. If you can use race as a criterion for spending money, I take it one
argument on the other side, which I’d like you to address, is that we live in a world where
more than half of all the minority…really 75 percent of black students below the college
level are at schools that are more than 50 percent minority. And 85 percent of those
schools are in areas of poverty. And many among other things that they tell us on the
other side is that many people feel in the schools, the Universities, that the way…the only
way to break this cycle is to have a leadership that is diverse. And to have a leadership
across the country that is diverse, you have to train a diverse student body for law, for the
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military, for business, for all the other positions in this country that will allow us to have
a diverse leadership in a country that is diverse. Now you are familiar with that argument.
But if it is reasonable to use race as a criterion, as a plus for spending money, why isn’t it
also reasonable to use it as a plus to see that …to obtain that set of objectives that I’ve
tried to summarize in a second that you’re very familiar with.
(2) Justice Stevens: I’d like you to comment on Carter Phyllip’s (sic) brief. What is your
view of the strength of the argument? That’s the one about the generals and about the
military academies.
Mr. Olson: I understand…the…our position with respect to that is we respect the
opinions of those individuals, but the position of the United States is that we do not
accept the proposition that black soldiers will only fight for…black officers or the reverse
that race neutral means should be used in the academies as well as other places.
And that to the extent that there’s any difference in analysis, the Court might consider its
position, the position it articulated in connection with the military in Rostker v. Goldberg.
But our position with respect to that brief is that(OC: Mr. Olson may not be aware of the abuse of black soldiers in 20th Century
United States military corps that required years of law suit stimulated mainly by
Thurgood Marshall’s trip to Korea to enlighten people to the physical abuses and
suppression of rights of these soldiers (Rowan, 1993). It will take decades if not
longer for the residual effects of this abuse to abate. Having a diverse officer corps
not only ensures an equal opportunity for people of all races to serve in a
democratic leadership, but promotes checks and balances for equal and respectful
treatment of all persons serving in the military).
(OC: Rostker v. Goldberg, [453 U.S. 57 (1981)], was a decision of the United States
Supreme Court holding that the practice of requiring only men to register for the
draft was constitutional. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that this
gender distinction was not a violation of the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause, and that the Act would stand as passed.)
Justice Stevens: Your suggestion is that the military has broader latitude than the private
university?

234
Mr. Olson: No, I’m suggesting that –
Justice Stevens: Well, you’re point to Rostker suggests that.
Mr. Olson: Yes – I’m suggesting that the Court will want to look at each of these
individual situtions according to the circumstances and that may be a factor in that
context.
But I started my answer, Justice Stevens, by saying you do not accept the proposition that
race neutral means should not be used and employed fully to…to make sure that the
academies are accessible and open and …and offer opportunities for as many people as
possible.
Justice Ginsburg: But you recognize, General Oson, that here and now, all of the military
academies do have race preference programs in admissions?
Mr. Olson: The Coast Guard does not.
It’s prohibited by Congress from doing so.
I do acknowledge, Justice Ginsburg, that the other academies are doing so. It’s the
position of the United States –
Justice Ginsburg: Is that that’s illegal what they’re doing?
Mr. Olson: Pardon me?
Justice Ginsburg: Is it…that it is illegal, a violation of the Constitution?
Mr. Olson: We haven’t examined that and we haven’t presented a brief with respect to
the specifics of each individual academy. And we would want to take into consideration
any potential impact suggested by the Court in the Rostker case.
(OC: Section (3) addresses the question of, is there another way to develop a diverse
leadership without using race as a method.)
(3) Justice Souter: What do you…what do you think is the …is the principal race neutral
means, that the academy should use?
Mr. Olson: WellJustice Souter: Without criticizing necessarily what they’re doing now, what would be
the…in your judgment, the best race neutral way for them to go about reaching your
objective?
Mr. Olson: Well, ther are a variety of race neutral means and narrowly tailored methods
by which acadmies and universitities can reach out to people of all backgrounds to make
sure that they’ve eliminated-
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Justice Souter: No, no. I realize your position. But specifically, which …which of the
race neutral suggestions that have benn considered do you think would be, you know,
most adaptable to the academy situion?
Mr. Olson: Widespread recruiting, making sure that there’s opportunities for education
and advancement in the… in the academies.
(OC: How is this different than what the academies are already doing? How will
this help improve the equal access/diversity concern for women and minorities?)
Justice Souter: Recruiting with an objective of minority students?
Mr. Olson: Not limited, a race neutral system of broad scale recruiting that this Court has
always supported the porposition that efforts may be made by governmental institutions
to eliminate barriers that have existed where artificial barriersJustice Souter: Okay. But my question is, if they don’t do it with a racial objective, how
does the recruiting respond to the position taken in…in Mr. Phillips’s brief that without
the kind of…of racial weighting and admissions that is given now, they simply will not
reach a …a…a substantial number of…or be able to attain a substantial number of
minority slots in the class?
Mr. Olson: That is the opinion of certain individuals. It is…we do not accept that
conclusion based upon those opinions. And this Court has repeatedly held that race
neutral means must be demonstrated and will be accepted, and will not…and the Court
will not accept the proposition that race neutral means will not be successful unless
they’ve been attempted and demonstrated. These…this program that the University of
Michigan Law School fails every one of the Court’s tests. First, it’s a thinly disguised
quota which sets aside a significant portion of each year’s entering class for preferred
ethnic groups.
Secondly, it overtly employs stigmatizing and divisive racial stereotypes, what the law
school calls diversity-relevant characteristics. It identifies persons by diversity-relevant
characteristics.
(OC: The Bakke opinion forbids the use of quotas, but allows the use of race as one
criteria among other factors for admission as constitutional. Mr. Olson’s accusation
that the University of Michigan Law School used a “thinly disguised quota system”
is a conservative point of view purported by President Bush II on the Grutter case.
However, other scholars have the view point that the Michigan Law School
admissions policy is similar to the one upheld in the Bakke case at the University of
California at Davis, which was described by Justice Powell as compelling, justifiable,
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and legal, and similar to the Harvard program. The 2003 Gratz v. Bollinger case
was clearly more of a quota system used by the undergraduate admissions of the
University of Michigan, which the Court held as too explicit, and thus
unconstitutional, of a quota system because applicants were awarded points for
race).
(OC: The following excerpt (4) addresses the Justices’ concern over whether
creating a diverse leadership through the using race as a factor is a compelling State
interest.)
(4) Ms. Mahoney: Your honor, I don’t think there’s anything in this Court’s cases that
suggests that the law school has to make an election between academic excellence and
racial diversity. The interest here is having a –
Justice Scalia: If it claims it’s a compelling State interest. If it’s important enough to
override the Constitution’s prohibition of racial distribution, it seems to me it’s important
enough to override Michigan’s desire to have a super-duper law school?
Ms. Mahoney: Your Honor, the question isn’t whether it’s important to override the
prohibition on discrimination. It’s whether this is discrimination. Michigan…what
Michigan is doing benefitsJustice Kennedy: No, no. No.
The question is whether or not there is a compelling interest that allows race to be used.
Ms. Mahoney: But Your Honor there is a compelling interest in having an institution that
is both academically excellent and racially diverse, because our leaders need to be trained
in institutions that are excellent, that are superior academically, but they also need to be
trained with exposure to viewpoints, to the prospectives, to the experiences of individuals
from diverse backgrounds.
Equal Access
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(OC: Student access has been a concern of higher education in the United States
since the 1800s. Harold Wechsler’s The Qualified Student (1977) chronicles the
obstacles that minorities have faced as they have fought for the equal access to
quality educational programs and resources that they deserve, including, ironically,
the struggles at the University of Michigan as far back as the 1800s. Scholars,
lawyers, and political analysts of the Grutter case should be aware of these issues as
the theme of equal access is addressed in this case.)
(1) Justice Kennedy: So if year after year after year there’s an underrepresentation, there
is not cause for the State or the Government or its educational experts to be concerned
whatsoever?
Mr. Kolbo: I wouldn’t say not to be concerned, Your Honor, I think the mere fact of
underrepresentation, that is that say, blacks are not represented as they are in the
population is not a concern that would justify racial preferences. It certainly would
justify perhaps broad social and political concerns.
Justice Kennedy: Well, it’s a broad social and political concern that there are not
adequate members of…of the profession which is designed to protect our rights and
to …and to promote progress. I would….I should think that’s a very legitimate concern
on the part of the State.
Mr. Kolbo: The current concern there, Your Honor, ought to be addressed by…by
addressing the problem.
If there is some reason that …that particular minority groups are not participating as fully
in the fruits of our society such as being represented at the schools, we need to address
those problems. But racial preferences don’t address those problems.
(OC: What solutions would Mr. Kolbo suggest? Educational leaders are
recognizing the problems and making their best effort to generate solutions to it.
The educational leaders are making their best effort toward creating a diverse
student body population.)
Justice Kennedy: The military brief tells us…the green brief…that there are preparatory
schools that the academies have and 40 percent of the registration in those preparatory
schools are racial minorities. And they…suppose the Government does this and expends
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money for the purpose of recruiting and helping racial minorities apply to the academies
and succeed there. Is that a proper constitutional purpose?
Mr. Kolbo: I see no constitutional objection there, Justice Kennedy. For the reason I
think it…it’s quite permissible in principle to draw a line between casting a wider net,
recruiting and …and the point of competition where people…where people…where the
decision must be made whether people are going to be treated on the basis of the sameJustice Kennedy: Would you allow recruiting targeted at minorities?
Mr. Kolbo: I don’t see the constitutional object with that, Your Honor.
(OC: Today, there is considerable public argument that past discrimination against
minorities in the United States has been remedied by now. I argue that the past
discrimination that minorities have endured in the United States can never be fully
remedied or forgotten, and that educational leaders have the responsibility to ensure
that equal access to quality educational programs and resources is fully available to
people of all races. This issue is addressed in section (2) below).
(2) Justice Ginsburg: If you’re right…if you’re right about what equal protection
requires and we have also two statutes that incorporate the equal protection principle,
then there could be no affirmative action, I take it, in employment?
Mr. Kolbo: There could be, Your Honor, to remedy past identified discrimination, but
not to exceed diversity and there is not today as I understand it any compelling interest in
the employment context with respect to –
Justice Ginsburg: So, for example, if we have a prison that was largely minority
population and the State wanted to give a preference so that it would have a critical mass
of correction officers of the minority race, that would be impermissible?
Mr. Kolbo: It would be impermissible, Your honor, unless based upon a compelling
interest and the only one that has been recognized in the employment context is identified
discrimination. And I don’t see that in your hypothetical.
Justice Stevens: Can I ask you one question about the extent of your position. There’s a
brief applied, I think it’s by the Potawatomi tribe. If Michigan had made…the governor
of Michigan many years ago had made a commitment to an Indian tribe to allow three
person into the University of Michigan every year, three tribemen, and nothing else,
would that be constitutionally permissible?
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Mr. Kolbo: I don’t believe so Your Honor. Again, it’s a distinction drawn on the basis
of race.
Justice Stevens: Or just one, still would be a …that would exclude an impermissible
number of slots for –
Mr. Kolbo: If it’s slots on the basis of race, Your Honor.
(OC: How are Native Americans, women, and black citizens expected to get past
this after all of the years of suppression and discrimination that they have endured
without retribution and support from the white educational and political leaders?
Mr. Kolbo fails to address these critical issues of equal educational access and
extreme suppression for underrepresented minorities).
(OC: This section (3) shows the Grutter attorneys’ lack of clarity and specifics in
arguing their case. These arguments do not specifically state what tests the
University of Michigan Law School admissions program failed according to Bakke.)
(3) Justice O’Connor- General Olson, do you…do you agree with the articulated proposal
of Justice Powell in the Bakke case of using race as a plus factor as he…as he saw the use
of it. Do you agree with that approach?
Mr. Olson: We disagree with that approach in the sense that we…we…in the first place,
contrary to what our opponents have said, we would not believe that that single opinion,
which was the only opinion, to examine the issue of diversity under a compelling
argumentJustice O’Connor: I don’t think it commanded a court. I’m just asking if you agreed
with that approach.
Mr. Olson: We’re reluctant to say never, Justice O’Connor. But this test…every test that
Justice Powell applied in that opinion, the law school program here fails. It’s a
stereotypes.

(OC: Excerpts in this section (4) considers gender discrimination in light of this
case.)
(4) Justice Scalia: But General Olson, is race different from sex in that regard?
I thought we have…we have disapproved using sex as just a plus factor?
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That is one factor among many, but you know, when you get down to it, this is…this
person is a male and therefore we’ll put that into the mix and that’ll favor the person.
We’ve disapproved that with regard to sex discrimination, haven’t we?
Mr. Olson: I don’t disagree with that.
Justice Scalia: Why would race discrimination be any different?
Mr. Olson: I’m suggesting that the programs here, without getting to the point of
whether are there any other circumstances whether they be remedial, which this Court…
a factor of the Court has recognized before, or something else in an unusual situation,
where it could be appropriate. I don’t know what that might be. But this test –
Justice Ginsburg: I think Santa Clara…I think what Justice Scalia said bears
modification, because in fact in Santa Clara, the highway dispatcher, there was a plus for
sex, although there was no proven discrimination against that particular woman and this
Court approved that.
Mr. Olson: I would also say that it’s conceivable if you’re constructing …the National
Institutes of Health is constructing this study of diseases that focus on particular races,
the race may be a factor but the fact is that the law school program here, not only is a set
aside and a quota, but it…but it –
Justice Stevens: General Olson, I’m not sure you answered Justice O’Connor’s question.
Do you agree with Justice Powell’s suggestion that race could be used as a plus in
something like the Harvard program?
Mr. Olson: No, the Harvard program A wasn’t examined according to any compelling
governmental interest. It was examined onlyJustice Stevens: So your answer is no, you would not agree with that?
Mr. Olson – We would not based upon any what we see in that opinion, which is-
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APPENDIX F
Fieldnotes
Grutter v. Bollinger
Opinion of the Court
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
June 23, 2003

Key excerpts from the Supreme Court of the United States Opinion of the Court
June 23, 2003, written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
The purpose of these fieldnotes is to analyze the legal ideologies that emerge from
the Grutter opinion and to analyze how they contribute to racial respect and harmony in
United States higher education. My definition of racial respect is that people recognize,
value, and appreciate the unique cultural and historical backgrounds of each race. Racial
respect means that all people celebrate each race’s contributions to the world. Further, all
people work together to make their communities and collectively, the world, a healthier,
safer, and more productive environment. Racial harmony emerges from the mutual
respect that people from all races give to each other.
Through this analysis of O’Connor’s opinion for the Court, I will identify key
themes in affirmative action cases to organize the legal ideologies purported by the
petitioner, the Law School, and the Justices in this case. I have selected key passages and
organized them into nine themes, which are: Creating Diversity in Universities and in
other Contexts, Diverse Democratic Leadership (Hutcheson), Transcending Race/
Breaking-down Stereotypes, Reverse Discrimination, Equal Access, Compelling Interest,
Narrow Tailoring, The Fourteenth Amendment, and Fixed Time Period. I will provide
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comments to the arguments made in the opinion to correspond with historical, social, and
political contextual analysis. Observer Comments (OC) are my analyses typed in bold
print.
(OC: In Grutter, Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. The Justices
usually try to be cohesive on critical cases, such as in Brown, by working to generate
an opinion upon which they can all agree. The goal is to be united on controversial
decisions to show a strong emphasis on the opinion being delivered. This was not
the case in Grutter. O’Connor struggled with the issue of how much longer. It had
been 25 years since Bakke, and the question remained, how and when will we know
when we have reached the point when we no longer need to consider racial
preferencing or balancing to have representative minority populations in student
admissions, corporate leadership, and in military officer training corps.
Affirmative action plans had been originally developed to begin to repay the debt of
centuries of oppressive measures against minorities. After the 1978 Bakke case,
which restricted quotas, but allowed the use of race as one factor among many in
considering student admissions to higher education programs, the intent of
affirmative action policies has become to promote diversity.
(Background information from O’Connor’s opinion regarding Bakke:
“Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s
judgment and vacated the injunction. The Court of Appeals first held that
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke was binding precedent establishing
diversity as a compelling state interest. According to the Court of Appeals,
Justice Powell’s opinion with respect to diversity comprised the controlling
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rationale for the judgment of this Court under the analysis set forth in Marks
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). The Court of Appeals also held that
the Law School’s use of race was narrowly tailored because race was merely
a “potential ‘plus’ factor” and because the Law School’s program was
“virtually identical” to the Harvard admissions program described
approvingly by Justice Powell and appended to his Bakke opinion. 288 F.3d
732, 746, 749 (CA6 2002). Four dissenting judges would have held the Law
School’s use of race unconstitutional. Three of the dissenters, rejecting the
majority’s Marks analysis, examined the Law School’s interest in student
body diversity on the merits and concluded it was not compelling. The
fourth dissenter, writing separately, found it unnecessary to decide whether
diversity was a compelling interest because, like the other dissenters, he
believed that the Law School’s use of race was not narrowly tailored to
further that interest.
We granted certiorari, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002), to resolve the disagreement
among the Courts of Appeals on a question of national importance: Whether
diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of
race in selecting applicants for admission to public universities. Compare
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (CA5 1996) (Hopwood I ) (holding that
diversity is not a compelling state interest), with Smith v. University of Wash.
Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (CA9 2000) (holding that it is).) We last
addressed the use of race in public higher education over 25 years ago. In the
landmark Bakke case, we reviewed a racial set-aside program that reserved
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16 out of 100 seats in a medical school class for members of certain minority
groups. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The decision produced six separate opinions,
none of which commanded a majority of the Court. Four Justices would
have upheld the program against all attack on the ground that the
government can use race to “remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by
past racial prejudice.” Id., at 325 (joint opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Four other Justices avoided the constitutional question altogether and struck
down the program on statutory grounds. Id., at 408 (opinion of Stevens, J.,
joined by Burger, C. J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell provided a fifth vote
not only for invalidating the set-aside program, but also for reversing the
state court’s injunction against any use of race whatsoever. The only holding
for the Court in Bakke was that a “State has a substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program
involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.” Id., at
320. Thus, we reversed that part of the lower court’s judgment that enjoined
the university “from any consideration of the race of any applicant.” Ibid.
Since this Court’s splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court has served as the touchstone for
constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies. Public and
private universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions
programs on Justice Powell’s views on permissible race-conscious policies.
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See, e.g., Brief for Judith Areen et al. as Amici Curiae 12—13 (law school
admissions programs employ “methods designed from and based on Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bakke”); Brief for Amherst College et al. as Amici
Curiae 27 (“After Bakke, each of the amici (and undoubtedly other selective
colleges and universities as well) reviewed their admissions procedures in
light of Justice Powell’s opinion … and set sail accordingly”). We therefore
discuss Justice Powell’s opinion in some detail.”
(OC: The Bakke case is critical to the Grutter decision because the
criteria articulated by Justice Powell has been the basis for all
affirmative action policies since 1978. The Grutter case challenged the
University of Michigan’s implementation of the Bakke criteria as well as
whether Bakke is still appropriate for student admissions at all. It is
important for the courts to periodically reconsider the affirmative
action plans to ensure their appropriate usage and legitimate interests.)
Background on the Grutter case
(OC: One of the important phrases in this passage is “’contributing in diverse ways
to the well-being of others.’” The purpose of the legal profession is at issue here. Is
being a lawyer only about intellectual abilities, or should other factors be included?
Should one of the other factors be representation of different ethnicities,
perspectives, and cultural backgrounds? Should then the primary purpose of a
lawyer be to use his/her talents in conjunction with their personal backgrounds to
help others?)
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O’Connor: Justice Powell was, however, careful to emphasize that in his
view race “is only one element in a range of factors a university properly
may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body.” Id., at
314. For Justice Powell, “[i]t is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in
which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be
members of selected ethnic groups,” that can justify the use of race. Id., at
315. Rather, “[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.” Ibid.
In the wake of our fractured decision in Bakke, courts have struggled to
discern whether Justice Powell’s diversity rationale, set forth in part of the
opinion joined by no other Justice, is nonetheless binding precedent under
Marks. In that case, we explained that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”
430 U.S., at 193 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the
divergent opinions of the lower courts demonstrate, however, “[t]his test is
more easily stated than applied to the various opinions supporting the result
in [Bakke].” Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745—746 (1994).
Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234
(CA11 2001) (Justice Powell’s diversity rationale was not the holding of the
Court); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274—275 (CA5 2000) (Hopwood
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II ) (same); Hopwood I, 78 F.3d 932 (same), with Smith v. University of
Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1199 (Justice Powell’s opinion, including the
diversity rationale, is controlling under Marks).
(OC: O’Connor’s mention of the “fractured decision in Bakke” is
important. This states that the affirmative action policies are
controversial and should be carefully applied in appropriate
circumstances only. This makes affirmative action policies difficult to
define and implement. It also requires strict scrutiny to ensure that
affirmative action policies are implemented narrowly and
appropriately.)
O’Connor: We do not find it necessary to decide whether Justice Powell’s
opinion is binding under Marks. It does not seem “useful to pursue the
Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously
baffled and divided the lower courts that have considered it.” Nichols v.
United States, supra, at 745—746. More important, for the reasons set out
below, today we endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is
a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.
(OC: The University of Michigan recognized that the practice of law calls for
lawyers to understand the needs and perspectives of all people to the best of their
ability, and that the meaningful exchange of diverse backgrounds and ideas in a
classroom is critical to the individual and overall effectiveness of their profession. I
have greatly valued the benefits of having a diverse classroom in my graduate
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programs at Georgia State. I did not have this benefit in my undergraduate
program. I have learned so much from my classmates and professors from a variety
of ethnic and cultural backgrounds that I would have never learned in a
homogenous environment. I have begun to think about things I never would have
considered by just reading a book alone. To listen to others speak about their lived
experiences in an engaging learning environment is an immeasurable benefit to
one’s education, personal growth, and professional contributions.)
(2) O’Connor: In 1992, the dean of the Law School charged a faculty committee with
crafting a written admissions policy to implement these goals. In particular, the Law
School sought to ensure that its efforts to achieve student body diversity complied with
this Court’s most recent ruling on the use of race in university admissions. See Regents
of Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Upon the unanimous adoption of the
committee’s report by the Law School faculty, it became the Law School’s official
admissions policy.
(OC: The key word in this passage is “unanimous.” In potentially controversial
decisions, the Supreme Court will attempt to have a unanimous decision to show
their unity and force behind their ruling, such as the Warren Court did in Brown.
Likewise, the use of the phrase, “unanimous adoption,” shows that the Law School
was unified in their belief that taking extra measures to ensure the diversity of their
program was critical to the effectiveness of their educational program.)
(3) O’Connor: The policy aspires to “’achieve that diversity which has the potential to
enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its
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parts.’” Id., at 118. The policy does not restrict the types of diversity contributions
eligible for “’substantial weight’” in the admissions process, but instead recognizes
“’many possible bases for diversity admissions.” Id., at 118, 120. The policy does,
however, reaffirm the law School’s longstanding commitment to “’one particular type of
diversity,”’ that is, “’racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of
students from groups which have been historically discriminated against, like AfricanAmericans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be
represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.’” Id., at 120. By enrolling a
“’critical mass’” of (underrepresented) minority students, “’the Law School seeks to
“’ensure their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School.’”
Id., at 120-121.
(OC: The key phrase in this section is “critical mass.” The legal ideology of
“critical mass” is controversial. Those against affirmative action programs view the
“critical mass” as indicative of a quota system. Those supportive of affirmative
action programs argue that the “critical mass” is not a specific number or quota,
but does mean that a meaningful representative of minority students should be
included for two reasons. First, the “critical mass” provides a substantial voice
from different races, and second, it restricts the isolation feeling that individual
students might have in being a singular representative of their race in the classes,
that students in the early stages of higher education integration into graduate
programs reported feeling. This feeling is not only difficult to bear emotionally, but
could lead to program drop-out and the like.)
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(4) O’Connor: The District Court heard extensive testimony from Professor Richard
Lempert, who chaired the faculty committee that drafted the 1992 policy. Lempert
emphasized that the Law School seeks students with diverse interests and backgrounds to
enhance classroom discussion and the educational experience both inside and outside the
classroom. Id., at 213a. When asked about the policy’s “‘commitment to racial and ethnic
diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been
historically discriminated against,’ ” Lempert explained that this language did not purport
to remedy past discrimination, but rather to include students who may bring to the Law
School a perspective different from that of members of groups which have not been the
victims of such discrimination. Ibid. Lempert acknowledged that other groups, such as
Asians and Jews, have experienced discrimination, but explained they were not
mentioned in the policy because individuals who are members of those groups were
already being admitted to the Law School in significant numbers. Ibid.
(OC: There will be a future date at which all races will have a meaningful
representation without regard to race in the admissions process. In the meantime,
the University of Michigan’s attempt to provide a substantial voice in their
classrooms from minority races is compelling.)
(5) O’Connor: Justice Powell approved the university’s use of race to
further only one interest: “the attainment of a diverse student body.” Id., at
311. With the important proviso that “constitutional limitations protecting
individual rights may not be disregarded,” Justice Powell grounded his
analysis in the academic freedom that “long has been viewed as a special
concern of the First Amendment.” Id., at 312, 314. We have long recognized
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that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment,
universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition. See, e.g.,
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.
Y., 385 U.S., at 603. In announcing the principle of student body diversity as
a compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a
constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational
autonomy: “The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
education includes the selection of its student body.” Bakke, supra, at 312.
From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming “the right to
select those students who will contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of
ideas,’ ” a university “seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission.” 438 U.S., at 313 (quoting
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., supra, at 603). Our
conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the
heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that “good faith”
on the part of a university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.”
438 U.S., at 318-319.
As part of its goal of “assembling a class that is both exceptionally
academically qualified and broadly diverse,” the Law School seeks to
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“enroll a ‘critical mass’ of minority students.” Brief for Respondents
Bollinger et al. 13. The Law School’s interest is not simply “to assure within
its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely
because of its race or ethnic origin.” Bakke, 438 U.S., at 307 (opinion of
Powell, J.). That would amount to outright racial balancing, which is
patently unconstitutional. Ibid.; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)
(“Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake”); Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S., at 507. Rather, the Law School’s concept of critical
mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce.
(OC: Justice Powell’s discussion of university freedom to develop its own, unique
student body is important here. He is affirming academic freedom and providing
the leeway for universities to exercise judgment in creating student bodies that
match their missions.)
Diverse Democratic Leadership (Hutcheson)
(1) O’Connor: Third, Justice Powell rejected an interest in “increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved,” concluding that
even if such an interest could be compelling in some circumstances the program under
review was not “geared to promote that goal.” Id., at 306, 310.
(OC: Powell is stating that despite the fact that the idea of increasing the number of
physicians who would potentially assist underserved communities did not
appropriately apply in the Bakke case, he is leaving the door open for that
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compelling interest to allow for racial preferences should a legitimate circumstance
occur.)
(2) O’Connor: Justice Powell emphasized that nothing less than the
“ ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to
the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”
Id., at 313 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y.,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). In seeking the “right to select those students who
will contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas,’ ” a university
seeks “to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of
its mission.” 438 U.S., at 313. Both “tradition and experience lend support to
the view that the contribution of diversity is substantial.” Ibid. The Law
School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer. The Law School’s assessment
that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by
respondents and their amici. Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law
School is no less strict for taking into account complex educational
judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university.
Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of
deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally
prescribed limits. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225
(1985); Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96, n. 6
(1978); Bakke, 438 U.S., at 319, n. 53 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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(OC: Leadership is the key point in this passage. O’Connor is
affirming Powell’s assertion that the United States’ leadership requires
leaders who have been exposed to and trained to understand and
represent our many ethnicities and cultures.)
(3) (OC: The following passages from the opinion extend the
importance of leadership training strengthened by exposure to diversity
to other areas of the United States’ leadership. Critical to this statement
by the Justices is the strong showing of support of the United States
ROTC and major corporations such as General Motors for affirmative
action programs in leadership training, not only for leaders to be
exposed to diverse perspectives, but to represent all of the races present
in our armed forces and in our businesses.)
O’Connor: These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. Brief for 3M et al. as Amici
Curiae 5; Brief for General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae 3-4. What is
more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States
military assert that, “[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,” a “highly
qualified, racially diverse officer corps … is essential to the military’s ability
to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.” Brief for Julius
W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae 27. The primary sources for the
Nation’s officer corps are the service academies and the Reserve Officers
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Training Corps (ROTC), the latter comprising students already admitted to
participating colleges and universities. Id., at 5. At present, “the military
cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially
diverse unless the service academies and the ROTC used limited raceconscious recruiting and admissions policies.” Ibid. (emphasis in original).
To fulfill its mission, the military “must be selective in admissions for
training and education for the officer corps, and it must train and educate a
highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse setting.”
Id., at 29 (emphasis in original). We agree that “[i]t requires only a small
step from this analysis to conclude that our country’s other most selective
institutions must remain both diverse and selective.” Ibid.
We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing
students for work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to
“sustaining our political and cultural heritage” with a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of society. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
This Court has long recognized that “education … is the very foundation of
good citizenship.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
For this reason, the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public
institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals
regardless of race or ethnicity. The United States, as amicus curiae, affirms
that “[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all
segments of American society, including people of all races and ethnicities,
represents a paramount government objective.” Brief for United States as
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Amicus Curiae 13. And, “[n]owhere is the importance of such openness
more acute than in the context of higher education.” Ibid. Effective
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of
our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be
realized.
(OC: The specific case of higher education is highlighted in this passage,
noting that colleges and universities provide our best opportunity for
the meaningful exchange of ideas from people of various backgrounds
and perspectives and the positive interaction among people of all races
to develop productive learning environments to learn from each other
and to work together to create better communities.)
O’Connor: Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools, represent
the training ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders. Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (describing law school as a “proving
ground for legal learning and practice”). Individuals with law degrees
occupy roughly half the state governorships, more than half the seats in the
United States Senate, and more than a third of the seats in the United States
House of Representatives. See Brief for Association of American Law
Schools as Amicus Curiae 5-6. The pattern is even more striking when it
comes to highly selective law schools. A handful of these schools accounts
for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States Courts of Appeals
judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States District Court
judges. Id., at 6.
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In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members
of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and
integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training. As we have
recognized, law schools “cannot be effective in isolation from the
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.” See Sweatt v.
Painter, supra, at 634. Access to legal education (and thus the legal
profession) must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and
education necessary to succeed in America.
Reverse Discrimination - (Defined by Petitioners as the Use of Quotas)
(1) O’Connor: Second, Justice Powell rejected an interest in remedying societal
discrimination because such measures would risk placing unnecessary burdens on
innocent third parties “who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of
the special admissions program are thought to have suffered.” Id., at 310.
(OC: This is the argument used by Gratz and Grutter to bring their cases to the
courts. They argued that in Bakke, Justice Powell stated that there should not be
harm done to Caucasian applicants as a result of the University of Michigan’s
affirmative action policies. This statement also provided the shift in the ideology
that affirmative action policies approved by the courts are no longer be based on
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remedying past discrimination, but are be based on the compelling interest of
creating a diverse student population.)
(2) O’Connor: The hallmark of that policy is its focus on academic ability coupled with a
flexible assessment of applicants’ talents, experiences, and potential “’to contribute to the
learning of those around them.” App. 111.
(OC: The key word in this sentence is “flexible.” The Bakke Case prohibits the use
of a structured quota-type of system, but allows the use of affirmative action as a
method of achieving diverse school populations. Justice Lewis Powell in his opinion
in the Bakke case found that quota systems promoted reverse discrimination and
were thus, unconstitutional. However, Powell wrote that universities could use race
as a “plus factor.” Powell refered to the affirmative action program established by
Harvard College as an example of how to view race in a “holistic review,” taking
into account all of the applicant’s qualities.)
O’Connor: The policy requires admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on
all the information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of
recommendation, and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute
to the life and diversity of the Law School. Kl. At 83, 84, 114, 171. In reviewing an
applicant’s file, admissions officials must consider the applicant’s undergraduate grade
point average (GPA) and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score because they are
important (if imperfect) predictors of academic success in law school. Id., at 112. The
policy stresses that “’no applicant should be admitted unless we expect that applicant to
do well enough to graduate with no serious academic problems.” Id., at 111.
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(OC: O’Connor is noting the important factor in this case which is that academic
credentials remained the top criteria in the Law School’s admissions process.)
O’Connor: The policy makes clear, however, that even the highest possible score does
not guarantee admission to the Law School, Id., at 113. Nor does a low score
automatically disqualify an applicant. Ibid. Rather, the policy requires admissions
officials to look beyond grades and test scores to other criteria that are important to the
Law School’s educational objectives. Id., at 114. So-called “’soft’ variables” such as
“’the enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution, the
quality of the applicant’s essay, and the areas and difficulty of the undergraduate course
selection” are all brought to bear in assessing an “’applicant’s likely contributions to the
intellectual and social life of the institution.’” Ibid.
(OC: If Grutter did not value the University of Michigan’s Law School objectives,
which emphasized the educational benefits of diversity in the legal program, which
is stated so clearly in their policies, then there were other law schools to which she
could apply. This is in contrast to the Gaines case, in which Lloyd Gaines was
prohibited from applying to the University of Missouri because of his race and was
told to go out of state to find a law school that would accept students from his race.
The black higher education school in Missouri was Lincoln University, and they did
not offer a legal program at that time.)
(3) O’Connor: Petitioner further alleged that her application was rejected because the
Law School uses race as a “’predominant’” factor, giving applicants who belong to
certain minority groups “’significantly greater chance of admission than students with
similar credentials from disfavored racial groups.’” App. 33-34. Petitioner also alleged
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that respondents “’had no compelling interest to justify their use of race in the admissions
process.’” Id., at 34. Petitioner requested compensatory and punitive damages, an order
requiring the Law School to offer her admission, and an injunction prohibiting the Law
School from continuing to discriminate on the basis of race. Id., at 36. Petitioner clearly
has standing to bring this lawsuit. Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen.
Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666. (1993).
The District Court granted petitioner’s motion for class certification and for
bifurcation of the trial into liability and damages phases. The class was
defined as “‘all persons who (A) applied for and were not granted admission
to the University of Michigan Law School for the academic years since (and
including) 1995 until the time that judgment is entered herein; and (B) were
members of those racial or ethnic groups, including Caucasian, that
Defendants treated less favorably in considering their applications for
admission to the Law School.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 191a—192a.
(OC: Our history of white dominance of educational environments
works against this argument. The petitioner is ignoring past
discrimination and not recognizing the national importance of including
all races in student populations. The vast majority of the Law School’s
population was Caucasian during the 1990s. Even today, the percentage
of minorities enrolled in the classes of 2010, 2011, and 2012 are 25%,
21%, and 22% respectively at the University of Michigan Law School.)
(4) O’Connor: The District Court heard oral argument on the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment on December 22, 2000. Taking the motions
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under advisement, the District Court indicated that it would decide as a
matter of law whether the Law School’s asserted interest in obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body was compelling.
The District Court also indicated that it would conduct a bench trial on the
extent to which race was a factor in the Law School’s admissions decisions,
and whether the Law School’s consideration of race in admissions decisions
constituted a race-based double standard.
(OC: The Equal Protection Clause will be evaluated in this last
argument. At some point, there will be a day when considering race as a
factor in ensuring representation among student populations will no
longer be necessary. The “double standard” argument will no longer be
purported by whites.)
(5) O’Connor: During the 15-day bench trial, the parties introduced
extensive evidence concerning the Law School’s use of race in the
admissions process. Dennis Shields, Director of Admissions when petitioner
applied to the Law School, testified that he did not direct his staff to admit a
particular percentage or number of minority students, but rather to consider
an applicant’s race along with all other factors. Id., at 206a. Shields testified
that at the height of the admissions season, he would frequently consult the
so-called “daily reports” that kept track of the racial and ethnic composition
of the class (along with other information such as residency status and
gender). Id., at 207a. This was done, Shields testified, to ensure that a critical
mass of underrepresented minority students would be reached so as to
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realize the educational benefits of a diverse student body. Ibid. Shields
stressed, however, that he did not seek to admit any particular number or
percentage of underrepresented minority students. Ibid.
(OC: This last statement is critical evidence that the Court deemed that
the Law School was abiding under the criteria established by Bakke,
using race as a plus-factor, but not as a quota system in student
admissions.)
Erica Munzel, who succeeded Shields as Director of Admissions, testified
that “ ‘critical mass’ ” means “ ‘meaningful numbers’ ” or “ ‘meaningful
representation,’ ” which she understood to mean a number that encourages
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and not
feel isolated. Id., at 208a-209a. Munzel stated there is no number, percentage,
or range of numbers or percentages that constitute critical mass. Id., at 209a.
Munzel also asserted that she must consider the race of applicants because a
critical mass of underrepresented minority students could not be enrolled if
admissions decisions were based primarily on undergraduate GPAs and
LSAT scores. Ibid.
The current Dean of the Law School, Jeffrey Lehman, also testified. Like the
other Law School witnesses, Lehman did not quantify critical mass in terms
of numbers or percentages. Id., at 211a. He indicated that critical mass
means numbers such that underrepresented minority students do not feel
isolated or like spokespersons for their race. Ibid. When asked about the
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extent to which race is considered in admissions, Lehman testified that it
varies from one applicant to another. Ibid. In some cases, according to
Lehman’s testimony, an applicant’s race may play no role, while in others it
may be a “ ‘determinative’ ” factor. Ibid.
(6) O’Connor: In an attempt to quantify the extent to which the Law School
actually considers race in making admissions decisions, the parties
introduced voluminous evidence at trial. Relying on data obtained from the
Law School, petitioner’s expert, Dr. Kinley Larntz, generated and analyzed
“admissions grids” for the years in question (1995-2000). These grids show
the number of applicants and the number of admittees for all combinations
of GPAs and LSAT scores. Dr. Larntz made “ ‘cell-by-cell’ ” comparisons
between applicants of different races to determine whether a statistically
significant relationship existed between race and admission rates. He
concluded that membership in certain minority groups “ ‘is an extremely
strong factor in the decision for acceptance,’ ” and that applicants from these
minority groups “ ‘are given an extremely large allowance for admission’ ”
as compared to applicants who are members of nonfavored groups. Id., at
218a-220a. Dr. Larntz conceded, however, that race is not the predominant
factor in the Law School’s admissions calculus. 12 Tr. 11-13 (Feb. 10, 2001).
(OC: I concur with Justice Powell and Justice O’Connor’s opinions in
Bakke and in Grutter. There should not be a quota system used in
student admissions. The University of Michigan Law School used a
flexible plus-factor plan which promotes diversity in their student
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populations, which is appropriate until the time that we will reach when
the plus-factor plan is no longer necessary.)
(6) (OC: The following passages reflect the Court’s opinion that the
Law School did not use a quota system and appropriately followed the
criteria established by Bakke in developing their programs.)
O’Connor: To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program
cannot use a quota system–it cannot “insulat[e] each category of applicants
with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other
applicants.” Bakke, supra, at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.). Instead, a
university may consider race or ethnicity only as a “ ‘plus’ in a particular
applicant’s file,” without “insulat[ing] the individual from comparison with
all other candidates for the available seats.” Id., at 317. In other words, an
admissions program must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although
not necessarily according them the same weight.” Ibid.
We find that the Law School’s admissions program bears the hallmarks of a
narrowly tailored plan. As Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly
individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible,
nonmechanical way. It follows from this mandate that universities cannot
establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of
those groups on separate admissions tracks. See id., at 315—316. Nor can
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universities insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups
from the competition for admission. Ibid. Universities can, however,
consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a “plus” factor in the context of
individualized consideration of each and every applicant. Ibid.
We are satisfied that the Law School’s admissions program, like the Harvard
plan described by Justice Powell, does not operate as a quota. Properly
understood, a “quota” is a program in which a certain fixed number or
proportion of opportunities are “reserved exclusively for certain minority
groups.” Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., supra, at 496 (plurality opinion).
Quotas “ ‘impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or
which cannot be exceeded,’ ” Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
495 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and
“insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the
available seats.” Bakke, supra, at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.). In contrast, “a
permissible goal … require[s] only a good-faith effort … to come within a
range demarcated by the goal itself,” Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, supra,
at 495, and permits consideration of race as a “plus” factor in any given case
while still ensuring that each candidate “compete[s] with all other qualified
applicants,” Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S.
616, 638 (1987).
Justice Powell’s distinction between the medical school’s rigid 16-seat quota
and Harvard’s flexible use of race as a “plus” factor is instructive. Harvard
certainly had minimum goals for minority enrollment, even if it had no
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specific number firmly in mind. See Bakke, supra, at 323 (opinion of Powell,
J.) (“10 or 20 black students could not begin to bring to their classmates and
to each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of
blacks in the United States”). What is more, Justice Powell flatly rejected the
argument that Harvard’s program was “the functional equivalent of a quota”
merely because it had some “ ‘plus’ ” for race, or gave greater “weight” to
race than to some other factors, in order to achieve student body diversity.
438 U.S., at 317—318.
The Law School’s goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented
minority students does not transform its program into a quota. As the
Harvard plan described by Justice Powell recognized, there is of course
“some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be
derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a
reasonable environment for those students admitted.” Id., at 323. “[S]ome
attention to numbers,” without more, does not transform a flexible
admissions system into a rigid quota. Ibid. Nor, as Justice Kennedy posits,
does the Law School’s consultation of the “daily reports,” which keep track
of the racial and ethnic composition of the class (as well as of residency and
gender), “suggest[ ] there was no further attempt at individual review save
for race itself” during the final stages of the admissions process. See post, at
6 (dissenting opinion). To the contrary, the Law School’s admissions
officers testified without contradiction that they never gave race any more or
less weight based on the information contained in these reports. Brief for
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Respondents Bollinger et al. 43, n. 70 (citing App. in Nos. 01—1447 and
01—1516 (CA6), p. 7336). Moreover, as Justice Kennedy concedes, see post,
at 4, between 1993 and 2000, the number of African-American, Latino, and
Native-American students in each class at the Law School varied from 13.5
to 20.1 percent, a range inconsistent with a quota.
(OC: The above passage describes one of the key disagreements among
the Justices in deciding Grutter. O’Connor explains that the “daily
reports” used by the Law School to keep track of the ethnicity, race,
gender, and residency status of the applicants was viewed by the
Justices in two different ways. Dissenting Justices viewed the charts as
keeping a tally, which implies that a minimum number, or potentially a
quota, was being applied to their decision-making process. O’Connor
states the other side of the argument, which was that the “daily charts”
were used to keep track of their admissions progress and not necessarily
used to create a quota system.)
(7) O’Connor: The Chief Justice believes that the Law School’s policy
conceals an attempt to achieve racial balancing, and cites admissions data to
contend that the Law School discriminates among different groups within
the critical mass. Post, at 3-9 (dissenting opinion). But, as The Chief Justice
concedes, the number of underrepresented minority students who ultimately
enroll in the Law School differs substantially from their representation in the
applicant pool and varies considerably for each group from year to year. See
post, at 8 (dissenting opinion).
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(OC: Again, the critical differences among the Justices center on their
beliefs about whether the Law School was trying to mask a quota system
or if they were using the Bakke criteria appropriately.)
O’Connor: That a race-conscious admissions program does not operate as a
quota does not, by itself, satisfy the requirement of individualized
consideration. When using race as a “plus” factor in university admissions, a
university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that
each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an
applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.
The importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a raceconscious admissions program is paramount. See Bakke, supra, at 318, n. 52
(opinion of Powell, J.) (identifying the “denial … of th[e] right to
individualized consideration” as the “principal evil” of the medical school’s
admissions program).
Here, the Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of
each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an
applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. The Law
School affords this individualized consideration to applicants of all races.
There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or
rejection based on any single “soft” variable. Unlike the program at issue in
Gratz v. Bollinger, ante, the Law School awards no mechanical,
predetermined diversity “bonuses” based on race or ethnicity. See ante, at 23
(distinguishing a race-conscious admissions program that automatically
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awards 20 points based on race from the Harvard plan, which considered
race but “did not contemplate that any single characteristic automatically
ensured a specific and identifiable contribution to a university’s diversity”).
Like the Harvard plan, the Law School’s admissions policy “is flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the
particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same
footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same
weight.” Bakke, supra, at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.).
(OC: O’Connor carries the opinion of the Court by writing that 5
Justices believe that the Law School used an appropriate, “flexible,”
system of racial preferencing. O’Connor was chosen to write this
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist because of her moderate viewpoint
on this issue among the nine Justices. She also had a close relationship
with the author of Bakke, Justice Lewis Powell. He was a mentor to her
and greatly influenced her legal ideologies and decision-making.)
Narrow -tailoring
(1) O’Connor: We also find that, like the Harvard plan Justice Powell
referenced in Bakke, the Law School’s race-conscious admissions program
adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body
diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions decisions.
With respect to the use of race itself, all underrepresented minority students
admitted by the Law School have been deemed qualified. By virtue of our
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Nation’s struggle with racial inequality, such students are both likely to have
experiences of particular importance to the Law School’s mission, and less
likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those
experiences. See App. 120.
The Law School does not, however, limit in any way the broad range of
qualities and experiences that may be considered valuable contributions to
student body diversity. To the contrary, the 1992 policy makes clear “[t]here
are many possible bases for diversity admissions,” and provides examples of
admittees who have lived or traveled widely abroad, are fluent in several
languages, have overcome personal adversity and family hardship, have
exceptional records of extensive community service, and have had
successful careers in other fields. Id., at 118-119. The Law School seriously
considers each “applicant’s promise of making a notable contribution to the
class by way of a particular strength, attainment, or characteristic–e.g., an
unusual intellectual achievement, employment experience, nonacademic
performance, or personal background.” Id., at 83-84. All applicants have the
opportunity to highlight their own potential diversity contributions through
the submission of a personal statement, letters of recommendation, and an
essay describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute to the life
and diversity of the Law School.
(OC: The Law School’s balanced admissions criteria emphasizes
qualities beyond academics, while still prioritizing intellectual
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achievement. This provides a comprehensive and meaningful review of
an applicant, which enriches the student population in their program.)
What is more, the Law School actually gives substantial weight to diversity
factors besides race. The Law School frequently accepts nonminority
applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority
applicants (and other nonminority applicants) who are rejected. See Brief for
Respondents Bollinger et al. 10; App. 121—122. This shows that the Law
School seriously weighs many other diversity factors besides race that can
make a real and dispositive difference for nonminority applicants as well. By
this flexible approach, the Law School sufficiently takes into account, in
practice as well as in theory, a wide variety of characteristics besides race
and ethnicity that contribute to a diverse student body. Justice Kennedy
speculates that “race is likely outcome determinative for many members of
minority groups” who do not fall within the upper range of LSAT scores and
grades. Post, at 3 (dissenting opinion). But the same could be said of the
Harvard plan discussed approvingly by Justice Powell in Bakke, and indeed
of any plan that uses race as one of many factors. See 438 U.S., at 316
(“ ‘When the Committee on Admissions reviews the large middle group of
applicants who are “admissible” and deemed capable of doing good work in
their courses, the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor’ ”).
(OC: The above passage provides a critical piece of evidence that
shifted the balance of opinions in favor of the Law School. The Law
School gives substantial weight to diversity factors other than just race.

272
“The Law School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades
and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants (and
other nonminority applicants) who are rejected.” This is significant in
the Law School’s argument that there is no structured quota system and
that race is used as one “factor” among others.)
(2) O’Connor: Petitioner and the United States argue that the Law School’s
plan is not narrowly tailored because race-neutral means exist to obtain the
educational benefits of student body diversity that the Law School seeks. We
disagree. Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable
race-neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to choose between
maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups. See Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280, n. 6 (1986) (alternatives must serve
the interest “ ‘about as well’ ”); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S., at
509-510 (plurality opinion) (city had a “whole array of race-neutral”
alternatives because changing requirements “would have [had] little
detrimental effect on the city’s interests”). Narrow tailoring does, however,
require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks. See id., at
507 (set-aside plan not narrowly tailored where “there does not appear to
have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral means”); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Ed., supra, at 280, n. 6 (narrow tailoring “require[s]
consideration” of “lawful alternative and less restrictive means”).
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We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Law School sufficiently
considered workable race-neutral alternatives. The District Court took the
Law School to task for failing to consider race-neutral alternatives such as
“using a lottery system” or “decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on
undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 251a. But
these alternatives would require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the
academic quality of all admitted students, or both.
(OC: The Justices developed the “narrow tailoring” idea to show their
concern that the Law School and other affirmative action policies are
used appropriately and only when no other means were possible in
developing meaningful diversity in their student populations. School
officials should attempt every other means possible to achieve diversity
and use affirmative action programs only as a last resort. The Justices
admit the imperfection of the plans, but reiterate its necessity until a
better situation exists. They affirm the Law School’s good intention
behind their admissions program.)
The Law School’s current admissions program considers race as one factor
among many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is diverse in ways
broader than race. Because a lottery would make that kind of nuanced
judgment impossible, it would effectively sacrifice all other educational
values, not to mention every other kind of diversity. So too with the
suggestion that the Law School simply lower admissions standards for all
students, a drastic remedy that would require the Law School to become a
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much different institution and sacrifice a vital component of its educational
mission. The United States advocates “percentage plans,” recently adopted
by public undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida, and California to
guarantee admission to all students above a certain class-rank threshold in
every high school in the State. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1418. The United States does not, however, explain how such plans could work
for graduate and professional schools. More-over, even assuming such plans
are race-neutral, they may preclude the university from conducting the
individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not
just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the
university. We are satisfied that the Law School adequately considered raceneutral alternatives currently capable of producing a critical mass without
forcing the Law School to abandon the academic selectivity that is the
cornerstone of its educational mission.
(3) O’Connor: We acknowledge that “there are serious problems of justice connected
with the idea of preference itself.” Bakke, 438 U.S., at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.).
Narrow tailoring, therefore, requires that a race-conscious admissions program not
unduly harm members of any racial group. Even remedial race-based governmental
action generally “remains subject to continuing oversight to assure that it will work the
least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the benefit.” Id., at 308. To
be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must not “unduly burden
individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups.” Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Equal Access
(1) O’Connor: Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, the Law School’s expert, focused on the
predicted effect of eliminating race as a factor in the Law School’s admission process. In
Dr. Raudenbush’s view, a race-blind admissions system would have a “ ‘very
dramatic,’ ” negative effect on underrepresented minority admissions. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 223a. He testified that in 2000, 35 percent of underrepresented minority applicants
were admitted. Ibid. Dr. Raudenbush predicted that if race were not considered, only 10
percent of those applicants would have been admitted. Ibid. Under this scenario,
underrepresented minority students would have comprised 4 percent of the entering class
in 2000 instead of the actual figure of 14.5 percent. Ibid.
(OC: This is one of the key arguments in the compelling interest argument that
eventually decided the case in favor of the Law School. The government must
approve the appropriate use of affirmative action plans as necessary for specific
educational programs as well as for national interests.)
O’Connor: The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall “deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, §2.
Because the Fourteenth Amendment “protect[s] persons, not groups,” all “governmental
action based on race–a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited–should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.”
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We are a “free people whose institutions
are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It follows from that principle that
“government may treat people differently because of their race only for the most
compelling reasons.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S., at 227.
(OC: Again, the compelling interest factor is the key to the legitimacy of affirmative
action plans.)
(2) O’Connor: We have held that all racial classifications imposed by
government “must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”
Ibid. This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. “Absent
searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures,” we have no way to determine what “classifications are ‘benign’
or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.” Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion). We apply strict
scrutiny to all racial classifications to “ ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race
by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.” Ibid.
Strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, supra, at 237 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict
scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it. As we have explained, “whenever the
government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that
person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and
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spirit of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.” 515 U.S., at 229230. But that observation “says nothing about the ultimate validity of any
particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict
scrutiny.” Id., at 230. When race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring
requirement is also satisfied.
Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the
Equal Protection Clause. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343—
344 (1960) (admonishing that, “in dealing with claims under broad
provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by an interpretive
process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations,
based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must
not be applied out of context in disregard of variant controlling facts”). In
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, we made clear that strict scrutiny must
take “ ‘relevant differences’ into account.” 515 U.S., at 228. Indeed, as we
explained, that is its “fundamental purpose.” Ibid. Not every decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to
provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the
sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the
use of race in that particular context.
(OC: I think that the cautions that O’Connor and Powell address in the Equal
Protection Clause remain crucial to the proper usage of affirmative action policies.
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In particular, it is imperative for the courts to apply strict scrutiny to ensure the
credibility and legitimacy of affirmative action policies in light of the requirement of
creating a program based solely upon the compelling government interest to
promote diversity. Assessing the context of the affirmative action policies to be an
appropriate match is also an important consideration for the courts.)
Compelling Interest
(1) O’Connor: This policy does not define diversity “’solely in terms of racial and ethnic
status.’” Id., at 121. Nor is the policy “’insensitive to the competition among all students
for admission to the Law School.’” Ibid. Rather, the policy seeks to guide admissions
officers in “’producing classes both diverse and academically outstanding, classes made
up of students who promise to continue the tradition of outstanding contribution by
Michigan Graduates to the legal profession.’” Ibid.
(OC: O’Connor is explaining the compelling interest of diversity in this case in these
two paragraphs. Grutter had charged that the Law School did not have a compelling
interest to justify the additional consideration given to minority applicants. I, personally,
can not think of a more compelling interest for a law school, of all educational programs,
to ensure the representation of all voices and perspectives in their classroom and legal
discussions. In addition, a meaningful legal education must include a comprehensive
review of past legal issues and cases, not just from a white perspective, but from all
perspectives. The legal profession, like most others, has developed over the centuries in
United States’ history. Historical analysis and legal examination of past court cases,
racial oppression and discrimination in this case, are paramount to a meaningful legal
education.)
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(OC: In conjunction with the theme of Creating a Diverse Student Body,
Justices’ Powell and O’Connor reiterate the importance of affirmative
action policies being based on one compelling interest only: that of
being absolutely necessary for creating a diverse student body. The
following passages articulate the expectations and criteria that the
Justices hold for establishing a compelling interest in implementing
affirmative action policies in creating admissions policies to promote
diversity.)
(1) O’Connor: With these principles in mind, we turn to the question
whether the Law School’s use of race is justified by a compelling state
interest. Before this Court, as they have throughout this litigation,
respondents assert only one justification for their use of race in the
admissions process: obtaining “the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body.” Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. i. In other
words, the Law School asks us to recognize, in the context of higher
education, a compelling state interest in student body diversity.
We first wish to dispel the notion that the Law School’s argument has been
foreclosed, either expressly or implicitly, by our affirmative-action cases
decided since Bakke. It is true that some language in those opinions might be
read to suggest that remedying past discrimination is the only permissible
justification for race-based governmental action. See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., supra, at 493 (plurality opinion) (stating that unless
classifications based on race are “strictly reserved for remedial settings, they
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may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of
racial hostility”). But we have never held that the only governmental use of
race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination. Nor,
since Bakke, have we directly addressed the use of race in the context of
public higher education. Today, we hold that the Law School has a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.
(2) The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by
its amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity. In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence
at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning
outcomes, and “better prepares students for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.” Brief for
American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae 3; see,
e.g., W. Bowen & D. Bok, The Shape of the River (1998); Diversity
Challenged: Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action (G. Orfield &
M. Kurlaender eds. 2001); Compelling Interest: Examining the Evidence on
Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities (M. Chang, D. Witt, J. Jones,
& K. Hakuta eds. 2003).
(3) Even in the limited circumstance when drawing racial distinctions is
permissible to further a compelling state interest, government is still
“constrained in how it may pursue that end: [T]he means chosen to
accomplish the [government’s] asserted purpose must be specifically and
narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.” Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,
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908 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The purpose of
the narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that “the means chosen ‘fit’ …
th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S., at 493 (plurality opinion).
Since Bakke, we have had no occasion to define the contours of the narrowtailoring inquiry with respect to race-conscious university admissions
programs. That inquiry must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by
the use of race to achieve student body diversity in public higher education.
Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s assertions, we do not “abandon[ ] strict
scrutiny,” see post, at 8 (dissenting opinion). Rather, as we have already
explained, ante, at 15, we adhere to Adarand’s teaching that the very
purpose of strict scrutiny is to take such “ relevant differences into account.”
515 U.S., at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).
(OC: O’Connor is stating that the compelling interest for developing an
affirmative action program established by the Law School must be
policed with strict scrutiny. Like other programs, the intentions and
implementation of the policies must be carefully considered in light of
the Bakke criteria. The dissention among the Justices’ opinions on the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs is reflected in this
passage as O’Connor refers to Justice Kennedy’s concern over the lack
of strict scrutiny that could allow an affirmative action programs to
hinder equal protection.)
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Transcending Race/ Breaking-down Stereotypes
(1) O’Connor: Kent Syverud was the final witness to testify about the Law School’s use
of race in admissions decisions. Syverud was a professor at the Law School when the
1992 admissions policy was adopted and is now Dean of Vanderbilt Law School. In
addition to his testimony at trial, Syverud submitted several expert reports on the
educational benefits of diversity. Syverud’s testimony indicated that when a critical mass
of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force
because nonminority students learn there is no “‘minority viewpoint’ ” but rather a
variety of viewpoints among minority students. Id., at 215a.
(OC: My own personal experience in growing up in a diverse middle and high
school environment reinforces this argument. When children grow up becoming
friends with other children of different races, they learn the different cultural and
historical backgrounds of their friends from different races without regard to
notions of superiority or dominance or even inferiority and subordination. They
grow up with an appreciation and a respect for each other’s unique cultural
backgrounds. A diverse classroom provides a similar experience for students at
any age or educational level. This is a critical element in the process of breaking
down of negative stereotypes for people of all races.)
(2) O’Connor: These benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law
School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps to break down
racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 246a. These benefits are “important and laudable,” because
“classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and
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interesting” when the students have “the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.” Id., at
246a, 244a.
(OC: O’Connor is reinforcing a primary benefit that a diverse student population
allows, which is to break-down racial stereotypes, and contribute to racial respect
and harmony among children and adults. The Courts are evaluating the “benefit”
that the policies provide in contrast to the “harm” that may occur to others.)
(3) O’Connor: The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on “any belief
that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority
viewpoint on any issue.” Brief for Respondent Bollinger et al. 30. To the contrary,
diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s
mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.
Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional experiences is
likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a
racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters. The
Law School has determined, based on its experience and expertise, that a “critical mass”
of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in securing
the educational benefits of a diverse student body.
(OC: O’Connor is reinforcing the Law School’s argument that a “critical mass” is
needed to make a meaningful attempt at fulfilling their mission, which includes the
breaking-down of racial stereotypes. It would be potentially more difficult for a
single representative than for it would for a group representation.)
Fixed Time Period
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(OC: The question remains how and when will we know we are there.
Justice O’Connor grappled with this concern. My belief is that we
should evaluate these programs every ten years for appropriate use and
compelling need. While affirmative action plans are imperfect and
should be short-term, (meaning, a few decades, not to last forever), they
have provided the method needed to represent all people in higher
education in the last several decades.)
(2) O’Connor: In the context of higher education, the durational
requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions
policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are
still necessary to achieve student body diversity. Universities in California,
Florida, and Washington State, where racial preferences in admissions are
prohibited by state law, are currently engaged in experimenting with a wide
variety of alternative approaches. Universities in other States can and should
draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they
develop. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he States may perform their role as laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far
from clear”).
The requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs have a
termination point “assure[s] all citizens that the deviation from the norm of
equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a
measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.” Richmond v. J. A.

285
Croson Co., 488 U.S., at 510 (plurality opinion); see also Nathanson &
Bartnik, The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority
Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 Chicago Bar Rec. 282, 293 (May—
June 1977) (“It would be a sad day indeed, were America to become a
quota-ridden society, with each identifiable minority assigned proportional
representation in every desirable walk of life. But that is not the rationale for
programs of preferential treatment; the acid test of their justification will be
their efficacy in eliminating the need for any racial or ethnic preferences at
all”).
We take the Law School at its word that it would “like nothing better than to
find a race-neutral admissions formula” and will terminate its race-conscious
admissions program as soon as practicable. See Brief for Respondents
Bollinger et al. 34; Bakke, supra, at 317—318 (opinion of Powell, J.)
(presuming good faith of university officials in the absence of a showing to
the contrary). It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use
of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public
higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants with
high grades and test scores has indeed increased. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43.
We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.
O’Connor’s conclusion: In summary, the Equal Protection Clause does not
prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational
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benefits that flow from a diverse student body. Consequently, petitioner’s
statutory claims based on Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 also fail. See Bakke,
supra, at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“Title VI … proscribe[s] only those
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the
Fifth Amendment”); General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389—391 (1982) (the prohibition against
discrimination in §1981 is co-extensive with the Equal Protection Clause).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, accordingly, is
affirmed.
The legal question evaluated in the Grutter and Gratz cases is: “A state
university's admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because its ranking system gave an automatic point increase to all racial
minorities rather than making individual determinations. Eastern District of Michigan
affirmed in part, reversed and remanded.” The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, established on July 9, 1868, as part of the Reconstruction Amendments, has
been the primary constitutional statute considered in equal rights cases since the Supreme
Court overruled the decision in the Dred Scott v. Sandford case of 1857, which excluded
slaves and their descendants from possessing Constitutional rights. The Fourteenth
Amendment extended the definition of citizenship to include slaves. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been used to require the states to
provide equal protection under the law to all people within their jurisdictions. Its most
notorious application was in Brown v. Board of Education which required the
desegregation of public schools, 1954.)
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(2) O’Connor: Justice Powell began by stating that “[t]he guarantee of equal protection
cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied
to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not
equal.” Bakke, 438 U.S., at 289-290. In Justice Powell’s view, when governmental
decisions “touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a
judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Id., at 299. Under this exacting
standard, only one of the interests asserted by the university survived Justice Powell’s
scrutiny. First, Justice Powell rejected an interest in “ ‘reducing the historic deficit of
traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession’ ” as
an unlawful interest in racial balancing. Id., at 306-307.
(OC: This is the standard that the petitioner has applied to the case to charge that
the affirmative action program at the University of Michigan treated people
unfairly by favoring one race over the other. Looking at this argument
simplistically, however, does not reveal the historic context and the justification for
such actions.)
(3) O’Connor: We are satisfied that the Law School’s admissions
program does not. Because the Law School considers “all pertinent elements
of diversity,” it can (and does) select nonminority applicants who have
greater potential to enhance student body diversity over underrepresented
minority applicants. See Bakke, supra, at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.). As
Justice Powell recognized in Bakke, so long as a race-conscious admissions
program uses race as a “plus” factor in the context of individualized
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consideration, a rejected applicant “will not have been foreclosed from all
consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had
the wrong surname… . His qualifications would have been weighed fairly
and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal
treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 438 U.S., at 318.
We agree that, in the context of its individualized inquiry into the
possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School’s raceconscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants.
We are mindful, however, that “[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination
based on race.” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). Accordingly,
race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. This requirement
reflects that racial classifications, however compelling their goals, are
potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than
the interest demands. Enshrining a permanent justification for racial
preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection principle. We
see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions programs from the
requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point.
The Law School, too, concedes that all “race-conscious programs must have
reasonable durational limits.” Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 32.041
The history of student access to higher education plays a critical role in the understanding
of Grutter because affirmative action programs were originally developed to remedy past
discrimination and now, are primarily intended to create a meaningful diverse population
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in higher education classrooms as well as in other contexts including corporate and
military leadership.
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APPENDIX G
Fieldnotes
Document Analysis
Grutter v. Bollinger
Concurring Opinion of Justice Ginsburg
June 23, 2003
The following document analysis is of Justice Ginsburg’s concurring
opinion supporting the majority of the Court and Justice O’Connor’s official
Opinion.
(OC: The primary arguments that Justice Ginsburg reiterates here include her
belief that establishing equal access and ensuring the development of diversity in
student populations in higher education are still necessary objectives in the 2000s
for official regulation. Justice Ginsburg acknowledges the Law School’s
justification for using race as a factor in admitting students to their legal education
program noting that ensuring equal access and establishing a meaningful diverse
student population are compelling government interests that must continue to
receive official protections for an additional, but limited, time period. Justice
Ginsburg concurs with Justice O’Connor that there will be a time when official
regulation of student access will no longer be necessary nor appropriate in student
admissions, but that, despite some progress, that time has not yet come.)
(OC: I have developed the following categories for analysis of this document
as well as in previous analyses and for additional documents to be analyzed
in subsequent fieldnotes: Creating Diversity in Universities and in other
Contexts, Diverse Democratic Leadership (Hutcheson), Transcending
Race/Breaking-down Stereotypes, Reverse Discrimination, Equal Access,
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Compelling Interest, Narrow Tailoring, the Fourteenth Amendment, Fixed
Time Period, Critical Mass, Racial Preferencing, and Quota. The codes are
listed at the end of the analysis.)
The following statement is the official concurring opinion written by Justice
Ginsburg:
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joins, concurring.The Court’s
observation that race-conscious programs “must have a fixed time period
(1965). But such measures, the Convention instructs, “shall in no

9. FTP

case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or 1. DIV
separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they
were taken have been achieved.” Ibid; see also Art. 1(4) (similarly providing
for temporally limited affirmative action); Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Annex to G. A. Res. 34/180,
34 U. N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No. 46) 194, U. N. Doc. A/34/46, Art. 4(1)
(1979)
5. EA (authorizing “temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de
facto equality” that “shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality
of opportunity and treatment have been achieved”).
(OC: Ginsburg is reiterating O’Connor’s opinion for the Court
that the Law School’s admission policy is not a perfect solution to
the problem for ensuring equal access and fulfilling the primary
objective for the Law School, which is creating a diverse student
population. However, this is the best solution available right now,
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and the compelling interest of providing equal access to minority
students and having a meaningful diverse student population
still requires official intervention to achieve those objectives.
When the time comes, that equal access and diversity in student
populations have been sufficiently achieved, affirmative action
programs will no longer be necessary and will be deemed no
longer a compelling interest to warrant the burden placed upon
students in the majority via the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause enforced by the courts.)
The Court further observes that “it has been 25 years since Justice
Powell [in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)]
first approved the use of race to further an interest in student body
diversity in the context of public higher education.” Ante, at 31. For
at least part of that time, however, the law could not fairly be
described as “settled,” and in some regions of the Nation, overtly
race-conscious admissions policies have been proscribed. See
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (CA5 1996); cf. Wessmann v.
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (CA1 1998); Tuttle v. Arlington Cty. School
Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (CA4 1999); Johnson v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (CA11 2001). Moreover, it was only 25 years
before Bakke that this Court declared public school segregation
unconstitutional, a declaration that, after prolonged resistance,
yielded an end to a law-enforced racial caste system, itself the legacy
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of centuries of slavery. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954); cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
It is well documented that conscious and unconscious race
5. EA bias, even rank discrimination based on race, remain alive in
our land, impeding realization of our highest values and ideals. See,
e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, ante, at 1—4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 272—274 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:
Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 1251,
1276—1291, 1303 (1998). As to public education, data for the years
2000—2001 show that 71.6% of African-American children and
76.3% of Hispanic children attended a school in which minorities
made up a majority of the student body. See E. Frankenberg, C. Lee,
& G. Orfield, A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are
We Losing the Dream? p. 4 (Jan. 2003),
(OC: I have also read this report. It also concludes that schools
in the United States are becoming increasingly more segregated
to a level similar to that in 1969 in some areas of the country,
primarily the south. Other research has shown similar findings
(Jones and Hancock, 2005, Pettigrew, 2004.)
http://www.civilrightsproject.
harvard.edu / research / reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf
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(as visited June 16, 2003, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
And schools in predominantly minority communities lag far behind
others measured by the educational resources available to them. See
id., at 11; Brief for National Urban League et al. as Amici Curiae
11—12 (citing General Accounting Office, Per-Pupil Spending
Differences Between Selected Inner City and Suburban Schools
Varied by Metropolitan Area, 17 (2002)).
However strong the public’s desire for improved education
systems may be, see P. Hart & R. Teeter, A National Priority:
Americans Speak on Teacher Quality 2, 11 (2002) (public opinion
research conducted for Educational Testing Service); The No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107—110, 115 Stat. 1425 , 20
U.S.C. A. §7231 (2003 Supp. Pamphlet), it remains the current
reality that many minority students encounter markedly inadequate
and unequal educational opportunities. Despite these inequalities,
some minority students are able to meet the high threshold
requirements set for admission to the country’s finest undergraduate
and graduate educational institutions. As lower school education in
minority communities improves, an increase in the number of such
students may be anticipated. From today’s vantage point, one may
hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s span,
9. FTP progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal
opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.*
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(OC: I agree with Justice Ginsburg that the compelling interest
of firmly establishing equal access and ensuring that quality
instructional programs and resources are available for all
children is still a primary objective in public education today.
Therefore, we need more time and official regulation to advance
these objectives.)

Notes
*.

*As the Court explains, the admissions policy challenged here survives

review under the standards stated in Adarand Constructors, Inc . v. Peña,
515 U.S. 200 (1995), Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989),
and Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978). This case therefore does not require the Court to revisit whether
all governmental classifications by race, whether designed to benefit or to
burden a historically disadvantaged group, should be subject to the same
standard of judicial review. Cf. Gratz, ante, at 4—5 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Adarand, 515 U.S., at 274, n. 8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Nor
does this case necessitate reconsideration whether interests other than
“student body diversity,” ante, at 13, rank as sufficiently important to justify
a race-conscious government program. Cf. Gratz, ante, at 5 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Adarand, 515 U.S., at 273—274 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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(OC: Justice Ginsburg is reaffirming Justice O’Connor’s official
Opinion of the Court. She is stating that the Law School’s use of
affirmative action in their student admissions policy is affirmed
under the precedents of the Bakke case and does not warrant
further review by the Court. The compelling interest
established by the Law School of creating diversity in their
student population is still a necessary objective for today’s
admission’s policies.)
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Coding Sheet

1. DIV (Creating diversity in universities and in other contexts)
2. DDL (Diverse, democratic leadership – Hutcheson; A priority for an effective democracy
is to have meaningful diversity represented in its leadership.)
3. TR/BDS (Transcending race / breaking-down stereotypes)
4. RD (Reverse Discrimination)
5. EA (Equal Access)
6. CI (Compelling Interest)
7. NT (Narrow Tailoring)
8. 14th A (The Fourteenth Amendment)
9. FTP (Fixed Time Period)
10. CM (Critical Mass)
11. RP (Racial Preferencing)
12. QTA (Quota)
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APPENDIX H
Fieldnotes
Document Analysis
Grutter v. Bollinger
Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist
June 23, 2003
(OC: Background on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion: The
Chief Justice disagrees with the majority of the Court and, thus, with
Justice O’Connor’s official Opinion of the Court. Rehnquist’s primary
disagreement with the majority is based on his belief that the Law School’s
attempt to develop a “critical mass” of underrepresented students is a veil to
cover a quota system favoring African -American students over students
from other race categories, specifically, Caucasians, Native Americans, and
Hispanics, which is inconsistent with the idea of a critical mass. Rehnquist
argues that the unequal application of the Law School’s admittance policy
for minority students proved that the Law School’s intentions were not to
create a meaningful diverse student population through the idea of the
critical mass, but were to favor African-American student admissions.)
The following statement is the official dissenting opinion written by the Chief Justice:

Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas
join, dissenting:
7. NT I agree with the Court that, in the limited circumstance when drawing racial
distinctions is permissible, the government must ensure that its means are
6. CI narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Ante, at 21; see also
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 498 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). Even if
the government proffers a compelling interest to support reliance upon a suspect
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classification, the means selected must be narrowly drawn to fulfill the
governmental purpose.). I do not believe, however, that the University of
7. NT Michigan Law Schools (Law School) means are narrowly tailored to the interest it
asserts. The Law School claims it must take the steps it does to achieve a critical
mass of underrepresented minority students.
13. RD But its actual program bears no relation to this asserted goal. Stripped of its
critical mass veil, the Law Schools program is revealed as a naked effort to
achieve racial balancing. As we have explained many times, . . .any preference
based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching
examination. Our cases establish that, in order Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 223 (1995) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.
S. 267, 273 (1986) to withstand this demanding inquiry, respondents must
7. NT demonstrate that their methods of using race fit a compelling state interest with
6. CI greater precision than any alternative means. Id., at 280, n. 6; Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 299 (1978) (opinion of Powell,J.) (When political
4. RD judgments touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to
7. NT a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is
6. CI precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest).
(OC: Rehnquist argues that the University of Michigan’s Law School
violated the Supreme Court’s precedents in Adarand, Wygant, and Bakke, by
veiling a structured system of racial preferencing. Rehnquist finds that the
Law School did not sufficiently prove that their admissions policy was
narrowly-tailored to be the best and only means to achieve diversity.
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Rehnquist argues that the burden placed on white students was unjust
because the admissions policy was not serving a strong-enough compelling
government interest.)
7. NT Before the Court’s decision today, we consistently applied the same strict scrutiny
analysis regardless of the government’s purported reason for using race and
regardless of the setting in which race was being used. We rejected calls to use
more lenient review in the face of claims that race was being used in good faith
7. NT because more than good motives should be required when government seeks to
allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial classification system.
Adarand, supra, at 226; Fullilove, supra, at 537 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
4. RD (Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most
exact connection between justification and classification). We likewise rejected
calls to apply more lenient review based on the particular setting in which race is
being used. Indeed, even in the specific context of higher education, we
8. 14th A. emphasized that constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not
be disregarded. Bakke, supra, at 314. Although the Court recites the language of
our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its
deference. Respondents asserted justification for the Law School’s use of race in
1. DIV the admissions process is obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body. Ante, at 15 (quoting Brief for Respondents Bollinger Cite
as: 539 U. S._ (2003) 3 REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting Bollinger et al.). They
contend that a critical mass of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further
that interest. Ante, at 17. Respondents and school administrators explain generally
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that critical mass means a sufficient number of underrepresented minority
students to achieve several objectives: To ensure that these minority students
1. DIV do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race; to provide adequate
5. EQA opportunities for the type of interaction upon which the educational benefits of
diversity depend; and to challenge all students to think critically and reexamine
3. TR/BDS stereotypes. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 211a; Brief for Respondents Bollinger
et al. 26. These objectives indicate that critical mass relates to the size of the
student body. Id., at 5 (claiming that the Law School has enrolled critical mass, or
enough minority students to provide meaningful integration of its classrooms and
residence halls.). Respondents further claim that the Law School is achieving
critical mass. Id., at 4 (noting that the Law School’s goals have been greatly
furthered by the presence of . . . a critical mass of minority students in the student
body).
In practice, the Law School’s program bears little or no relation to its
10. CM asserted goal of achieving critical mass. Respondents explain that the Law
School seeks to accumulate a critical mass of each underrepresented minority
group. See, e.g., id., at 49, n. 79. (.The Law School’s . . . current policy . . .
provides a special commitment to enrolling a critical mass of Hispanics). But the
record demonstrates that the Law School’s admissions practices with respect to
these groups differ dramatically and cannot be defended under any consistent use
of the term critical mass.
(OC: Rehnquist is calling into question the Law School’s unequal
application of its critical mass objective in the admissions policy citing that
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Hispanics are not given the same balancing preference as other minorities,
for example.)
From 1995 through 2000, the Law School admitted between 1,130 and 1,310
students. Of those, between 13 and 19 were Native American, between 91 and
108 were African-Americans, and between 47 and 56 were Hispanic. 4
GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER, REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting. If the Law School
is admitting between 91 and 108 African-Americans in order to achieve critical
mass, thereby preventing African-American students from feeling isolated or like
spokespersons for their race one would think that a number of the same order of
magnitude would be necessary to accomplish the same purpose for Hispanics and
Native Americans. Similarly, even if all of the Native American applicants
admitted in a given year matriculate, which the record demonstrates is not at all
10. CM the case, how can this possibly constitute a critical mass of Native Americans in
a class of over 350 students?
In order for this pattern of admission to be consistent with the Law School’s
explanation of critical mass, one would have to believe that the objectives of critical mass
offered by respondents are achieved with only half the number of Hispanics and onesixth the number of Native Americans as compared to African-Americans. But
respondents offer no race-specific reasons for such disparities.
4. RD Instead, they simply emphasize the importance of achieving critical mass, without
any explanation of why that concept is applied differently among the three
underrepresented minority groups.
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(OC: It is a valid question for the Law School to answer. However, I believe
when you read the oral argument and the opinion of O’Connor, it is clear that the
Law School has honorable intentions to create a meaningfully diverse student
population to enrich the legal instruction as well as the future of the legal profession.
The Law School officials have an imperfect solution to a challenging problem, but
they recognize the importance of trying to promote diversity in their program and
to create a diverse legal profession to ensure that all voices are represented in the
legal professions, not just those from the majority group. The Law School states the
benefit to have the opportunity to advance the breaking-down of stereotypes that
has been successful in higher education classrooms, especially in legal education,
in which social and political issues are analyzed for relevance to community,
state, and federal leadership. However, Rehnquist makes a fair point, and
the Law School should continue to work better toward the inclusion of the
Native American and Hispanic population as he suggests.)
These different numbers, moreover, come only as a result of substantial different
treatment among the three underrepresented minority groups, as is apparent in an
example offered by the Law School and highlighted by the Court: The school
asserts that it frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test
scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority
applicants) who are rejected. Ante, at 26. Indeed, during this 5-year time period,
enrollment of Native American students dropped to as low as three such students.
10. CM Any assertion that such a small group constituted a critical mass of Native
Americans is simply absurd.

304
Specifically, the Law School states that sixty-nine minority applicants were
rejected between 1995 and 2000 with at least a 3.5 Grade Point Average (GPA)
and a score of 159 or higher on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT),
while a number of Caucasian and Asian-American applicants with similar lower
scores were admitted. Review of the record reveals only 67 such individuals. Of
these 67 individuals, 56 were Hispanic, while only 6 were African-American, and
only 5 were Native American. This discrepancy reflects a consistent practice. For
example, in 2000, 12 Hispanics who scored between a 159.160 on the LSAT and
earned a GPA of 3.00 or higher applied for admission and only 2 were admitted.
Meanwhile, 12 African-Americans in the same range of qualifications applied for
11. RP admission and all 12 were admitted. Likewise, that same year, 16 Hispanics who
scored between a 151.153 on the LSAT and earned a 3.00 or higher applied for
admission and only 1 of those applicants was admitted. Twenty-three similarly
qualified African-Americans applied for admission and 14 were admitted.
These statistics have a significant bearing on petitioner’s case. Respondents have
never offered any race specific arguments explaining why significantly more
11. RP individuals from one underrepresented minority group are needed in order to
achieve critical mass or further student body diversity. They certainly have not
explained why Hispanics, who they have said are among the groups most isolated
by racial barriers in our country, should have their admission capped out in this
manner. Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 50. True, petitioner is neither
Hispanic nor Native American. But the Law School’s disparate admissions
practices with respect to these minority groups demonstrate that its alleged goal of
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critical (6 GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER REHNQUIST, C. J.,) dissenting mass is
simply a sham. Petitioner may use these statistics to expose this sham, which is
4. RD the basis for the Law School’s admission of less qualified underrepresented
minorities in preference to her. Surely strict scrutiny cannot permit these sort of
disparities without at least some explanation.
Only when the critical mass label is discarded does a likely explanation for these
numbers emerge. The Court states that the Law School’s goal of attaining a
critical mass of underrepresented minority students is not an interest in merely
assur(ing) within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group
merely because of its race or ethnic origin. Ante, at 17 (quoting Bakke, 438 U. S.,
at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). The Court recognizes that such an interest would
11. RP amount to outright to racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional. Ante, at
17. The Court concludes, however, that the Law School’s use of race in
admissions, consistent with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, only pays some
attention to numbers. Ante, at 23 (quoting Bakke, supra, at 323). But the
correlation between the percentage of the Law School’s pool of applicants who
are members of the three minority groups and the percentage of the admitted
applicants who are members of these same groups is far too precise to be
dismissed as merely the result of the school paying some attention to the numbers.
11. RP As the tables below show, from 1995 through 2000, the percentage of admitted
applicants who were members of these minority groups closely tracked the
percentage of individuals in the School’s applicant pool who were from the same
groups.
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For example, in 1995, when 9.7% of the applicant pool was African-American,
9.4% of the admitted class was African-American. By 2000, only 7.5% of the
applicant pool was African-American, and 7.3% of the admitted class was
African-American. This correlation is striking. Respondents themselves
emphasize that the number of underrepresented minority students admitted to the
Law School would be significantly smaller if the race of each applicant were not
considered. But, as the examples above illustrate, the measure of the decrease
would differ dramatically among the groups. The tight correlation between the
percentage of applicants and admittees of a given race, therefore, must result from
12 QTA careful race based planning by the Law School. It suggests a formula for
admission based on the aspirational assumption that all applicants are equally
qualified academically, and therefore that the proportion of each group
admitted should be the same as the proportion of that group in the applicant pool.
See Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 43, n. 70 (discussing admissions
officers use of periodic reports to track the racial composition of
the developing class).
12 QTA Not only do respondents fail to explain this phenomenon, they attempt to
4. RD obscure it. See id., at 32, n. 50 (The Law School’s minority enrollment
percentages . . . diverged from the percentages in the applicant pool by as much as
17.7% from 1995-2000). But the divergence between the percentages of
underrepresented minorities in the applicant pool and in the enrolled classes is not
the only relevant comparison. In fact, it may not be the most relevant comparison.
The Law School cannot precisely control which of its admitted applicants decide
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to attend the university. But it can and, as the numbers demonstrate, clearly does
employ racial preferences in extending offers of admission. Indeed, the ostensibly
flexible nature of the Law School’s admissions program that the Court finds
appealing, see ante, at 24.26, appears to be, in practice, a carefully managed
program designed to ensure proportionate representation of applicants from
8. 14th A. selected minority groups. I do not believe that the Constitution gives the Law
School such free rein in the use of race. The Law School has offered no
explanation for its actual admissions practices and, unexplained, we are bound to
conclude that the Law School has managed its admissions program, not to
achieve a critical mass, but to extend offers of admission to members of selected
minority groups in proportion to their statistical representation in the applicant
12. QTA pool. But this is precisely the type of racial balancing that the Court itself calls
patently unconstitutional. Ante, at 17. Finally, I believe that the Law School’s
program fails strict scrutiny because it is devoid of any reasonably precise
time limit on the Law School’s use of race in admissions. We have emphasized
that we will consider the planned duration of the remedy in determining whether a
race-conscious program is constitutional. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 510 (Powell, J.
concurring); see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U. S. 149, 171 (1987).
(In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look
9. FTP to several factors, including the . . . duration of the relief). Our previous cases
have required some limit on the duration of programs such as this because
discrimination on the basis of race is invidious. The Court suggests a possible 25year limitation on the Law School’s current program. See ante, at 30.
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Respondents, on the other hand, remain more ambiguous, explaining
that the Law School of course recognizes that race-conscious programs must have
reasonable durational limits, and the Sixth Circuit properly found such a limit in
the Law School’s resolve to cease considering race when genuine race-neutral
alternatives become available. Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 32. These
discussions of a time limit are the vaguest of assurances. In truth, they permit the
Law School’s use of racial preferences on a seemingly permanent basis. Thus, an
9. FTP important component of strict scrutiny that a program be limited in time is
casually subverted.
The Court, in an unprecedented display of deference under our strict scrutiny
analysis, upholds the Law School’s program despite its obvious flaws. We have
said that when it comes to the use of race, the connection between the ends and
the means used to attain them must be precise. But here the flaw is deeper than
that; it is not merely a question of fit between ends and means. Here the means
8. 14th A. actually used are forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
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Coding Sheet

1. DIV (Creating diversity in universities and in other contexts)
2. DDL (Diverse, democratic leadership – Hutcheson)
3. TR/BDS (Transcending race / breaking-down stereotypes)
4. RD (Reverse Discrimination)
5. EA (Equal Access)
6. CI (Compelling Interest)
7. NT (Narrow Tailoring)
8. 14th A (The Fourteenth Amendment)
9. FTP (Fixed Time Period)
10. CM (Critical Mass)
11. RP (Racial Preferencing)
12. QTA (Quota)
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APPENDIX I
Fieldnotes
Document Analysis
Grutter v. Bollinger
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kennedy
June 23, 2003

(OC: Background: The Grutter case must be considered in concordance
with the Gratz v. Bollinger case, which was argued and decided at the same time as
Grutter. The opinions result in a compromise on the appropriate implementation of
affirmative action policies for student admissions in higher education. What is
critical to note is the difference between the Grutter and the Gratz arguments on the
University of Michigan’s use of

affirmative action criteria in its undergraduate

program admissions (Gratz) versus their Law School’s student admissions policies
(Grutter). The resulting “compromise” from the majority’s opinions upheld the
decision made by the Court in Bakke. The Bakke criteria has been the foundational
criteria established for adherence to a constitutional implementation of affirmative
action policies for higher education as well as for other institutional contexts since
1978.
In Grutter, the opinion written by Justice O’Connor affirms the University
of Michigan’s Law School’s adherence to the Bakke criteria in their use of race in
admitting students to their legal education program. The primary area of
contention that Justice Kennedy will argue in the statement below is over the Law
School’s use of daily reports in their student admissions procedures. The purpose of
the daily reports was to tally the ethnic and gender characteristics of those
applications that had been accepted to organize their admittance process in light
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of their officially stated primary objective, which was to develop a diverse student
population.

The majority of the Court found that these daily reports did not

constitute an official quota system. Instead, the majority found that the
consideration of race as a plus-factor was constitutional because other factors were
considered equally as well. In Gratz, however, the majority found that the
University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions procedure of awarding points
to applicants based upon their minority race status, was too structured and did
clearly represent a precise numeric-type system. Specifically, the undergraduate
policy awarded an automatic 20 point bonus on a 150 point scale, (with 100 points
need to guarantee admission), to underrepresented minority groups, which included
African-Americans, Native Americans, and Hispanics. By contrast, in Grutter, there
was no point system, but rather a tally system to provide information for the
admissions officers to be able to

establish their goal of ensuring a diverse student

population through the development of a critical mass.)
The following statement is a dissenting opinion written by Justice Kennedy:
The separate opinion by Justice Powell in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke is based on
the principle that a university admissions program may take account of race as one,
nonpredominant factor in a system designed to consider each applicant as an individual,
provided the program can meet the test of strict scrutiny by the judiciary. 438 U. S. 265,
289.291, 315.318 (1978). This is a unitary formulation. If strict scrutiny is abandoned or
manipulated to distort its real and accepted meaning, the Court lacks authority to approve
the use of race even in this modest, limited way. The opinion by Justice Powell, in my
view, states the correct rule for resolving this case.
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7. NT The Court, however, does not apply strict scrutiny. By trying to say otherwise, it
undermines both the test and its own controlling precedents. Justice Powell’s approval of
the use of race in university admissions reflected a tradition, grounded
8. 14th A. in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a university’s conception of its
educational mission. Bakke, supra, at 312.314; ante, at16.17. Our precedents provide a
basis for the Court’s acceptance of a university’s considered judgment 1. DIV

that

racial diversity among students can further its educational task, when supported by
empirical evidence. Ante, at 17.19. It is unfortunate, however, that the Court takes the
first rule, but abandons the second. Having approved the use of race as a factor in the
admissions process, the majority proceeds to nullify the essential safeguard Justice
Powell insisted upon as the precondition of the

7. NT approval. The

safeguard was rigorous judicial review, with strict scrutiny as the controlling standard.
Bakke, supra, at 291 (.Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination). This Court has reaffirmed,
subsequent to Bakke, the absolute necessity of strict scrutiny when the state uses race as
an operative category. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 224 (1995).
Any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor
subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,
488

U. S. 469, 493.494 (1989); see id., at 519 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and

11. RP concurring in judgment. Any racial preference must face the most rigorous
scrutiny by the courts.). The Court confuses deference to a university’sdefinition of its
educational objective with deference to the implementation of this goal. In the context of
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university admissions the objective of racial diversity can be accepted based on empirical
data known to us, but deference is not to be given with respect to the methods by which it
is pursued. Preferment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive of
all policies, containing
4. RD within it the potential to destroy confidence in the Constitution and in the idea of
8. 14th A. equality. The majority today refuses to be faithful to the settled principle of
strict review designed to reflect these concerns. The Court, in a review that is nothing
short of perfunctory, accepts the University of Michigan Law School’s assurances that its
admissions process meets with constitutional requirements. The majority fails to confront
the reality of how the Law School’s admissions policy is implemented.
(OC: Although concurring with the Chief Justice in dissenting from the
majority opinion on the case, Kennedy has a different argument on the issue from
Rehnquist. While both Rehnquist and Kennedy contend that the critical mass
argument used by the Law School was a veil for a quota system and question the
legitimacy of racial preferencing in this case, Kennedy reiterates his support for the
Bakke precendent and established criteria for strict scrutiny of the use of race in
student admissions, but denounces the Law School’s implementation of their
student admissions policy.)
The dissenting opinion by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, which I join in full, demonstrates
beyond question why the concept of critical mass is a delusion used
10. CM by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most
12. QTA instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas. An
effort to achieve racial balance among the minorities the school seeks to attract is, by the
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Court’s own admission, patently unconstitutional. Ante, at 17; see also

Bakke, 438 U.

S, at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). It remains to point out how critical mass becomes
inconsistent with individual consideration in some
more specific aspects of the admissions process. About 80 to 85 percent of the places in
the entering class are given to applicants in the upper range of Law School Admissions
Test scores and grades. An applicant with these credentials likely will be admitted
without consideration of race or ethnicity. With respect to the remaining 15 to 20 percent
of the seats, race is likely outcome determinative
for many members of minority groups. That is where the competition become tight and
where any given applicant’s chance of admission is far smaller if he or
8. 14th A. she lacks minority status. At this point the numerical concept of critical mass
10. CM has the real potential to compromise individual review. The Law School has not
demonstrated how individual consideration is, or can be, preserved at this stage of the
application process given the instruction to attain what it calls critical mass. In fact the
evidence shows otherwise.
There was little deviation among admitted minority students during the years from 1995
to 1998. The percentage of enrolled minorities fluctuated only by 0.3%, from 13.5% to
13.8%. The number of minority students to whom offers were extended varied by just a
slightly greater magnitude of 2.2%, from the high of 15.6% in 1995 to the low of 13.4%
in 1998.
12. QTA The District Court relied on this uncontested fact to draw an inference that the
Law School’s pursuit of critical mass mutated into the equivalent of a quota. 137 F. Supp.
2d 821, 851 (ED Mich. 2001). Admittedly, there were greater fluctuations among
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enrolled minorities in the preceding years, 1987.1994, by as much as 5 or 6%. The
percentage of minority offers, however, at no point fell
below 12%, historically defined by the Law School as the bottom of its critical mass
range. The greater variance during the earlier years, in any event, does not 11. RP dispel
suspicion that the school engaged in racial balancing. The data would be consistent with
an inference that the Law School modified its target only twice, in 1991 (from 13% to
19%), and then again in 1995 (back from 20% to 13%).
The intervening year, 1993, when the percentage dropped to 14.5%, could be an
aberration, caused by the school’s miscalculation as to how many applicants with offers
would accept or by its redefinition, made in April 1992, of which minority groups were
entitled to race-based preference.
The narrow fluctuation band raises an inference that the Law School subverted
individual determination, and strict scrutiny requires the Law School to overcome 10.
CM the inference. Whether the objective of critical mass is described as a quota or a
12. QTA goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status, and so risks 4. RD
compromising individual assessment. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 289 (opinion of Powell,
J.). In this respect the Law School program compares unfavorably with the experience of
Little Ivy League colleges. Amicus Amherst College, for example, informs us that the
offers it extended to students of African- American background during the period from
1993 to 2002 ranged between 81 and 125 out of 950 offers total, resulting in a fluctuation
from 24 to 49 matriculated students in a class of about 425. See Brief for Amherst
College et al. as Amici Curiae 10.11. The Law School insisted upon a much smaller
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fluctuation, both in the offers extended and in the students who eventually enrolled,
despite having a comparable class size.
The Law School has the burden of proving, in conformance with the standard of strict scrutiny,
that it did not utilize race in an unconstitutional way. Adarand Constructors, 515 U. S., at 224.
At the very least, the constancy of admitted minority students and the close correlation between
the racial breakdown of admitted minorities and the composition of the applicant pool, discussed
by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, ante, at 3.9, require the Law School either to produce a convincing
explanation or to show it has taken adequate steps to ensure individual assessment. The Law
School does neither. The obvious tension between the pursuit of critical mass and the
requirement of individual review increased by the
end of the admissions season. Most of the decisions where race may decide the
outcome are made during this period. See supra, at 3. The admissions officers
consulted the daily reports which indicated the composition of the incoming
12. QTA class along racial lines.
As Dennis Shields, Director of Admissions from 1991 to 1996, stated, the further he
went into the admissions season the more frequently he would want to look at
reports and see the change from day-to-day. These reports would track

these

exactly where

the Law School stood at any given time in assembling the class,

and so would tell the

admissions personnel whether they were short of assembling

a critical mass of

minority students. Shields generated these reports because the

Law School’s

admissions policy told him the racial make-up of the entering class
he needed to be concerned about, and so he had to find a way of

was something
tracking what’s going

on. The consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the admissions process
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suggests there was no further attempt at individual review save for race itself. The
admissions officers could use the reports to recalibrate the plus factor given to race
depending were on how close they were to 10. CM achieving the Law School’s goal of
critical mass. The
bonus factor of race would then become divorced from individual review; it
12. QTA would be premised instead on the numerical objective set by the Law
School. The Law School made no effort to guard against this danger. It provided
no guidelines to its admissions personnel on how to reconcile individual
assessment with the directive to admit a critical mass of minority students. The
5. EA admissions program could have been structured to eliminate at least some
of the risk that the promise of individual evaluation was not being kept. The daily
consideration of racial breakdown of admitted students is not a feature of
affirmative-action programs used by other institutions of higher learning. The
Little Ivy League colleges, for instance, do not keep ongoing tallies of racial or
ethnic composition of their entering students.
6. CI To be constitutional, a university’s compelling interest in a diverse student
body
1. DIV must be achieved by a system where individual assessment is safeguarded
5. EA the entire process. There is no constitutional objection to the goal of
considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity,
but an educational institution must ensure, through sufficient procedures, that
each applicant receives individual consideration and that race does not become a
predominant factor in the admissions decision making. The Law School failed to
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comply with this requirement, and by no means has it carried its burden
to show otherwise by the test of strict scrutiny. The Court’s refusal to apply
meaningful strict scrutiny will lead to serious consequences. By deferring to the
law school’s choice of minority admissions programs, the courts will lose the
talents and resources of the faculties and administrators in devising new and fairer
ways to ensure individual consideration. Constant and rigorous judicial review
forces the law school faculties to undertake their responsibilities as state
employees in this most sensitive of areas with utmost fidelity to the mandate of
the Constitution. Dean Allan Stillwagon, who directed the Law School’s Office
of Admissions from 1979 to 1990, explained the difficulties he encountered in
defining racial groups entitled to benefit under the School’s affirmative
action policy. He testified that faculty members were breathtakingly cynical in
deciding who would qualify as a member of underrepresented minorities. An
example he offered was faculty debate as to whether Cubans should be
counted as Hispanics: One professor objected on the grounds that Cubans were
Republicans. Many academics at other law schools who are affirmative action’s
1. DIV more forthright defenders readily concede that diversity is merely the
current rationale of convenience for a policy that they prefer to justify on other
grounds.

Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 Yale L.

(OC: Kennedy is charging that diversity in student population is not the
actual intent of affirmative action policies. He and Justice Thomas believe
that the Law School is intentionally favoring the African-American
applicants. Justice Thomas’ primary argument in his dissent is to reiterate
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Frederick Douglass request to “’do nothing with us!’” However, Thomas
must acknowledge that Douglass made this demand before the resistance and
noncompliance to the Gaines v. Canada and Brown v. Board decisions
complicated the efforts to create equal opportunities in secondary and
higher education programs.)
This is not to suggest the faculty at Michigan or other law schools do not pursue
aspirations they consider laudable and consistent with our constitutional traditions. It is
but further evidence of the necessity for scrutiny that is real, not feigned, where the
corrosive category of race is a factor in decision making. Prospective students, the courts,
and the public can demand that the State and its law schools
prove their process is fair and constitutional in every phase of implementation.
It is difficult to assess the Court’s pronouncement that race-conscious admissions
9. FTP programs will be unnecessary 25 years from now. Ante, at 30.31. If it is
intended to mitigate the damage the Court does to the concept of strict scrutiny,
neither petitioners nor other rejected law school applicants will find solace in
knowing the basic protection put in place by Justice Powell will be suspended for
a full quarter of a century. Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not
consistent with it. As to the interpretation that the opinion contains its own selfdestruct mechanism, the majority’s abandonment of strict scrutiny undermines
this objective. Were the courts to apply a searching standard to race-based
admissions schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously explore
race-neutral alternatives. The Court, by contrast, is willing to be satisfied by the
Law School’s profession of its own good faith. The majority admits as much. We
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take the Law School at its word that it would like nothing better than to find a
race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its race-conscious admissions
program as soon as practicable. Ante, at 30 (quoting Brief for Respondent
Bollinger et al. 34). If universities are given the latitude to administer
programs that are tantamount to quotas, they will have few incentives to make the
4. RD existing minority admissions schemes transparent and protective of
individual review. The unhappy consequence will be to perpetuate the hostilities
that proper consideration of race is designed to avoid. The perpetuation, of course,
would be the worst of all outcomes. Other programs do exist which will be more
effective in bringing about the harmony and mutual respect among all citizens that
our constitutional tradition has always sought. They, and not the program under
review here, should be the model, even if the Court defaults by not demanding it.
It is regrettable the Court’s important holding allowing racial minorities to have
their special circumstances considered in order to improve their educational
opportunities is accompanied by a suspension of the strict scrutiny which was the
predicate of allowing race to be considered in the first place. If the Court
abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the use of race in
university admissions, it negates my authority to approve the use of race in pursuit
of student diversity. The Constitution cannot confer the right to classify on the
basis of race even in this special context absent searching judicial review.
For these reasons, though I reiterate my approval of giving appropriate consideration to
race in this one context, I must dissent in the present case.
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Coding Sheet
1. DIV (Creating diversity in universities and in other contexts)
2. DDL (Diverse, democratic leadership – Hutcheson)
3. TR/BDS (Transcending race / breaking-down stereotypes)
4. RD (Reverse Discrimination)
5. EA (Equal Access)
6. CI (Compelling Interest)
7. NT (Narrow Tailoring)
8. 14th A (The Fourteenth Amendment)
9. FTP (Fixed Time Period)
10. CM (Critical Mass)
11. RP (Racial Preferencing)
12. QTA (Quota)
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APPENDIX J
Opinion of Thomas, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 02—241
BARBARA GRUTTER, PETITIONER v. LEE
BOLLINGER et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June 23, 2003]
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins as to Parts I—VII,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Frederick Douglass, speaking to a group of abolitionists almost 140 years
ago, delivered a message lost on today’s majority:
“[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always more that is benevolent, I
perceive, than just, manifested towards us. What I ask for the negro is not
benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The American
people have always been anxious to know what they shall do with us… . I
have had but one answer from the beginning. Do nothing with us! Your
doing with us has already played the mischief with us. Do nothing with us!
If the apples will not remain on the tree of their own strength, if they are
worm-eaten at the core, if they are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them
fall! … And if the negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I
ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! … [Y]our
interference is doing him positive injury.” What the Black Man Wants: An
Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts, on 26 January 1865, reprinted
in 4 The Frederick Douglass Papers 59, 68 (J. Blassingame & J. McKivigan
eds. 1991) (emphasis in original).
Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American
life without the meddling of university administrators. Because I wish to see
all students succeed whatever their color, I share, in some respect, the
sympathies of those who sponsor the type of discrimination advanced by the
University of Michigan Law School (Law School). The Constitution does
not, however, tolerate institutional devotion to the status quo in admissions
policies when such devotion ripens into racial discrimination. Nor does the
Constitution countenance the unprecedented deference the Court gives to the
Law School, an approach inconsistent with the very concept of “strict
scrutiny.”
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No one would argue that a university could set up a lower general
admission standard and then impose heightened requirements only on black
applicants. Similarly, a university may not maintain a high admission
standard and grant exemptions to favored races. The Law School, of its own
choosing, and for its own purposes, maintains an exclusionary admissions
system that it knows produces racially disproportionate results. Racial
discrimination is not a permissible solution to the self-inflicted wounds of
this elitist admissions policy.
The majority upholds the Law School’s racial discrimination not by
interpreting the people’s Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan
of the cognoscenti. Nevertheless, I concur in part in the Court’s opinion.
First, I agree with the Court insofar as its decision, which approves of only
one racial classification, confirms that further use of race in admissions
remains unlawful. Second, I agree with the Court’s holding that racial
discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years. See
ante, at 31 (stating that racial discrimination will no longer be narrowly
tailored, or “necessary to further” a compelling state interest, in 25 years). I
respectfully dissent from the remainder of the Court’s opinion and the
judgment, however, because I believe that the Law School’s current use of
race violates the Equal Protection Clause and that the Constitution means the
same thing today as it will in 300 months.
I
The majority agrees that the Law School’s racial discrimination should be
subjected to strict scrutiny. Ante,
at 14. Before applying that standard to this case, I
will briefly revisit the Court’s treatment of racial
classifications.
The strict scrutiny standard that the Court purports to apply in this case
was first enunciated in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
There the Court held that “[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify
the existence of [racial discrimination]; racial antagonism never can.” Id., at
216. This standard of “pressing public necessity” has more frequently been
termed “compelling governmental interest,”1 see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). A majority
of the Court has validated only two circumstances where “pressing public
necessity” or a “compelling state interest” can possibly justify racial
discrimination by state actors. First, the lesson of Korematsu is that national
security constitutes a “pressing public necessity,” though the government’s
use of race to advance that objective must be narrowly tailored. Second, the
Court has recognized as a compelling state interest a government’s effort to
remedy past discrimination for which it is responsible. Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989).
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The contours of “pressing public necessity” can be further discerned from
those interests the Court has rejected as bases for racial discrimination. For
example, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), found
unconstitutional a collective-bargaining agreement between a school board
and a teachers’ union that favored certain minority races. The school board
defended the policy on the grounds that minority teachers provided “role
models” for minority students and that a racially “diverse” faculty would
improve the education of all students. See Brief for Respondents, O. T. 1984,
No. 84—1340, pp. 27—28; 476 U. S., at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]n
integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body that
could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white faculty”).
Nevertheless, the Court found that the use of race violated the Equal
Protection Clause, deeming both asserted state interests insufficiently
compelling. Id., at 275—276 (plurality opinion); id., at 295 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“None of the interests asserted by the [school
board] … justify this racially discriminatory layoff policy”).2
An even greater governmental interest involves the sensitive role of courts
in child custody determinations. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984),
the Court held that even the best interests of a child did not constitute a
compelling state interest that would allow a state court to award custody to
the father because the mother was in a mixed-race marriage. Id., at 433
(finding the interest “substantial” but holding the custody decision could not
be based on the race of the mother’s new husband).
Finally, the Court has rejected an interest in remedying general societal
discrimination as a justification for race discrimination. See Wygant, supra,
at 276 (plurality opinion); Croson, 488 U.S., at 496—498 (plurality opinion);
id., at 520—521 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). “Societal
discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a
racially classified remedy” because a “court could uphold remedies that are
ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the
future.” Wygant, supra, at 276 (plurality opinion). But see Gratz v. Bollinger,
ante, p. ___ (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Where the Court has accepted only national security, and rejected even the
best interests of a child, as a justification for racial discrimination, I conclude
that only those measures the State must take to provide a bulwark against
anarchy, or to prevent violence, will constitute a “pressing public necessity.”
Cf. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam) (Black, J.,
concurring) (indicating that protecting prisoners from violence might justify
narrowly tailored racial discrimination); Croson, supra, at 521 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“At least where state or local action is at issue,
only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and
limb … can justify [racial discrimination]”).
The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because
those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate
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motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on
racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or
benefits, it demeans us all. “Purchased at the price of immeasurable human
suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our Nation’s understanding
that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the
individual and our society.” Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Peña,, 515 U.S.
200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
II
Unlike the majority, I seek to define with precision the interest being
asserted by the Law School before determining whether that interest is so
compelling as to justify racial discrimination. The Law School maintains
that it wishes to obtain “educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity,” Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 14. This statement must be
evaluated carefully, because it implies that both “diversity” and “educational
benefits” are components of the Law School’s compelling state interest.
Additionally, the Law School’s refusal to entertain certain changes in its
admissions process and status indicates that the compelling state interest it
seeks to validate is actually broader than might appear at first glance.
Undoubtedly there are other ways to “better” the education of law
students aside from ensuring that the student body contains a “critical mass”
of underrepresented minority students. Attaining “diversity,” whatever it
means,3 is the mechanism by which the Law School obtains educational
benefits, not an end of itself. The Law School, however, apparently believes
that only a racially mixed student body can lead to the educational benefits it
seeks. How, then, is the Law School’s interest in these allegedly unique
educational “benefits” not simply the forbidden interest in “racial
balancing,” ante, at 17, that the majority expressly rejects?
A distinction between these two ideas (unique educational benefits based
on racial aesthetics and race for its own sake) is purely sophistic–so much so
that the majority uses them interchangeably. Compare ante, at 16 (“[T]he
Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body”),
with ante, at 21 (referring to the “compelling interest in securing the
educational benefits of a diverse student body” (emphasis added)). The Law
School’s argument, as facile as it is, can only be understood in one way:
Classroom aesthetics yields educational benefits, racially discriminatory
admissions policies are required to achieve the right racial mix, and therefore
the policies are required to achieve the educational benefits. It is the
educational benefits that are the end, or allegedly compelling state interest,
not “diversity.” But see ante,
at 20 (citing the need for “openness and integrity of
the educational institutions that provide [legal] training” without reference to any consequential educational benefits).
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One must also consider the Law School’s refusal to entertain changes to
its current admissions system that might produce the same educational
benefits. The Law School adamantly disclaims any race-neutral alternative
that would reduce “academic selectivity,” which would in turn “require the
Law School to become a very different institution, and to sacrifice a core
part of its educational mission.” Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 33—
36. In other words, the Law School seeks to improve marginally the
education it offers without sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite
status.4
The proffered interest that the majority vindicates today, then, is not
simply “diversity.” Instead the Court upholds the use of racial discrimination
as a tool to advance the Law School’s interest in offering a marginally
superior education while maintaining an elite institution. Unless each
constituent part of this state interest is of pressing public necessity, the Law
School’s use of race is unconstitutional. I find each of them to fall far short
of this standard.
III
A
A close reading of the Court’s opinion reveals that all of its legal work is
done through one conclusory statement: The Law School has a “compelling
interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.” Ante,
at 21. No serious effort is made to explain how these benefits fit with the
state interests the Court has recognized (or rejected) as compelling, see Part I,
supra, or to place any theoretical constraints on an enterprising court’s desire
to discover still more justifications for racial discrimination. In the absence
of any explanation, one might expect the Court to fall back on the judicial
policy of stare decisis. But the Court eschews even this weak defense of its
holding, shunning an analysis of the extent to which Justice Powell’s opinion
in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), is binding, ante,
at 13, in favor of an unfounded wholesale adoption of it.
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke and the Court’s decision today rest on
the fundamentally flawed proposition that racial discrimination can be
contextualized so that a goal, such as classroom aesthetics, can be
compelling in one context but not in another. This “we know it when we see
it” approach to evaluating state interests is not capable of judicial application.
Today, the Court insists on radically expanding the range of permissible uses
of race to something as trivial (by comparison) as the assembling of a law
school class. I can only presume that the majority’s failure to justify its
decision by reference to any principle arises from the absence of any such
principle. See Part VI, infra.
B
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Under the proper standard, there is no pressing public necessity in
maintaining a public law school at all and, it follows, certainly not an elite
law school. Likewise, marginal improvements in legal education do not
qualify as a compelling state interest.
1
While legal education at a public university may be good policy or
otherwise laudable, it is obviously not a pressing public necessity when the
correct legal standard is applied. Additionally, circumstantial evidence as to
whether a state activity is of pressing public necessity can be obtained by
asking whether all States feel compelled to engage in that activity. Evidence
that States, in general, engage in a certain activity by no means demonstrates
that the activity constitutes a pressing public necessity, given the expansive
role of government in today’s society. The fact that some fraction of the
States reject a particular enterprise, however, creates a presumption that the
enterprise itself is not a compelling state interest. In this sense, the absence
of a public, American Bar Association (ABA) accredited, law school in
Alaska, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, see
ABA—LSAC Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools (W. Margolis,
B. Gordon, J. Puskarz, & D. Rosenlieb, eds. 2004) (hereinafter ABA—
LSAC Guide), provides further evidence that Michigan’s maintenance of the
Law School does not constitute a compelling state interest.
2
As the foregoing makes clear, Michigan has no compelling interest in
having a law school at all, much less an elite one. Still, even assuming that a
State may, under appropriate circumstances, demonstrate a cognizable
interest in having an elite law school, Michigan has failed to do so here.
This Court has limited the scope of equal protection review to interests
and activities that occur within that State’s jurisdiction. The Court held in
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), that Missouri could
not satisfy the demands of “separate but equal” by paying for legal training
of blacks at neighboring state law schools, while maintaining a segregated
law school within the State. The equal protection
“obligation is imposed by the Constitution upon the States severally as
governmental entities–each responsible for its own laws establishing the
rights and duties of persons within its borders. It is an obligation the burden
of which cannot be cast by one State upon another, and no State can be
excused from performance by what another State may do or fail to do. That
separate responsibility of each State within its own sphere is of the essence
of statehood maintained under our dual system.” Id., at 350 (emphasis
added).
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The Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by the Court in Gaines, does not
permit States to justify racial discrimination on the basis of what the rest of
the Nation “may do or fail to do.” The only interests that can satisfy the
Equal Protection Clause’s demands are those found within a State’s
jurisdiction.
The only cognizable state interests vindicated by operating a public law
school are, therefore, the education of that State’s citizens and the training of
that State’s lawyers. James Campbell’s address at the opening of the Law
Department at the University of Michigan on October 3, 1859, makes this
clear:
“It not only concerns the State that every one should have all reasonable
facilities for preparing himself for any honest position in life to which he
may aspire, but it also concerns the community that the Law should be taught
and understood… . There is not an office in the State in which serious legal
inquiries may not frequently arise… . In all these matters, public and private
rights are constantly involved and discussed, and ignorance of the Law has
frequently led to results deplorable and alarming… . [I]n the history of this
State, in more than one instance, that ignorance has led to unlawful violence,
and the shedding of innocent blood.” E. Brown, Legal Education at
Michigan 1859—1959, pp. 404—406 (1959) (emphasis added).
The Law School today, however, does precious little training of those
attorneys who will serve the citizens of Michigan. In 2002, graduates of the
University of Michigan Law School made up less than 6% of applicants to
the Michigan bar, Michigan Lawyers Weekly, available at http: //
www.michiganlawyersweekly.com / barpassers0202.cfm,
barpassers0702.cfm (all Internet materials as visited June 13, 2003, and
available in Clerk of Court’s case file), even though the Law School’s
graduates constitute nearly 30% of all law students graduating in Michigan.
Ibid. Less than 16% of the Law School’s graduating class elects to stay in
Michigan after law school. ABA—LSAC Guide 427. Thus, while a mere
27% of the Law School’s 2002 entering class are from Michigan, see
University of Michigan Law School Website, available at
http:// www.law.umich.edu / prospectivestudents /Admissions/index.htm,
only half of these, it appears, will stay in Michigan.
In sum, the Law School trains few Michigan residents and
overwhelmingly serves students, who, as lawyers, leave the State of
Michigan. By contrast, Michigan’s other public law school, Wayne State
University Law School, sends 88% of its graduates on to serve the people of
Michigan. ABA—LSAC Guide 775. It does not take a social scientist to
conclude that it is precisely the Law School’s status as an elite institution
that causes it to be a way- station for the rest of the country’s lawyers, rather
than a training ground for those who will remain in Michigan. The Law
School’s decision to be an elite institution does little to advance the welfare
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of the people of Michigan or any cognizable interest of the State of
Michigan.
Again, the fact that few States choose to maintain elite law schools raises
a strong inference that there is nothing compelling about elite status.
Arguably, only the public law schools of the University of Texas, the
University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall), and the University of
Virginia maintain the same reputation for excellence as the Law School.5
Two of these States, Texas and California, are so large that they could
reasonably be expected to provide elite legal training at a separate law
school to students who will, in fact, stay in the State and provide legal
services to its citizens. And these two schools far outshine the Law School in
producing in-state lawyers. The University of Texas, for example, sends
over three-fourths of its graduates on to work in the State of Texas,
vindicating the State’s interest (compelling or not) in training Texas’ lawyers.
Id., at 691.
3
Finally, even if the Law School’s racial tinkering produces tangible
educational benefits, a marginal improvement in legal education cannot
justify racial discrimination where the Law School has no compelling
interest in either its existence or in its current educational and admissions
policies.
IV
The interest in remaining elite and exclusive that the majority thinks so
obviously critical requires the use of admissions “standards” that, in turn,
create the Law School’s “need” to discriminate on the basis of race. The
Court validates these admissions standards by concluding that alternatives
that would require “a dramatic sacrifice of … the academic quality of all
admitted students,” ante, at 27, need not be considered before racial
discrimination can be employed.6 In the majority’s view, such methods are
not required by the “narrow tailoring” prong of strict scrutiny because that
inquiry demands, in this context, that any race-neutral alternative work
“ ‘about as well.’ ” Ante, at 26—27 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S., at 280, n. 6).
The majority errs, however, because race-neutral alternatives must only be
“workable,” ante, at 27, and do “about as well” in vindicating the compelling
state interest. The Court never explicitly holds that the Law School’s desire
to retain the status quo in “academic selectivity” is itself a compelling state
interest, and, as I have demonstrated, it is not. See Part III—B, supra.
Therefore, the Law School should be forced to choose between its classroom
aesthetic and its exclusionary admissions system–it cannot have it both ways.
With the adoption of different admissions methods, such as accepting all
students who meet minimum qualifications, see Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 13—14, the Law School could achieve its vision of the
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racially aesthetic student body without the use of racial discrimination. The
Law School concedes this, but the Court holds, implicitly and under the
guise of narrow tailoring, that the Law School has a compelling state interest
in doing what it wants to do. I cannot agree. First, under strict scrutiny, the
Law School’s assessment of the benefits of racial discrimination and
devotion to the admissions status quo are not entitled to any sort of
deference, grounded in the First Amendment or anywhere else. Second, even
if its “academic selectivity” must be maintained at all costs along with racial
discrimination, the Court ignores the fact that other top law schools have
succeeded in meeting their aesthetic demands without racial discrimination.
A
The Court bases its unprecedented deference to the Law School–a
deference antithetical to strict scrutiny–on an idea of “educational
autonomy” grounded in the First Amendment. Ante, at 17. In my view, there
is no basis for a right of public universities to do what would otherwise
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The constitutionalization of “academic freedom” began with the
concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957). Sweezy, a Marxist economist, was investigated by the
Attorney General of New Hampshire on suspicion of being a subversive.
The prosecution sought, inter alia, the contents of a lecture Sweezy had
given at the University of New Hampshire. The Court held that the
investigation violated due process. Id., at 254.
Justice Frankfurter went further, however, reasoning that the First
Amendment created a right of academic freedom that prohibited the
investigation. Id., at 256—267 (opinion concurring in result). Much of the
rhetoric in Justice Frankfurter’s opinion was devoted to the personal right of
Sweezy to free speech. See, e.g., id., at 265 (“For a citizen to be made to
forgo even a part of so basic a liberty as his political autonomy, the
subordinating interest of the State must be compelling”). Still, claiming that
the United States Reports “need not be burdened with proof,” Justice
Frankfurter also asserted that a “free society” depends on “free universities”
and “[t]his means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the
intellectual life of a university.” Id., at 262. According to Justice Frankfurter:
“[I]t is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in
which there prevail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university–to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.’ ” Id., at
263 (citation omitted).
In my view, “[i]t is the business” of this Court to explain itself when it
cites provisions of the Constitution to invent new doctrines–including the
idea that the First Amendment authorizes a public university to do what
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would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause. The majority fails in its
summary effort to prove this point. The only source for the Court’s
conclusion that public universities are entitled to deference even within the
confines of strict scrutiny is Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. Justice
Powell, for his part, relied only on Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Sweezy
and the Court’s decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State
of N. Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967), to support his view that the First Amendment
somehow protected a public university’s use of race in admissions. Bakke,
438 U.S., at 312. Keyishian provides no answer to the question whether the
Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions are relaxed when applied to public
universities. In that case, the Court held that state statutes and regulations
designed to prevent the “appointment or retention of ‘subversive’ persons in
state employment,” 385 U.S., at 592, violated the First Amendment for
vagueness. The statutes covered all public employees and were not
invalidated only as applied to university faculty members, although the
Court appeared sympathetic to the notion of academic freedom, calling it a
“special concern of the First Amendment.” Id., at 603. Again, however, the
Court did not relax any independent constitutional restrictions on public
universities.
I doubt that when Justice Frankfurter spoke of governmental intrusions
into the independence of universities, he was thinking of the Constitution’s
ban on racial discrimination. The majority’s broad deference to both the Law
School’s judgment that racial aesthetics leads to educational benefits and its
stubborn refusal to alter the status quo in admissions methods finds no basis
in the Constitution or decisions of this Court.
B
1
The Court’s deference to the Law School’s conclusion that its racial
experimentation leads to educational benefits will, if adhered to, have
serious collateral consequences. The Court relies heavily on social science
evidence to justify its deference. See ante, at 18—20; but see also Rothman,
Lipset, & Nevitte, Racial Diversity Reconsidered, 151 Public Interest 25
(2003) (finding that the racial mix of a student body produced by racial
discrimination of the type practiced by the Law School in fact hinders
students’ perception of academic quality). The Court never acknowledges,
however, the growing evidence that racial (and other sorts) of heterogeneity
actually impairs learning among black students. See, e.g., Flowers &
Pascarella, Cognitive Effects of College Racial Composition on African
American Students After 3 Years of College, 40 J. of College Student
Development 669, 674 (1999) (concluding that black students experience
superior cognitive development at Historically Black Colleges (HBCs) and
that, even among blacks, “a substantial diversity moderates the cognitive
effects of attending an HBC”); Allen, The Color of Success: AfricanAmerican College Student Outcomes at Predominantly White and
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Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities, 62 Harv. Educ. Rev. 26,
35 (1992) (finding that black students attending HBCs report higher
academic achievement than those attending predominantly white colleges).
At oral argument in Gratz v. Bollinger, ante, p. ___, counsel for
respondents stated that “most every single one of [the HBCs] do have
diverse student bodies.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 02—516, p. 52. What
precisely counsel meant by “diverse” is indeterminate, but it is reported that
in 2000 at Morehouse College, one of the most distinguished HBC’s in the
Nation, only 0.1% of the student body was white, and only 0.2% was
Hispanic. College Admissions Data Handbook 2002—2003, p. 613 (43d ed.
2002) (hereinafter College Admissions Data Handbook). And at Mississippi
Valley State University, a public HBC, only 1.1% of the freshman class in
2001 was white. Id., at 603. If there is a “critical mass” of whites at these
institutions, then “critical mass” is indeed a very small proportion.
The majority grants deference to the Law School’s “assessment that
diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits,” ante, at 16. It follows,
therefore, that an HBC’s assessment that racial homogeneity will yield
educational benefits would similarly be given deference.7 An HBC’s
rejection of white applicants in order to maintain racial homogeneity seems
permissible, therefore, under the majority’s view of the Equal Protection
Clause. But see United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 748 (1992) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“Obviously, a State cannot maintain … traditions by closing
particular institutions, historically white or historically black, to particular
racial groups”). Contained within today’s majority opinion is the seed of a
new constitutional justification for a concept I thought long and rightly
rejected–racial segregation.
2
Moreover one would think, in light of the Court’s decision in United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), that before being given license to
use racial discrimination, the Law School would be required to radically
reshape its admissions process, even to the point of sacrificing some
elements of its character. In Virginia, a majority of the Court, without a word
about academic freedom, accepted the all-male Virginia Military Institute’s
(VMI) representation that some changes in its “adversative” method of
education would be required with the admission of women, id., at 540, but
did not defer to VMI’s judgment that these changes would be too great.
Instead, the Court concluded that they were “manageable.” Id., at 551, n. 19.
That case involved sex discrimination, which is subjected to intermediate,
not strict, scrutiny. Id., at 533; Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S 190, 197 (1976). So
in Virginia, where the standard of review dictated that greater flexibility be
granted to VMI’s educational policies than the Law School deserves here,
this Court gave no deference. Apparently where the status quo being
defended is that of the elite establishment–here the Law School–rather than a
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less fashionable Southern military institution, the Court will defer without
serious inquiry and without regard to the applicable legal standard.
C
Virginia is also notable for the fact that the Court relied on the
“experience” of formerly single-sex institutions, such as the service
academies, to conclude that admission of women to VMI would be
“manageable.” 518 U.S., at 544—545. Today, however, the majority ignores
the “experience” of those institutions that have been forced to abandon
explicit racial discrimination in admissions.
The sky has not fallen at Boalt Hall at the University of California,
Berkeley, for example. Prior to Proposition 209’s adoption of Cal. Const.,
Art. 1, §31(a), which bars the State from “grant[ing] preferential
treatment … on the basis of race … in the operation of … public
education,”8 Boalt Hall enrolled 20 blacks and 28 Hispanics in its first-year
class for 1996. In 2002, without deploying express racial discrimination in
admissions, Boalt’s entering class enrolled 14 blacks and 36 Hispanics.9
University of California Law and Medical School Enrollments, available at
http://www.ucop.edu/acadadv/ datamgmt/ lawmed/ law-enrolls-eth2.html.
Total underrepresented minority student enrollment at Boalt Hall now
exceeds 1996 levels. Apparently the Law School cannot be counted on to be
as resourceful. The Court is willfully blind to the very real experience in
California and elsewhere, which raises the inference that institutions with
“reputation[s] for excellence,” ante, at 16, 26, rivaling the Law School’s
have satisfied their sense of mission without resorting to prohibited racial
discrimination.
V
Putting aside the absence of any legal support for the majority’s reflexive
deference, there is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and other
measures to “predict” academic performance is a poor substitute for a
system that gives every applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the
study of law. The rallying cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in
admissions there would be a true meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire
process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to “merit.” For example, in the
national debate on racial discrimination in higher education admissions,
much has been made of the fact that elite institutions utilize a so-called
“legacy” preference to give the children of alumni an advantage in
admissions. This, and other, exceptions to a “true” meritocracy give the lie
to protestations that merit admissions are in fact the order of the day at the
Nation’s universities. The Equal Protection Clause does not, however,
prohibit the use of unseemly legacy preferences or many other kinds of
arbitrary admissions procedures. What the Equal Protection Clause does
prohibit are classifications made on the basis of race. So while legacy
preferences can stand under the Constitution, racial discrimination cannot.10
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I will not twist the Constitution to invalidate legacy preferences or otherwise
impose my vision of higher education admissions on the Nation. The
majority should similarly stay its impulse to validate faddish racial
discrimination the Constitution clearly forbids.
In any event, there is nothing ancient, honorable, or constitutionally
protected about “selective” admissions. The University of Michigan should
be well aware that alternative methods have historically been used for the
admission of students, for it brought to this country the German certificate
system in the late-19th century. See H. Wechsler, The Qualified Student
16—39 (1977) (hereinafter Qualified Student). Under this system, a
secondary school was certified by a university so that any graduate who
completed the course offered by the school was offered admission to the
university. The certification regime supplemented, and later virtually
replaced (at least in the Midwest), the prior regime of rigorous subjectmatter entrance examinations. Id., at 57—58. The facially race-neutral
“percent plans” now used in Texas, California, and Florida, see ante, at 28,
are in many ways the descendents of the certificate system.
Certification was replaced by selective admissions in the beginning of the
20th century, as universities sought to exercise more control over the
composition of their student bodies. Since its inception, selective admissions
has been the vehicle for racial, ethnic, and religious tinkering and
experimentation by university administrators. The initial driving force for
the relocation of the selective function from the high school to the
universities was the same desire to select racial winners and losers that the
Law School exhibits today. Columbia, Harvard, and others infamously
determined that they had “too many” Jews, just as today the Law School
argues it would have “too many” whites if it could not discriminate in its
admissions process. See Qualified Student 155—168 (Columbia); H. Broun
& G. Britt, Christians Only: A Study in Prejudice 53—54 (1931) (Harvard).
Columbia employed intelligence tests precisely because Jewish applicants,
who were predominantly immigrants, scored worse on such tests. Thus,
Columbia could claim (falsely) that “ ‘[w]e have not eliminated boys
because they were Jews and do not propose to do so. We have honestly
attempted to eliminate the lowest grade of applicant [through the use of
intelligence testing] and it turns out that a good many of the low grade men
are New York City Jews.’ ” Letter from Herbert E. Hawkes, dean of
Columbia College, to E. B. Wilson, June 16, 1922 (reprinted in Qualified
Student 160—161). In other words, the tests were adopted with full
knowledge of their disparate impact. Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312, 335 (1974) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Similarly no modern law school can claim ignorance of the poor
performance of blacks, relatively speaking, on the Law School Admissions
Test (LSAT). Nevertheless, law schools continue to use the test and then
attempt to “correct” for black underperformance by using racial
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discrimination in admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic student body. The
Law School’s continued adherence to measures it knows produce racially
skewed results is not entitled to deference by this Court. See Part IV, supra.
The Law School itself admits that the test is imperfect, as it must, given that
it regularly admits students who score at or below 150 (the national median)
on the test. See App. 156—203 (showing that, between 1995 and 2000, the
Law School admitted 37 students–27 of whom were black; 31 of whom were
“underrepresented minorities”–with LSAT scores of 150 or lower). And the
Law School’s amici cannot seem to agree on the fundamental question
whether the test itself is useful. Compare Brief for Law School Admission
Council as Amicus Curiae 12 (“LSAT scores … are an effective predictor of
students’ performance in law school”) with Brief for Harvard Black Law
Students Association et al. as Amici Curiae 27 (“Whether [the LSAT]
measure[s] objective merit … is certainly questionable”).
Having decided to use the LSAT, the Law School must accept the
constitutional burdens that come with this decision. The Law School may
freely continue to employ the LSAT and other allegedly merit-based
standards in whatever fashion it likes. What the Equal Protection Clause
forbids, but the Court today allows, is the use of these standards hand-inhand with racial discrimination. An infinite variety of admissions methods
are available to the Law School. Considering all of the radical thinking that
has historically occurred at this country’s universities, the Law School’s
intractable approach toward admissions is striking.
The Court will not even deign to make the Law School try other methods,
however, preferring instead to grant a 25-year license to violate the
Constitution. And the same Court that had the courage to order the
desegregation of all public schools in the South now fears, on the basis of
platitudes rather than principle, to force the Law School to abandon a
decidedly imperfect admissions regime that provides the basis for racial
discrimination.
VI
The absence of any articulated legal principle supporting the majority’s
principal holding suggests another rationale. I believe what lies beneath the
Court’s decision today are the benighted notions that one can tell when racial
discrimination benefits (rather than hurts) minority groups, see Adarand, 515
U.S., at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and
that racial discrimination is necessary to remedy general societal ills. This
Court’s precedents supposedly settled both issues, but clearly the majority
still cannot commit to the principle that racial classifications are per se
harmful and that almost no amount of benefit in the eye of the beholder can
justify such classifications.
Putting aside what I take to be the Court’s implicit rejection of Adarand’s
holding that beneficial and burdensome racial classifications are equally
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invalid, I must contest the notion that the Law School’s discrimination
benefits those admitted as a result of it. The Court spends considerable time
discussing the impressive display of amicus support for the Law School in
this case from all corners of society. Ante, at 18—19. But nowhere in any of
the filings in this Court is any evidence that the purported “beneficiaries” of
this racial discrimination prove themselves by performing at (or even near)
the same level as those students who receive no preferences. Cf. Thernstrom
& Thernstrom, Reflections on the Shape of the River, 46 UCLA L. Rev.
1583, 1605—1608 (1999) (discussing the failure of defenders of racial
discrimination in admissions to consider the fact that its “beneficiaries” are
underperforming in the classroom).
The silence in this case is deafening to those of us who view higher
education’s purpose as imparting knowledge and skills to students, rather
than a communal, rubber-stamp, credentialing process. The Law School is
not looking for those students who, despite a lower LSAT score or
undergraduate grade point average, will succeed in the study of law. The
Law School seeks only a facade–it is sufficient that the class looks right,
even if it does not perform right.
The Law School tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a
University of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers.
These overmatched students take the bait, only to find that they cannot
succeed in the cauldron of competition. And this mismatch crisis is not
restricted to elite institutions. See T. Sowell, Race and Culture 176—177
(1994) (“Even if most minority students are able to meet the normal
standards at the ‘average’ range of colleges and universities, the systematic
mismatching of minority students begun at the top can mean that such
students are generally overmatched throughout all levels of higher
education”). Indeed, to cover the tracks of the aestheticists, this cruel farce
of racial discrimination must continue–in selection for the Michigan Law
Review, see University of Michigan Law School Student Handbook 2002—
2003, pp. 39—40 (noting the presence of a “diversity plan” for admission to
the review), and in hiring at law firms and for judicial clerkships–until the
“beneficiaries” are no longer tolerated. While these students may graduate
with law degrees, there is no evidence that they have received a qualitatively
better legal education (or become better lawyers) than if they had gone to a
less “elite” law school for which they were better prepared. And the
aestheticists will never address the real problems facing “underrepresented
minorities,”11 instead continuing their social experiments on other people’s
children.
Beyond the harm the Law School’s racial discrimination visits upon its
test subjects, no social science has disproved the notion that this
discrimination “engender[s] attitudes of superiority or, alternatively,
provoke[s] resentment among those who believe that they have been
wronged by the government’s use of race.” Adarand, 515 U.S., at 241
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(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). “These
programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to
develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to
preferences.” Ibid.
It is uncontested that each year, the Law School admits a handful of
blacks who would be admitted in the absence of racial discrimination. See
Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 6. Who can differentiate between
those who belong and those who do not? The majority of blacks are admitted
to the Law School because of discrimination, and because of this policy all
are tarred as undeserving. This problem of stigma does not depend on
determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the “beneficiaries”
of racial discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places of
government, industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether
their skin color played a part in their advancement. The question itself is the
stigma–because either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case the
person may be deemed “otherwise unqualified,” or it did not, in which case
asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed
without discrimination. Is this what the Court means by “visibly open”? Ante,
at 20.
Finally, the Court’s disturbing reference to the importance of the
country’s law schools as training grounds meant to cultivate “a set of leaders
with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry,” ibid., through the use of racial
discrimination deserves discussion. As noted earlier, the Court has soundly
rejected the remedying of societal discrimination as a justification for
governmental use of race. Wygant, 476 U.S., at 276 (plurality opinion);
Croson, 488 U.S., at 497 (plurality opinion); id., at 520—521 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). For those who believe that every racial
disproportionality in our society is caused
by some kind of racial discrimination, there can be no distinction between
remedying societal discrimination and erasing racial disproportionalities in
the country’s leadership caste. And if the lack of proportional racial representation among our leaders is not caused by societal discrimination, then
“fixing” it is even less of a pressing public necessity.
The Court’s civics lesson presents yet another example of judicial
selection of a theory of political representation based on skin color–an
endeavor I have previously rejected. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 899
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). The majority appears to
believe that broader utopian goals justify the Law School’s use of race, but
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers,
not their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be
organized.” DeFunis, 416 U.S., at 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
VII
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As the foregoing makes clear, I believe the Court’s opinion to be, in most
respects, erroneous. I do, however, find two points on which I agree.
A
First, I note that the issue of unconstitutional racial discrimination among
the groups the Law School prefers is not presented in this case, because
petitioner has never argued that the Law School engages in such a practice,
and the Law School maintains that it does not. See Brief for Respondents
Bollinger et al. 32, n. 50, and 6—7, n. 7. I join the Court’s opinion insofar as
it confirms that this type of racial discrimination remains unlawful. Ante, at
13—15. Under today’s decision, it is still the case that racial discrimination
that does not help a university to enroll an unspecified number, or “critical
mass,” of underrepresented minority students is unconstitutional. Thus, the
Law School may not discriminate in admissions between similarly situated
blacks and Hispanics, or between whites and Asians. This is so because
preferring black to Hispanic applicants, for instance, does nothing to further
the interest recognized by the majority today.12 Indeed, the majority
describes such racial balancing as “patently unconstitutional.” Ante, at 17.
Like the Court, ante, at 24, I express no opinion as to whether the Law
School’s current admissions program runs afoul of this prohibition.
B
The Court also holds that racial discrimination in admissions should be
given another 25 years before it is deemed no longer narrowly tailored to the
Law School’s fabricated compelling state interest. Ante, at 30. While I agree
that in 25 years the practices of the Law School will be illegal, they are, for
the reasons I have given, illegal now. The majority does not and cannot rest
its time limitation on any evidence that the gap in credentials between black
and white students is shrinking or will be gone in that timeframe.13 In recent
years there has been virtually no change, for example, in the proportion of
law school applicants with LSAT scores of 165 and higher who are black.14
In 1993 blacks constituted 1.1% of law school applicants in that score range,
though they represented 11.1% of all applicants. Law School Admission
Council, National Statistical Report (1994) (hereinafter LSAC Statistical
Report). In 2000 the comparable numbers were 1.0% and 11.3%. LSAC
Statistical Report (2001). No one can seriously contend, and the Court does
not, that the racial gap in academic credentials will disappear in 25 years.
Nor is the Court’s holding that racial discrimination will be unconstitutional
in 25 years made contingent on the gap closing in that time.15
Indeed, the very existence of racial discrimination of the type practiced by
the Law School may impede the narrowing of the LSAT testing gap. An
applicant’s LSAT score can improve dramatically with preparation, but such
preparation is a cost, and there must be sufficient benefits attached to an
improved score to justify additional study. Whites scoring between 163 and
167 on the LSAT are routinely rejected by the Law School, and thus whites
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aspiring to admission at the Law School have every incentive to improve
their score to levels above that range. See App. 199 (showing that in 2000,
209 out of 422 white applicants were rejected in this scoring range). Blacks,
on the other hand, are nearly guaranteed admission if they score above 155.
Id., at 198 (showing that 63 out of 77 black applicants are accepted with
LSAT scores above 155). As admission prospects approach certainty, there
is no incentive for the black applicant to continue to prepare for the LSAT
once he is reasonably assured of achieving the requisite score. It is far from
certain that the LSAT test-taker’s behavior is responsive to the Law School’s
admissions policies.16 Nevertheless, the possibility remains that this racial
discrimination will help fulfill the bigot’s prophecy about black
underperformance–just as it confirms the conspiracy theorist’s belief that
“institutional racism” is at fault for every racial disparity in our society.
I therefore can understand the imposition of a 25-year time limit only as a
holding that the deference the Court pays to the Law School’s educational
judgments and refusal to change its admissions policies will itself expire. At
that point these policies will clearly have failed to “ ‘eliminat[e] the
[perceived] need for any racial or ethnic’ ” discrimination because the
academic credentials gap will still be there. Ante, at 30 (quoting Nathanson
& Bartnika, The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority
Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 Chicago Bar Rec. 282, 293 (May—
June 1977)). The Court defines this time limit in terms of narrow tailoring,
see ante, at 30, but I believe this arises from its refusal to define rigorously
the broad state interest vindicated today. Cf. Part II, supra. With these
observations, I join the last sentence of Part III of the opinion of the Court.
***
For the immediate future, however, the majority has placed its imprimatur
on a practice that can only weaken the principle of equality embodied in the
Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause. “Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). It has been nearly 140 years since Frederick Douglass asked the
intellectual ancestors of the Law School to “[d]o nothing with us!” and the
Nation adopted the Fourteenth Amendment. Now we must wait another 25
years to see this principle of equality vindicated. I therefore respectfully
dissent from the remainder of the Court’s opinion and the judgment.

Notes
1.
2.

Throughout I will use the two phrases interchangeably.

The Court’s refusal to address Wygant’s rejection of a state interest
virtually indistinguishable from that presented by the Law School is
perplexing. If the Court defers to the Law School’s judgment that a racially
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mixed student body confers educational benefits to all, then why would the
Wygant Court not defer to the school board’s judgment with respect to the
benefits a racially mixed faculty confers?
3.

“[D]iversity,” for all of its devotees, is more a fashionable catchphrase
than it is a useful term, especially when something as serious as racial
discrimination is at issue. Because the Equal Protection Clause renders the
color of one’s skin constitutionally irrelevant to the Law School’s mission, I
refer to the Law School’s interest as an “aesthetic.” That is, the Law School
wants to have a certain appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in
its classrooms to the color of the students sitting at them. I also use the
term “aesthetic” because I believe it underlines the ineffectiveness of racially
discriminatory admissions in actually helping those who are truly
underprivileged. Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (noting that
suspect classifications are especially impermissible when “the choice made
by the State appears to redound … to the benefit of those without need for
special solicitude”). It must be remembered that the Law School’s racial
discrimination does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate
in elite higher education and therefore presents only an illusory solution to
the challenges facing our Nation.
4.

The Law School believes both that the educational benefits of a racially
engineered student body are large and that adjusting its overall admissions
standards to achieve the same racial mix would require it to sacrifice its elite
status. If the Law School is correct that the educational benefits of
“diversity” are so great, then achieving them by altering admissions
standards should not compromise its elite status. The Law School’s
reluctance to do this suggests that the educational benefits it alleges are not
significant or do not exist at all.
5.

Cf. U.S. News & World Report, America’s Best Graduate Schools 28
(2004 ed.) (placing these schools in the uppermost 15 in the Nation).
6.

The Court refers to this component of the Law School’s compelling state
interest variously as “academic quality,” avoiding “sacrifice [of] a vital
component of its educational mission,” and “academic selectivity.” Ante, at
27—28.
7.

For example, North Carolina A&T State University, which is currently
5.4% white, College Admissions Data Handbook 643, could seek to reduce
the representation of whites in order to gain additional educational benefits.
8.

Cal. Const., Art. 1, §31(a), states in full: “The state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”
See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (CA9 1997).
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9.

Given the incredible deference the Law School receives from the Court, I
think it appropriate to indulge in the presumption that Boalt Hall operates
without violating California law.
10.

Were this Court to have the courage to forbid the use of racial
discrimination in admissions, legacy preferences (and similar practices)
might quickly become less popular–a possibility not lost, I am certain, on the
elites (both individual and institutional) supporting the Law School in this
case.
11.

For example, there is no recognition by the Law School in this case that
even with their racial discrimination in place, black men are
“underrepresented” at the Law School. See ABA—LSAC Guide 426
(reporting that the Law School has 46 black women and 28 black men). Why
does the Law School not also discriminate in favor of black men over black
women, given this underrepresentation? The answer is, again, that all the
Law School cares about is its own image among know-it-all elites, not
solving real problems like the crisis of black male underperformance.
12.

That interest depends on enrolling a “critical mass” of underrepresented
minority students, as the majority repeatedly states. Ante, at 3, 5, 7, 17, 20,
21, 23, 28; cf. ante, at 21 (referring to the unique experience of being a
“racial minority,” as opposed to being black, or Native American); ante, at
24 (rejecting argument that the Law School maintains a disguised quota by
referring to the total number of enrolled underrepresented minority students,
not specific races). As it relates to the Law School’s racial discrimination,
the Court clearly approves of only one use of race–the distinction between
underrepresented minority applicants and those of all other races. A relative
preference awarded to a black applicant over, for example, a similarly
situated Native American applicant, does not lead to the enrollment of even
one more underrepresented minority student, but only balances the races
within the “critical mass.”
13.

I agree with Justice Ginsburg that the Court’s holding that racial
discrimination in admissions will be illegal in 25 years is not based upon a
“forecast,” post, at 3 (concurring opinion). I do not agree with Justice
Ginsburg’s characterization of the Court’s holding as an expression of
“hope.” Ibid.
14.

I use a score of 165 as the benchmark here because the Law School feels
it is the relevant score range for applicant consideration (absent race
discrimination). See Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 5; App. to Pet. for
Cert. 309a (showing that the median LSAT score for all accepted applicants
from 1995—1998 was 168); id., at 310a—311a (showing the median LSAT
score for accepted applicants was 167 for the years 1999 and 2000);
University of Michigan Law School Website, available at
http://www.law.umich.edu/prospectivestudents /Admissions / index.htm
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(showing that the median LSAT score for accepted applicants in 2002 was
166).
15.

The majority’s non sequitur observation that since 1978 the number of
blacks that have scored in these upper ranges on the LSAT has grown, ante,
at 30, says nothing about current trends. First, black participation in the
LSAT until the early 1990’s lagged behind black representation in the
general population. For instance, in 1984 only 7.3% of law school applicants
were black, whereas in 2000 11.3% of law school applicants were black. See
LSAC Statistical Reports (1984 and 2000). Today, however, unless blacks
were to begin applying to law school in proportions greater than their
representation in the general population, the growth in absolute numbers of
high scoring blacks should be expected to plateau, and it has. In 1992, 63
black applicants to law school had LSAT scores above 165. In 2000, that
number was 65. See LSAC Statistical Reports (1992 and 2000).
16.

I use the LSAT as an example, but the same incentive structure is in
place for any admissions criteria, including undergraduate grades, on which
minorities are consistently admitted at thresholds significantly lower than
whites.
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APPENDIX K
Opinion of Scalia, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 02—241
BARBARA GRUTTER, PETITIONER v. LEE
BOLLINGER et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June 23, 2003]
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
I join the opinion of The Chief Justice. As he demonstrates, the
University of Michigan Law School’s mystical “critical mass”
justification for its discrimination by race challenges even the most
gullible mind. The admissions statistics show it to be a sham to cover a
scheme of racially proportionate admissions.
I also join Parts I through VII of Justice Thomas’s opinion. I find
particularly unanswerable his central point: that the allegedly
“compelling state interest” at issue here is not the incremental
“educational benefit” that emanates from the fabled “critical mass” of
minority students, but rather Michigan’s interest in maintaining a
“prestige” law school whose normal admissions standards
disproportionately exclude blacks and other minorities. If that is a
compelling state interest, everything is.
I add the following: The “educational benefit” that the University of
Michigan seeks to achieve by racial discrimination consists, according
to the Court, of “ ‘cross-racial understanding,’ ” ante, at 18, and
“ ‘better prepar[ation of] students for an increasingly diverse workforce
and society,’ ” ibid., all of which is necessary not only for work, but
also for good “citizenship,” ante, at 19. This is not, of course, an
“educational benefit” on which students will be graded on their Law
School transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested by
the bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less your cross-racial
understanding). For it is a lesson of life rather than law–essentially the
same lesson taught to (or rather learned by, for it cannot be “taught” in
the usual sense) people three feet shorter and twenty years younger than
the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in
institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school
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kindergartens. If properly considered an “educational benefit” at all, it
is surely not one that is either uniquely relevant to law school or
uniquely “teachable” in a formal educational setting. And therefore: If
it is appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to use
racial discrimination for the purpose of putting together a “critical
mass” that will convey generic lessons in socialization and good
citizenship, surely it is no less appropriate–indeed, particularly
appropriate–for the civil service system of the State of Michigan to do
so. There, also, those exposed to “critical masses” of certain races will
presumably become better Americans, better Michiganders, better civil
servants. And surely private employers cannot be criticized–indeed,
should be praised–if they also “teach” good citizenship to their adult
employees through a patriotic, all-American system of racial
discrimination in hiring. The nonminority individuals who are deprived
of a legal education, a civil service job, or any job at all by reason of
their skin color will surely understand.
Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state
educational institutions are impermissible, or even a clear
anticonstitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational
institutions are OK, today’s Grutter-Gratz split double header seems
perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation. Some
future lawsuits will presumably focus on whether the discriminatory
scheme in question contains enough evaluation of the applicant “as an
individual,” ante, at 24, and sufficiently avoids “separate admissions
tracks” ante, at 22, to fall under Grutter rather than Gratz. Some will
focus on whether a university has gone beyond the bounds of a “ ‘good
faith effort’ ” and has so zealously pursued its “critical mass” as to
make it an unconstitutional de facto quota system, rather than merely
“ ‘a permissible goal.’ ” Ante, at 23 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v.
EEOC, 478 U. S 421, 495 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). Other lawsuits may focus on whether, in the
particular setting at issue, any educational benefits flow from racial
diversity. (That issue was not contested in Grutter; and while the
opinion accords “a degree of deference to a university’s academic
decisions,” ante, at 16, “deference does not imply abandonment or
abdication of judicial review,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340
(2003).) Still other suits may challenge the bona fides of the
institution’s expressed commitment to the educational benefits of
diversity that immunize the discriminatory scheme in Grutter.
(Tempting targets, one would suppose, will be those universities that
talk the talk of multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but
walk the walk of tribalism and racial segregation on their campuses–
through minority-only student organizations, separate minority housing
opportunities, separate minority student centers, even separate
minority-only graduation ceremonies.) And still other suits may claim
that the institution’s racial preferences have gone below or above the
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mystical Grutter-approved “critical mass.” Finally, litigation can be
expected on behalf of minority groups intentionally short changed in
the institution’s composition of its generic minority “critical mass.” I
do not look forward to any of these cases. The Constitution proscribes
government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided
education is no exception.

Notes
*.

Part VII of Justice Thomas’s opinion describes those portions of the
Court’s opinion in which I concur. See post, at 27—31.

